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I.

JURISDICTION

The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. § 78A-3-102. This action comes to the Utah Supreme Court from the summary
judgment granted to Defendants Brown's Crew Car of Wyoming, Inc. d/b/a Armadillo
Express and Union Pacific Railroad Company and the motion to reconsider denied to
Plaintiff John D. Archer, both by the Honorable Judith S.H. Atherton of the Third
Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County.
II.
A.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES

Whether Appellees Armadillo and/or Union Pacific owed a duty to Appellant

Archer to provide transportation equipped with rear seat head restraints (seat head rests).
Standard of Review: The Supreme Court reviews the District Court's grant of
summary judgment for correctness. Davis County Solid Waste Management v. City of
Bountiful, 52 P.3d 1174, 1176 (Utah 2002). In reviewing a grant of summary judgment,
the appellate court gives the trial court's legal decisions no deference, reviewing for
correctness. Kearns-Tribune Corp, v. Salt Lake County Commission, 2001 UT 55, 28
P.3d 686, 688 (Utah 2001).
B.

Whether a rear seat head restraint is a safety device which, like other safety

devices, is needed for a reasonably safe workplace.
Standard of Review: The Supreme Court reviews the District Court's grant of
summary judgment for correctness. Davis County Solid Waste Management v. City of
Bountiful, 52 P.3d 1174, 1176 (Utah 2002). In reviewing a grant of summary judgment,
8

the appellate court gives the trial court's legal decisions no deference, reviewing for
correctness. Kearns-Tribune Corp. v. Salt Lake County Commission, 2001 UT 55, 28
P.3d 686, 688 (Utah 2001).
C.

Whether Appellant's Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA), 45 U.S.C. § 51 e/

seq. claims that Appellees Armadillo and/or Union Pacific should have transported
Appellant in one of the many Armadillo vans already equipped with rear seat head
restraints, is preempted by federal regulations for automobile manufacturers which make
rear seat head restraints optional.
Standard of Review: The Supreme Court reviews the District Court's grant of
summary judgment for correctness. Davis County Solid Waste Management v. City of
Bountiful, 52 P.3d 1174, 1176 (Utah 2002). In reviewing a grant of summary judgment,
the appellate court gives the trial court's legal decisions no deference, reviewing for
correctness. Kearns-Tribune Corp. v. Salt Lake County Commission, 2001 UT 55, 28
P.3d 686, 688 (Utah 2001).
D.

Whether orthopedic and spine surgeons have the medical expertise to render

medical causation opinions regarding the injuries caused by the failure to provide rear
seat head restraints in the vehicle transporting Appellant which was involved in a rear end
collision.
Standard of Review: The Supreme Court reviews the District Court's grant of
summary judgment for correctness. Davis County Solid Waste Management v. City of
Bountifuly52 P.3d 1174, 1176 (Utah 2002). In reviewing a grant of summary judgment,
9

the appellate court gives the trial court's legal decisions no deference, reviewing for
correctness. Kearns-Tribune Corp. v. Salt Lake County Commission, 2001 UT 55, 28
P.3d 686, 688 (Utah 2001).
III.

STATUTES, RULES, AND REGULATIONS

Utah Court Rules
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 56. Summary Judgment.
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or
cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any
time, move for summary judgment as to all or any part thereof.
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion, memoranda and
affidavits shall be in accordance with Rule 7. The judgment sought shall be
rendered if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to
a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in
character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a
genuine issue as to the amount of damages.
Utah Rules of Evidence Rule 702. Testimony of Experts.
(a) Subject to the limitations in subsection (b), if scientific, technical, or
other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the
evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness is qualified as an expert
by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto
in the form of an opinion or otherwise.
Federal Statutes
The Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELAl 45 U.S.C. § 51 et seq.
Every common carrier by railroad while engaging in commerce between any
of the several states . . . shall be liable in damages to any person suffering
injury while he is employed by such carrier in such commerce . . . for such
injury resulting in whole or in part from the negligence of any of the officers,
agents, or employees or such carrier, or by reason of .any defect or
10

insufficiency, due to its negligence, in its cars, engines, appliances, machinery
track, road bed, works, boats, wharfs, or other equipment.
Federal Automobile Manufacturer Regulations
The Motor Vehicle Safety Act (MVSA), 49 U.S.C. § 30101. Purpose and policy.
The purpose of this chapter is to reduce traffic accidents and deaths and
injuries resulting from traffic accidents. Therefore it is necessary (1) to prescribe motor vehicle safety standards for motor vehicles and
motor vehicle equipment in interstate commerce; and
(2) to carry out needed safety research and development.
The Motor Vehicle Safety Act (MVSA), 49 U.S.C. § 30103. Relationship to other laws.
(a) Uniformity of regulations. - The Secretary of Transportation may not
prescribe a safety regulation related to a motor vehicle subject to subchapter
I of chapter 135 of this title that differs from a motor vehicle safety
standard prescribed under this chapter. However, the Secretary may
prescribe, for a motor vehicle operated by a carrier subject to subchapter I
of chapter 135, a safety regulation that imposes a higher standard of
performance after manufacture than that required by an applicable standard
in effect at the time of manufacture.
(b) Preemption. - (1) When a motor vehicle safety standard is in effect
under this chapter, a State or a political subdivision of a State may prescribe
or continue in effect a standard applicable to the same aspect of
performance of a motor vehicle or motor vehicle equipment only if the
standard is identical to the standard prescribed under this chapter.
However, the United States Government, a State, or a political subdivision
of a State may prescribe a standard for a motor vehicle or motor vehicle
equipment obtained for its own use that imposes a higher performance
requirement than that required by the otherwise applicable standard under
this chapter.
(e) Common law liability. - Compliance with a motor vehicle safety
standard prescribed under this chapter does not exempt a person from
liability at common law.

ll

The Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards (FMVSS), 49 C.F.R. § 571.202 Standard
No. 202; Head restraints; Applicable at the manufacturers option until September 1, 2009
51. Purpose and scope. This standard specifies requirements for head
restraints to reduce the frequency and severity of neck injury in rear-end
and other collisions.
52. Application. This standard applies to passenger cars, and to
multipurpose passenger vehicles, trucks and buses with a GVWR of 4,536
kg or less, manufactured before September 1, 2009. Until September 1,
2009, manufacturers may comply with the standard in this § 571.202, with
the European regulations referenced in S4.3 of this § 571.202, or with the
standard in § 571.202a. For vehicles manufactured on or after September 1,
2009 and before September 1, 2010, manufacturers may comply with the
standard in this § 571.202 or with the European regulations referenced in
S4.3 of this § 571.202, instead of the standard in § 571.202a, only to the
extent consistent with the phase-in specified in § 571.202a.
The Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards (FMVSS), 49 C.F.R. $ 571.202a Standard
No. 202a; Head restraints; Mandatory applicability begins on September 1, 2009
51. Purpose and scope. This standard specifies requirements for head
restraints to reduce the frequency and severity of neck injury in rear-end
and other collisions.
52. Application & incorporation by reference.
S2.1 Application. This standard applies to passenger cars, and to
multipurpose passenger vehicles, trucks and buses with a GVWR of 4,536
kg or less, manufactured on or after September 1, 2009. However, the
standard's requirements for rear head restraints do not apply to vehicles
manufactured before September 1, 2010, and, for vehicles manufactured
between September 1, 2010 and August 31, 2011, the requirements for rear
head restraints apply only to the extent provided in S7. Until September 1,
2009, manufacturers may comply with the standard in this § 571.202a, with
the standard in § 571.202, or with the European regulations referenced in
S4.3(a) of § 571.202. For vehicles manufactured on or after September 1,
2009 and before September 1, 2010, manufacturers may comply with the
standard in § 571.202 or with the European regulations referenced in
S4.3(a) of § 571.202, instead of the standard in this § 571.202a, only to the
extent consistent with the phase-in specified in this § 571.202a.
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IV.
A.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case.
Archer commenced this lawsuit against Appellees under the Federal Employers'

Liability Act (FELA), 45 U.S.C. § 51 et seq., for neck and shoulder injuries caused by a
rear-end motor vehicle collision occurring on September 26, 2004, while being
transported by Armadillo in the course of his employment with UP.
B.

Course of Proceedings.
UP and Armadillo filed a motion for summary judgment on April 3, 2008. Archer

filed a motion for reconsideration on October 3, 2008.
C.

Disposition in the Court Below.
On December 11, 2008, the Honorable Judith S.H. Atherton of the Third District

Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah, granted Defendants' Motion for Summary
Judgment and denied Plaintiffs Motion to Reconsider.
D.

Statement of Relevant Facts.

The Motor Vehicle Collision
1.

On September 26, 2004, Archer, in the course and scope of his employment

with UP, was being transported in a Chevrolet van owned and operated by Brown's Crew
Car of Wyoming, Inc. (Armadillo), without the protection of a rear seat head restraint. R.
589.
2.

On September 26, 2004, April Gaultney rear ended the Armadillo van in

which Archer was a passenger. R. 589 and 615-616.
13

3.

On June 8, 2006, Archer commenced this lawsuit against UP under the

Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA), 45 U.S.C. § 51 et seq.9 and negligence claims
against Armadillo and April Gaultney, for neck and shoulder injuries caused by the rearend motor vehicle collision occurring on September 26, 2004. R. 2-12.
The UP/Armadillo Contract
4.

Effective at the time of the September 26, 2004 incident, Union Pacific

Railroad Company (UP) contracted with Armadillo to provide on-the-job transportation
for Archer and other train crew members. R. 203-235.
5.

The contract gave UP the right to specify the safety equipment on

Armadillo's vehicles. R. 230.

UP required the following transportation and safety

equipment in Armadillo's vans, prior to the September 26, 2004 incident:
WHEREAS, Company wishes to perform transportation services for Union
Pacific Railroad Company and affiliated companies, hereinafter referred to
as Railroad...
Section 18. VEHICLE CONDITION, EQUIPMENT AND SAFETY
ITEMS
Vehicles used to transport Railroad employees must be capable of
transporting seven (7) passengers and their luggage in an efficient and
comfortable manner. Vehicles will be required to have a cage or netting
between the rear seat and the back doors to provide luggage storage space
during transit. All vehicles used in these services must be no more than
three years old, in good mechanical condition and must be equipped with
the following equipment:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)

Air conditioner
Heater
Operable safety belts for all passengers
Properly equipped First Aid Kit
Operable and inspected 2.51b. (ABC) fire extinguisher
14

(f)
(g)
(h)
(i)
(j)
(k)

Road flares
Spare tire
Jack and tools
Reflective striping
All mechanical items on the vehicle in good working order,
with special attention paid to tires, brakes, and lights
Back up alarm devices, whether mechanical or electrical,
where not specifically prohibited by law.

R. 226 and 230.
6.

UP's list of safety equipment for Armadillo vehicles did not include seat

head restraints. R. 230.
Reasonably Safe Workplace
7.

UP admits that it is responsible to provide a reasonably safe workplace and

that at the time of Archer's injuries on September 26, 2004, the Armadillo van was
Archer's workplace. R. 892.
8.

UP admits that it is responsible for identifying and reducing reasonably

foreseeable hazards in the workplace. R. 893.
9.

UP admits that rear-end collisions are reasonably foreseeable hazards in the

workplace, that it knew before Archer's injury on September 26, 2004, that seat head
restraints were important safety devices that reduce the risk of neck injuries in rear end
collisions, and that it was safer to have vehicles with rear seat head restraints. Id.
10.

UP admits that before Archer's September 26, 2004 collision and injuries,

it could have required Armadillo to use vehicles with rear seat head restraints. Id.

15

11.

Armadillo admits that had it known before Archer's September 26, 2004

injury that seat head restraints reduced the risk of neck injuries then it should have used
vehicles with rear seat head restraints for transporting UP passengers. Id.
Armadillo Had Vehicles With Rear Seat Head Restraints
12.

Armadillo admits that before Archer's September 26, 2004 injury,

Armadillo had transported UP crew members in vehicles with rear seat head restraints.
Id.
13.

Armadillo admits that the center seats of its vehicles did not have head

restraints and some railroad location passengers were restricted from using the center
seats. R. 894.
14.

Before Archer's September 26, 2004 injury, one third of Armadillo's 200

vehicle fleet had rear seat head restraints. Id.
15.

Armadillo's fleet had Chevy Suburban vehicles with the capacity to

transport up to five passengers with seat head restraints. Id.
Armadillo is an Agent of UP
16.

Armadillo admits it is a common carrier. Id.

17.

On June 6, 2007, the district court ruled that for purposes of this case,

Armadillo was an agent of UP on September 26, 2004, with respect to Archer's injuries.
R. 346-348; R. 894; andR. 1273-1274.
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18.

On June 6, 2007, the district court ruled that Armadillo was performing an

operational activity of UP in transporting Archer on September 26, 2004. R. 346-348; R.
894 and R. 1273-1274.
NHSTA Reports
19.

The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHSTA) reported

that there are approximately 272,464 whip lash injuries annually, of which 21,429
involve rear outboard seated passengers. R. 894.
20.

The NHSTA reported that "[f|ewer rear seat occupants are exposed to risk

in rear impacts because rear seats are much less likely to be occupied than front seats."
Id.
UP's Safety Rules
21.

UP extensively publishes safety rules governing its employees, such as

Archer, in detailed fashion, and UP could have promulgated a safety rule requiring its
employees to adjust and use seat head restraints when transported in vans. R. 896.
22.

UP could require its employees to properly adjust the rear seat head

restraints by safety rule and contract, and require the driver to supervise this adjustment.
R. 894.
23.

In 1990, UP's safety committee reported that numerous accidents and

injuries were associated with transporting its crews. R. 895.
24.

Prior to the September 26, 2004 incident, UP prevented crew haulers from

backing up vans when UP employees were in the vehicle. Id.
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25.

Armadillo stated that if UP gave Armadillo enough le'ad time, it could have

used vehicles with head restraints for the outboard passengers. Id.
Archer Did Not Have a Seat Head Restraint
26.

On September 26, 2004, the Armadillo van was full of passengers, and

Archer could not sit in a seat with a head restraint while being transported in the course
and scope of his employment with UP. R. 895.
27.

If the Armadillo van transporting Archer at the time of his injury had had a

seat head restraint for him to use, he would have leaned back in the seat and looked
forward, with his arms down. Id.
28.

Before the September 26, 2004 collision, it was Archer's custom to adjust

seat head restraints and he would have followed any safety rule promulgated by UP
requiring such adjustments. R. 896.
Archer's Injury
29.

Archer's mechanism of injury was hyper-extension of a neck with stenosis,

causing bruising of the spinal cord, resulting in a hollow spot inside the cord. Id.
30.

According to the NHSTA Report, Archer's biomechanical expert, Paul

France, PhD., and UP, before

Archer's September 26, 2004 injury, it was common

knowledge that seat head restraints prevent or reduce neck injuries from rear end
collisions. Id.
31.

According to Kade Huntsman, M.D., Archer's treating physician and

orthopedic surgeon specializing in spine surgery, if a seat head restraint had been
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provided to Archer on September 26, 2004, it is unlikely that Archer would have suffered
significant injuries because the head restraint would have prevented hyper-extension of
the neck, which with stenosis, caused the spinal cord injury. Id.
32.

According to Dr. France, in rear-end collision accidents of the magnitude of

the September 26, 2004 Armadillo van collision (the collision accelerated the van an
additional 6 or 7 M.P.H.), with seat head restraints for rear seated passengers, it is
unlikely that a spinal cord injury would occur to the general population of passengers. R.
896-897.
33.

According to Dr. Huntsman and Dr. France, the Spine articles Traumatic

Myopathy in Patients With Cervical Spinal Stenosis Without Fracture or Dislocation and
A Review of the Pathophysiology of Cervical Spondylotic Myelopathy With Insights for
Potential Novel Mechanisms Drawn From Traumatic Spinal Cord Injury - attached to Dr.
France's Report, express the mechanism of Archer's injury. R. 897, R. 1201-1202 and R.
1349-1380.
34.

According to Dr. France, there is no difference in risk of neck injury,

everything else being equal, to a rear seated adult passenger compared to a front seated
adult passenger. R. 897.
35.

According to Dr. France, the purpose of the Federal Motor Vehicle Safety

Standards (FMVSS), with respect to seat head restraints, is not frustrated by installation
of optional rear seat head restraints, because the purpose of the FMVSS is to reduce the
number and severity of neck injuries, which is achieved with rear seat head restraints. Id.
19

36.

Some of the Armadillo vehicles came from the manufacturer with rear seat

head restraints. Id.
Medical Causation
37.

Dr. Huntsman, Archer's treating physician and orthopedic surgeon

specializing in spine surgery, stated the following:
That based upon my education and training as a physician, my physical
examinations of Archer, my review of the radiological films, including Xray and MRI, and the surgery I performed upon Archer on December 15,
2004,1 make and hold the following opinions with a reasonable degree of
medical probability:
a. That the September 26, 2004 rear-end collision involving Mr.
Archer as a passenger in a vehicle without a seat head restraint
was one of the probable medical causes of the injuries I
diagnosed and treated, including contusion to his spinal cord,
radicular pain radiating from his neck into his right shoulder
along the C5 nerve root distribution, right arm weakness, and
changes in spinal reflexes;
b. It is medically probable that Mr. Archer would not have suffered
these injuries from the rear end collision if he had a seat head
restraint at the time of the collision; and
c. It is pure speculation that Mr. Archer would have suffered these
injuries even if he had a seat head restraint at the time of the
subject rear end collision.
R. 1492 and 1539-1540.
38.

Dr. Huntsman testified that the accident caused a contusion to Archer's

spinal cord, resulting in a permanent, hollow spot inside the cord. R. 1492.
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39.

Dr.

Huntsman

further

testified

that

head

restraints

"prevent

flexion/extension-type injury by avoiding excessive extension" and that the "neck doesn't
excessively extend because there is something there to protect it. Id.
40.

Dr. Huntsman stated that the "fact that [Archer] was then involved in this

motor vehicle accident in which his head and neck were not restrained did likely cause
the myelopathy and likely caused the subsequent need for surgical intervention." Id.
41.

Biomedical expert, Dr. France, stated that a head restraint "would have

likely reduced Mr. Archer's maximum posterior neck motion to be within a range of 1520 degrees extension of the neck." R. 1493 and 1548.
42.

Dr. France quoted Spine article, Traumatic Myelopathy In Patients With

Cervical Spinal Stenosis Without Fracture Or Dislocation, stating that, "[pjatients with
cervical spinal stenosis are uniquely vulnerable to hyper-extension injuries of the cervical
spine." R. 1493.
43.

Dr. Huntsman stated that, "[t]he 1980 article from Spine regarding

traumatic myelopathy in patients with cervical spinal stenosis without fracture and
dislocation as well as the 1998 Spine article which reviewed the pathophysiology of
cervical spondylotic myelopathy are accurate and I am in complete agreement with [sic]."
Id.
44.

Dr. Huntsman testified that the Spine article was significant to the

mechanism of injury in this case. Id.
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45.

The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration .(NHTSA), found that

seat head restraints help prevent hyperextension. Id.
46.

Dr France stated that, "[a] properly designed and positioned seat head

restraint prevents hyper-extension of the cervical spine when used as intended, and would
have likely prevent Mr. Archer's neck from hyper-extending, if used in such a manner.
Preventing hyper-extension significantly reduces the frequency and severity of cervical,
upper thoracic, and upper shoulder injuries in the general population." Id.
47.

When asked if it was his opinion that the head restraint, or the lack of head

restraint in this particular instance, was a causative factor with the shoulder injury, Dr.
Dennis H. Gordon, M.D., Archer's treating physician and orthopedic surgeon, testified,
"Yes. I think it contributed to it, yes." R. 1493-1494.
V.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Archer's neck and shoulder injuries, the subject of this FELA personal injury law
suit, were caused by a rear end motor vehicle collision occurring on September 26, 2004.
Archer was a passenger in a Chevrolet Van owned and operated by Armadillo. UP
through its agent Armadillo was transporting UP employee Archer, in the course and
scope of his employment with UP. On September 26, 2004, UP and Armadillo failed to
provide Archer with transportation equipped with a rear seat head restraint and Archer
suffered bruising and injury to his spinal cord and a rotator cuff and labrum tear in the
right shoulder.
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The district court's order granting Appellees' motion for summary judgment
should be reversed and Appellees' motion denied for the following reasons:
One, FELA imposes, and UP admits that it was responsible for identifying
reasonably foreseeable hazards in the work place and for minimizing or eliminating these
hazards. UP admits and the district court previously ruled that the subject van was
Archer's work place at the time of his injuries. UP admits that rear end collision caused
neck injuries are reasonably foreseeable work place hazards.

UP admits that head

restraints are important safety devices protecting against rear end collision caused neck
injuries.
Two, UP could have simply added rear seat head restraints as a mandatory safety
feature in its agreement with Armadillo. Prior to the September 26, 2004 incident, UP
had contracted with Armadillo to provide on the job transportation for UP employees.
Armadillo had transported UP employees in rear seats with head restraints before
Archer's injury and one third of Armadillo's 200 vehicle fleet were equipped with rear
seat head restraints. UP admits it had the power and the right to require Armadillo to
transport Archer in a vehicle equipped with head restraints. UP already had an existing
list of required safety equipment for Armadillo vans, in its agreement with Armadillo.
UP could have simply added rear seat head restraints to this list. UP negligently failed to
exercise this power and right and did not require head restraints to prevent neck injuries,
which UP admits was a reasonably foreseeable work place hazard to Archer. There are
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genuine issues of material fact as to UP's negligence under FELA and Armadillo's
negligence under the heightened standard of care as a common carrier.
Three, there is no conflict preemption between MVSA, FMVSS, and FELA,
preventing the transportation of Archer in Armadillo's vehicles with rear seat head
restraints. The doctrine of conflict preemption applies when there is an actual conflict
between state and federal law. Here, there is no state law to preempt and there is no
actual conflict. MVSA and FMVSS govern manufacturers only, and MVSA specifically
negates the preemption of state law claims. The purpose of MVSA, FMVSS and FELA,
is to promote safety. There can be no irreconcilable conflict between these laws and
Archer's FELA claims: 1) that Appellees should have used the vehicles they already had
with rear seat head restraints to transport Archer; and 2) that by contract, UP should have
required its employees be transported by vehicles with rear seat head restraints.
Four, Archer's orthopedic and spine surgeons have the medical expertise to render
medical causation opinions regarding the injuries caused by the failure to provide rear
seat head restraints. Dr. Huntsman, Archer's treating physician and orthopedic surgeon,
stated that to a reasonable degree of medical probability, the September 26, 2004 rear end
collision involving Archer as a passenger in a vehicle without a seat head restraint was
one of the probable medical causes of the injuries, and that it is medically probable that
Archer would not have suffered these injuries from the rear end collision if he had a seat
head restraint at the time of the collision. Dr. Gordon, Archer's treating physician and
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orthopedic surgeon, testified that the lack of a head restraint was a causative factor with
Archer's shoulder injury.
Five, FELA is a remedial statute and a jury trial is a significant part of the federal
remedy protecting rail road workers. A district court is justified in withdrawing a FELA
case from the jury's consideration only in those extremely rare instances when there is a
zero probability either of employer negligence or that any such negligence contributed to
the injury of the employee.

Archer has shown substantial evidence - far more than is

required for a jury trial. The district court's ruling should be reversed and Appellee's
motion for summary judgment denied accordingly.
VI.
A.

ARGUMENT

Federal Law Controls.
All questions of law under FELA are governed by federal decisions.

Urie v.

Thompson, 337 U.S. 163, 174 (1949); New York Central R. Co. v. Winfield, 244 U.S.
147, 150 (1917). "What constitutes negligence for the statute's purposes is a federal
question, not varying in accordance with the differing conceptions of negligence
applicable under state and local laws for other purposes. Federal decisional law
formulating and applying the concept governs." Urie, 337 U.S. at 174. Decisions of
state courts construing the Act are not controlling but may be deemed persuasive. Young
v. New York Cent. R. Co., 88 N.E.2d 220 (1949).
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B.

Summary Judgment is Particularly Inappropriate in this FELA Case.
In reviewing a district court's grant of summary judgment, the appellate court

gives the trial court's legal decisions no deference, reviewing for correctness. KearnsTribune Corp. v. Salt Lake County Commission, 2001 UT 55, 28 P.3d 686, 688 (Utah
2001). (Emphasis added).

The appellate court views the facts and all reasonable

inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Utah
R.Civ.P. 56; Wayment v. Clear Channel Broadcasting, Inc., 116 P.3d 271, 275 (Utah
2005). Summary judgment is a "drastic remedy" in Utah. Timm v. Dewsnup, 851 P.2d
1178, 1181 (Utah 1993). Where there is any evidence that raises a question of material
fact, no matter how improbable the evidence may appear, judgment as a matter of law is
improper.

Kleinert v. Kimball Elevator Co., 905 P.2d 297, 300 (Utah App. 1995).

(Emphasis added). As stated by the Utah Supreme Court:
We are cognizant of the desirability of permitting liligants to fully present
their case to the court and that a summary judgment prevents this. For that
reason courts are, and should be, reluctant to invoke this remedy.
Brandt v. Springville Banking Co., 10 Utah 2d 350, 354, 353 P.2d 460, 462 (Utah 1960).
(Emphasis added). Accordingly, a party seeking summary judgment under Utah R.Civ.P.
56 bears a substantial burden in demonstrating its propriety.
Summary judgment is particularly inappropriate in this FELA case. FELA is a
broad remedial statute and is to be liberally construed to further Congress1 remedial goal.
Urie, at 180. It is well established that the role of the jury is significantly greater in
FELA cases than in common law negligence actions. Eggert v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co.,
26

538 F.2d 509, 511 (2nd Cir. 1976). "[T]o deprive railroad workers of the benefit of a jury
trial in close or doubtful cases is to take away a goodly portion of the relief, which
Congress has afforded them." Blair v. Baltimore & O.R. Co., 323 U.S. 600, 601 (1945).1
Federal law controls the kind and amount of evidence necessary to take a case to the
jury.
By the Federal Employers' Liability Act, Congress took possession of the
field of employers' liability by employees in interstate transportation by
rail, and all state laws upon that subject were superseded.... The kind or
amount of evidence required to establish it is not subject to the control
of the several states.
Chicago M. & St. PaulRy. Co. v. Coogan, 271 U.S. 472, 474 (1926)(Emphasis added).
The standard for receiving a jury trial is less stringent in FELA cases than in
common law tort cases.
Although Federal Courts have generally rejected the "scintilla rule" that
any evidence supporting a tort claim raises a jury question, courts have
applied a rule very much like the "scintilla rule" to FELA cases. In
FELA cases, "it is only necessary that the jury conclusion be one which
is not outside the possibility of reason on the facts and circumstances
shown." Mendoza v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 733 F.2d 631, 633 (91
Cir. 1984) (citing Rogers v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 352 U.S. 500.... (other
1

See, also, Bailey v. Central Vermont. Ry.y 319 U.S. 350, 354 (1943) (the right to a jury
trial "is part and parcel of the remedy afforded to railroad workers" under the FELA.);
Finley v. National R. Passenger Corp.,1991 WL 59322 at *2 (E.D. Pa. 1997) ("in a
FELA case, the non-moving party can defeat a motion for summary judgment by
presenting only a minimum amount of evidence in opposition to the motion."); Baltimore
and O. R. Co. v. Taylor, 589 N.E.2d 267, 271 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992) ("in FELA negligence
actions, the role of the jury (fact finder) is much greater than in common-law negligence
actions; the right of the fact finder to pass upon the question of the employer's liability
must be most liberally viewed."); Seeberger v. Burlington Northern R. Co., 982 P.2d
1149, 1152 (Wash. 1999) ("in determining whether the worker's negligence case survives
a motion for summary judgment, a significantly reduced evidentiary standard applies in
FELA cases.").
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citations omitted). "By enacting FELA, Congress wanted to 'secure jury
determinations in a larger proportion of cases than would be true of
ordinary common law actions.' Jury trials were supposed to be part of
the FELA remedy." Mendoza, 733 F.2d at 633 (citations omitted). This
relaxed standard applies to both negligence and causation determinations.
Pierce v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 823 F.2d 1366, 1370 (9th Cir. 1987)
("A reviewing court must uphold a verdict even if it finds only 'slight' or
'minimal' facts to support a jury's finding of negligence"); Oglesby v.
Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 6 F.3d 603, 607 (9th Cir. 1993). (" 'Under [the
FELA] the test of the jury case is simply whether the proof justifies with
reason the conclusion that employer negligence played any part, even the
slightest, in producing injury.' ") (quoting Rogers, 352 U.S. at 506...)
(alteration in original).
Mullahon v. Union Pacific Railroad, 64 F.3d 1358, 1363-64 (9th Cir. 1995)(Emphasis
added). "The minimal FELA standard for raising a jury question" merely requires a
showing of negligence that is "not outside the possibility of reason ...." Id. at 1364.
As described by other courts "[t]he Supreme Court standard is that a district court
is justified in withdrawing such issues from the jury's consideration 'only in those
extremely rare instances when there is a zero probability either of employer negligence
or that any such negligence contributed to the injury of an employee.'" Eckert v.
Aliquippa & Southern R.R. Co., 828 F.2d 183, 187 (3rd Circ. 1987) (quoting Pehowic v.
Erie Lackawanna R. Co., 430 F.2d 697, 699 (3 rd Cir. 1970)). (Emphasis added). The
instant case is not one of those extremely rare instances. The district court's ruling
should be reversed and Appellee's motion for summary judgment denied accordingly.
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C.

Appellees Owed a Duty to Archer to Provide Transportation Equipped With
a Rear Seat Head Restraint

1.

Appellees had a non-delegable and continuing duty to provide Archer with a
reasonably safe workplace.
This is a FELA case brought under authority of Title 45 §§ 51-60, of the United

States Code. In pertinent part it provides:
Every common carrier by railroad while engaging in commerce between any
of the several states . . . shall be liable in damages to any person suffering
injury while he is employed by such carrier in such commerce . . . for such
injury resulting in whole or in part from the negligence of any of the
officers, agents, or employees or such carrier, or by reason of any defect or
insufficiency, due to its negligence, in its cars, engines, appliances, machinery
. . . or other equipment.
45 U.S.C. § 51. (Emphasis added).
FELA creates a relaxed standard for negligence. Williams v. Long Island R.R.
Co., 196 F.3d 402, 406 (2nd Cir. 1999).

Under FELA, an employer has a non-

delegable and continuing duty to provide its employees with a reasonably safe
workplace. Peyton v. St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co., 962 F.2d 832, 833 (8th Cir. 1992);
Ragsdell v. Southern Pacific Transportation Co., 688 F.2d 1282, 1283 (9th Cir. 1982).
(Emphasis added). "Because of a 'myriad of factors' involved, whether the railroad used
reasonable care in furnishing its employees a safe place to work is normally a question
for the jury." Gallose v. Long Island R. Co., 878 F.2d 80, 85 (2nd Cir. 1989), citing
7togwfe//,688F.2datl283.
In Leek v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co., 200 F. Supp. 368, 370-71 (D.C.N.D.
Va. 1962), railroad employees were passengers in a Yellow Cab Taxi which overturned
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in a one car accident. Id. at 369. The Court held that the transportation was an integral
part of the railroad's job subjecting employees to an inherent risk of injury. Id. at 370-71.
The Court found that "[w]hile the necessity of transporting workers is not unique to
railroading, it is one of the characteristics of the business. It would seem to be consonant
with the spirit of the FELA that the employer should bear the risk of negligent injury
to the employee while exposed to this risk." Id. at 371. (Emphasis added).
In the instant case, UP admits that it is responsible to provide a reasonably safe
workplace and that at the time of Archer's injuries on September 26, 2004, the Armadillo
van was Archer's workplace. R. 892. Like Leek, Archer was being transported on
September 26, 2004 and it was UP's duty to bear the risk of negligent injury to Archer
while he was exposed to that risk. This is the previous trial court ruling in this case. R.
346-348; R. 894; and R. 1273-1274. As held in Gallose and Ragsdell, whether UP used
reasonable care in furnishing Archer a safe place to work is a question for the jury. The
district court's ruling should be reversed and Appellee's motion for summary judgment
denied accordingly.
2.

Appellees breached their duty to provide a reasonably safe workplace (van)
by not providing Archer with transportation equipped with a rear seat head
restraint.
"An employer breaches its duty to provide a safe workplace when it knows or

should know of a potential hazard in the workplace, yet fails to exercise reasonable care
to inform and protect its employees." Gallose v. Long Island R. Co., 878 F.2d 80, 84-85
(2nd Cir. 1989). The railroad has a duty of reasonable care to make inspections, to
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discover, and to protect is employees from any hazards in the work place. Cazad v,
Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 622 F.2d 72, 75 (4th Cir. 1980); Williams v. Atlantic Coast
Line R. Co., 190 F.2d 744, 748 (5th Cir. 1951).
UP's duty to provide head restraints is clearly established in Wier v. Soo Line RR
Co., 1998 WL 474098 (N.D. 111.).2 In Wier, the Court held that the railroad could have
insisted that its employees be transported in vans with rear seat head restraints simply by
listing headrests as a mandatory safety feature in its agreement with the van company.
Wier at 4. The Court further held that whether the railroad should have taken such steps
is a material issue of fact in this case sufficient to defeat the railroad's motion for
summary judgment. In Wier, the railroad contracted through Mile Post, a minivan owner,
to provide transportation for employees, including the plaintiff engineer. Wier, &\2. A
minivan without headrests was used to transport the railroad employees. Id. A FELA
action was brought for neck injuries. Id. at 2-3. The railroad brought a motion for
summary judgment contending that there could be no FELA liability for the absence of a
headrest in the minivan. The Court recognizing that transporting railroad employees is a
railroad operational activity held:
[T]he record suggests that a prudent employer might have taken steps to
ensure that its employees were transported in minivans equipped with
rearseat headrests. Soo Line could have insisted that Mile Post provide
such a guarantee, simply by listing headrests as a mandatory safety
feature in its agreement with Mile Post .... Whether Soo Line should
have taken such steps remains a material issue of fact in this case
sufficient to defeat Soo Line's motion for summary judgment.
2

Wier v. Soo Line RR Co., 1998 WL 474098 (N.D. 111.) is attached for the Court's
convenience.
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Id. at 4. (Emphasis added).
The same is true in this case. UP should have taken steps to ensure that Archer
was transported in vans equipped with rear seat head restraints. Like Wier, UP could
have simply listed rear seat headrests as a mandatory safety feature in its agreement with
Armadillo. In fact, UP required the following transportation and safety equipment in
Armadillo vans, prior to the September 26, 2004 incident:
Section 18. VEHICLE CONDITION, EQUIPMENT AND SAFETY
ITEMS
All vehicles used in these services must be no more than three years old, in
good mechanical condition and must be equipped with the following
equipment:
(1)
(m)
(n)
(o)
(p)
(q)
(r)
(s)
(t)
(u)
(v)

Air conditioner
Heater
Operable safety belts for all passengers
Properly equipped First Aid Kit
Operable and inspected 2.51b. (ABC) fire extinguisher
Road flares
Spare tire
Jack and tools
Reflective striping
All mechanical items on the vehicle in good working order,
with special attention paid to tires, brakes, and lights
Back up alarm devices, whether mechanical or electrical,
where not specifically prohibited by lav/.

R. 226 and 230.
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Like Wier, UP could have added rear seat head restraints to the above list in its
agreement with Armadillo. In fact, UP admits that it could have required rear seat head
restraints in its agreement with Armadillo. R. 893. UP failed to do so and Archer was
transported and injured in a van without rear seat head restraints. R. 230, 589, 615-616.
UP breached its duty to provide a reasonably safe workplace when it should have insisted
its employees be transported in vehicles with rear seat head restraints simply by listing
them as a mandatory safety feature in its agreement with Armadillo. Nonetheless, like
Wier, whether UP should have taken such steps remains a material issue of fact sufficient
to defeat UP and Armadillo's motion for summary judgment.
UP admits that it has a responsibility to identify and reduce reasonably foreseeable
hazards within the workplace. R. 893. UP admits that rear end collisions are reasonably
foreseeable hazards in the workplace and that it knew it was safer to have vehicles with
rear seat head restraints. Id. Armadillo transported UP employees in rear seats with head
restraints before Archer's injury and one third of Armadillo's 200 vehicle fleet was
equipped with rear seat head restraints. Id. Therefore, vehicles with rear seat head
restraints were readily available, UP knew it was safer to use those vehicles yet failed to
take steps to ensure Archer was transported in a vehicle with rear seat head restraints. The
district court's ruling should be reversed and Appellee's motion for summary judgment
denied accordingly.
3

In addition, UP extensively publishes safety rules governing its employees and could
have certainly promulgated a safety rule requiring its employees tp adjust and use rear
seat head restraints when transported in vans. R. 896.
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3.

An optional regulation for an automobile manufacturer has no bearing on
UP's FELA duty and liability.
Appellees improperly assert that because it is optional for an automobile

manufacturer to install rear seat head restraints, then UP has no FELA duty to require
them.4 This argument was properly rejected by the U.S. Supreme Court in Urie, where
the railroad argued that the maintenance of trade standards negates negligence. Urie, 337
U.S. at 178. The Court held:
[W]e ... reject the premise, for we think that negligence, within the
meaning of the Federal Employers' Liability Act, attached if respondent
'knew, or by the exercise of due care should have known,' that prevalent
standards of conduct were inadequate to protect petitioner and similar
situated employees.
Urie, 337 U.S. at 178 (citing Hill v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 336 U.S. 911 (1949));
Sadowski v. Long IslandR. Co., 292 N.Y. 448, 456-57 (1944).
The Court further held in Urie, that the railroad's "knowledge, actual or
constructive, of the alleged inadequacies of equipment was a jury question." Urie at
178. (Emphasis added). The Court explained that:
Evidence that some railroads furnished no such contrivances as plaintiff
claimed were necessary for the use of men working under similar
conditions or furnished similar places to work for men doing work similar
to that required of plaintiff does not establish, as a matter of law, that no
such contrivances or no different place in which to work or no different
appliances to carry on the work were required in the case at bar in the
exercise of ordinary care. The ultimate question of fact was not what
particular protective means someone else used in similar work. It was
whether or not, under the particular conditions described in this case, the
4

49 C.F.R. §§ 571.202 and 571.202a makes rear seat head restraints optional for
automobile manufacturers before September 1, 2010.
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defendant furnished plaintiff a reasonably safe place in which to work and
such protection in connection with his work ...
Urie at 179 (quoting Sadowski, 292 N.Y. at 456-57).
In Mortensen v. Southern Pacific Company, 245 Cal. App. 2d 241 (1966), the
plaintiff was injured in an accident while being transported in a pickup during the course
and scope of his employment with the railroad. Id. at 242-43. The accident occurred in
1962 in California, at which time seat belts were not required for manufacturers. Id. at
244. The plaintiff brought a FELA claim against the railroad for its failure to equip its
motor vehicles with seat belts. Id. at 242. The railroad conceded that the plaintiff was
covered under FELA and that the pickup was his workplace at the time of the accident.
Id. at 243. The railroad argued that because it was not required to install seat belts in
California, and bus and taxicab companies had not installed seatbelts, the railroad has no
duty to install them. Id. at 244. The Court held that the fact that there was no seat belt
law in effect at the time of the accident, "obviously is not conclusive of this federal
question[.]" Id. at 244. (Emphasis added). The Court further held that:
Nor is defendant aided by evidence that bus and taxicab companies had not
installed seat belts. F.E.L.A. liability attaches if defendant knew, or in the
exercise of due care should have known, 'that prevalent standards of
conduct were inadequate to protect' its employees.
Id. (quoting, Urie, 337 U.S. at 178).
Finally, the Court held that the defendant's failure to equip its motor vehicles with
seat belts was a jury question. Id. at 244-45. (Emphasis added).
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The same is true in this case. Like Mortensen, UP admits Archer is covered under
FELA and that the Armadillo van was his workplace at the time of the September 26,
2004 incident. R. 892. Like Mortensen, UP and Armadillo argued that because it is
optional for an automobile manufacturer to install rear seat head restraints, then UP has
no FELA duty to require them. Like was held in Mortensen, the fact that rear seat head
restraints are optional for automobile manufacturers has no bearing in this FELA case.
The district court's ruling should be reversed and Appellee's motion for summary
judgment denied accordingly.
D.

A Rear Seat Head Restraint is a Safety Device Which, Like Other Safety
Devices, is Part of a Reasonably Safe Workplace.
The U.S. Supreme Court held in Sinkler v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Co., 356

U.S. 326, 331-32 (1958), that "when a railroad employee's injury is caused in whole or in
part by the fault of others in performing, under contract, operational activities of his
employer, such others are 'agents' of the employer within the meaning of § 1 of FELA."
Relying on Sinkler, federal courts have held that transporting railroad employees
from one point to another is an operational activity and as such, any companies
transporting railroad employees are considered agents of the railroad.

See, Leek v.

Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 200 F. Supp. 368 (D.C.W.Va. 1962); Penn Central Corp. v.
Checker Cab Co., 488 F. Supp. 1225 (D.C. Mich. 1980); Hopson v. Texaco, Inc., 383
U.S. 262, 263-64 (1966).
In Pyzynski v. Pennsylvania Cent. Transp. Co., 438 F. Supp. 1044 (D.C.N.Y.
1977), the Court held that:
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If defendant does delegate and relies upon the services of its agent to carry
out its own duty, it may not shift its liability from itself to said agent when
an employee seeks to hold it directly liable. Under FELA, the employer is
the one owing the duty to the employee. The employee need not look
elsewhere for his protection. He has a right under FELA to rely on his
employer and none other. When the employer delegates its duty, or
abdicates its control, the employer takes the risk, not the employee.
Pyzynski, 438 F.Supp. at 1048.
Moreover, the Armadillo van is constructively considered railroad equipment for
purposes of FELA.
Every common carrier by railroad...shall be liable in damages to any
person suffering injury while he is employed by such carrier in such
commerce...for such injury ... by reason of any defect or insufficiency,
due to its negligence, in its cars, engines, appliances, machinery, track,
road bed, works, boats, wharfs, or other equipment.
45U.S.C. §51. (Emphasis added).
A motor vehicle is FELA equipment. Chapman v. Union Pacific Railroad, 467
NW 2d 388, 392 (Neb. 1991); See, Mortensen v. Southern Pacific Co., 245 Cal. App. 2d
241, 244 (1966) (FELA negligence case where truck was not equipped with seatbelts and
seatbelts were not required for manufacturers at the time); Lewis v. Norfolk & Western
Ry. Co., 646 NE 2d 1378, 1380 (111. App. 1995) (motor vehicle is equipment under
FELA).
UP's duty of care under FELA extends to third party property. In Carter v. Union
Railroad Co., 438 F.2d 208, 210-11 (3rd Cir. 1971), the Court summarized the railroads
non-delegable duty to provide a safe place to work as follows:
The FELA imposes upon the employer a non-delegable duty to use
reasonable care to furnish his employees a safe place to work, Sano v.
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Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 282 F.2d 396 (3 rd Cir. I960), and this duty extends
beyond its premises and to property which third persons have a
primary obligation to maintain. Shenker v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co.,
374 U.S. 1, 82 S.Ct. 1667, 10 L.3d.2d 709 (1963); Nivens v. St. Louis
Southwestern Ry. Co., 425 F.2d 114 (5th Cir. 1970), cert, denied, 400 U.S.
879, 91 S.Ct. 121, 27 L.3d.2d 116 (1970); Payne v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R.,
309 F.2d 546 (6th Cir. 1962), cert, denied, 374 U.S. 827 (1963); Cooker v.
Pittsburgh & Lake Erie R.R., 258 F.2d 876 (6th Cir. 1958); Chicago Great
Western Ry v. Casura, 234 F.2d 441 (8th Cir. 1956). This duty includes a
responsibility to inspect a third party's property for hazards and to
take precautions to protect the employee from possible defect ...
Shenker v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., supra; Nivens v. St. Louis Southwestern
Ry., supra.
(Emphasis added).
In the instant case, UP contracted with Armadillo to provide on-the-job
transportation for Archer and other train crew members. R. 203-235. On September 26,
2004, Armadillo transported Archer in the course and scope of his employment with UP.
R. 589 and 894. On June 6, 2007, the district court ruled that for purposes of this case,
Armadillo was an agent of UP, and was performing an operational activity of UP in
transporting Archer on September 26, 2004. R. 346-348; R. 894; and R. 1273-1274.
(Trial court's June 6, 2007 ruling in this case). UP admits that it is responsible to provide
a reasonably safe workplace and that at the time of Archer's injuries on September 26,
2004 the Armadillo van was Archer's workplace. R. 892.
UP's non-delegable duty to provide a reasonably safe workplace extends to
Armadillo's van, including head restraints or lack thereof.

UP's duty includes the

responsibility to inspect Armadillo's vans for hazards and to take precautions to protect
Archer. In turn, a rear seat head restraint is a safety device which, like other safety
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devices, is a part of a reasonably safe workplace under FELA. Nevertheless, whether a
rear seat head restraint is a safety device as part of a reasonably safe workplace on
September 26, 2004 is a question for the jury. The district court's ruling should be
reversed and Appellee's motion for summary judgment denied accordingly.
E.

Archer's FELA Claims are NOT Preempted by an Automobile Manufacturer
Regulation.

1.

The doctrine of conflict preemption does not apply by definition.
The district court improperly ruled that Archer's FELA claims are preempted by

the doctrine of conflict preemption. R. 594-603 and R. 1605-1609. Specifically, the
court ruled that MVSA and FMVSS, which make rear head restraints optional for
automobile manufacturers, preempt Archer's FELA claim that UP was negligent in
failing to transport Archer with a rear seat head restraint. R. 594-603 and R. 1605-1609.
Contrary to the district court's ruling, the doctrine of conflict preemption applies when
"state law is pre-empted to the extent that it actually conflicts with federal law." English
v. General Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79 (1990). (Emphasis added). Here, we have two
federal laws - FELA and MVSA/FMVSS. Therefore, with no state law to preempt, the
doctrine of conflict preemption does not apply by definition.
2.

The doctrine of conflict preemption does not apply - there is no actual
conflict
The district court misinterprets MVSA, FMVSS, and FELA in reaching the absurd

conclusion that automobile manufacturer regulations preempt FELA. R. 594-603 and R.
1605-1609. Contrary to the court's interpretation, MVSA and FMVSS apply exclusively
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to manufacturers. Johnson v. General Motors Corp., 889 F.Supp. 451 (W.D.Okl. 1995)
(MVSA case against manufacturer for failing to install air bag); Carden v. General
Motors Corp., 509 F.3d 227, 229-230 (5th Cir. 2007) ("FMVSS therefore establishes the
types of passenger restraint systems which car and truck manufacturers must install in
their vehicles").

Conversely, FELA was enacted by Congress in 1908, and is the

exclusive remedy for injured railroad workers, imposing a non-delegable and continuing
duty on railroad employers to provide their employees with a reasonably safe workplace.
Urie, 337 U.S. at 181; Bailey v. Central Vermont Ry., 319 U.S. 350, 352-53 (1943);
Peyton, 962 F.2d at 833; Ragsdell, 688 F.2d at 1283.
MVSA and FMVSS do not impose standards for railroad employers, common
carriers, or a reasonably safe workplace under FELA. Instead, MVSA and FMVSS
impose minimum standards for automobile manufacturers.5

It is illogical and

unreasonable for a federal automobile manufacturer regulation to preempt FELA and its
well defined jurisprudence, which is to be liberally construed in light of its prime purpose
- the protection of employees and others by requiring the use of safe equipment. Lilly v.
Grand Trunk Western R. Co., 317 U.S. 481, 486 (1943).
3.

Geier is inapplicable - FELA does not "actually conflict" with MVSA or
FMVSS.
Appellees relied heavily on Geier v. American Honda Motor Company, 529 U.S.

861 (2000). In Geier, the plaintiff brought a claim against the manufacturer of her 1987
5

The FMVSS is "a minimum standard for motor vehicle or motor vehicle equipment
performance." 49 U.S.C. § 30103(e). (Emphasis added).
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Honda, alleging that it was negligently designed. Geier, 529 U.S. at 865. The plaintiff
alleged that Honda should have installed an airbag when it manufactured the 1987
Accord. Id. at 881. The Court held that the plaintiffs claim conflicted with FMVSS 208,
which only required that 10% of the manufacturer's fleet be equipped with any passive
restraint device, not just airbags. Id.

The Court specifically held that common law

actions are pre-empted only to the extent that they actually conflict with the federal
requirements. Id. at 872. (Emphasis added). "Actual conflict between state and federal
law exists where the federal scheme expressly authorizes an activity which the state
scheme disallows.9' Carden v. General Motors Corp., 509 F.3d 227, 230 (5th Cir. 2007).
(Emphasis added).
Geier is clearly distinguishable from the instant case. Unlike Geier, this is not a
suit against a manufacturer. Unlike Geier, this is not a case of negligent design. This is a
FELA case against a railroad for its failure to provide a reasonably safe workplace.
Unlike Geier, there is no actual conflict. Plaintiff is alleging that UP was negligent under
FELA in failing to provide a reasonably safe workplace, when it knew it was safer to use
the existing Armadillo vehicles equipped with rear seat head restraints, yet failed to take
steps to ensure Archer was transported in such a vehicle. Plaintiff is not alleging that
Chevrolet should have installed rear seat head restraints. MVSA and FMVSS impose
minimum standards for automobile manufacturers.6 FELA imposes standards for railroad

6

FMVSS is "a minimum standard for motor vehicle or motor vehicle equipment
performance." 49 U.S.C. § 30103(e) (MVSA). (Emphasis added).
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employers, common carriers, and a reasonably safe workplace under FELA. FELA and
MVSA/FMVSS do not conflict.
Moreover, MVSA safety clause provides that "[compliance with a motor vehicle
safety standard prescribed under this chapter does not exempt a person from liability at
common law." 49 U.S.C. §30103(e). (Emphasis added). The Court in Geier stated that
the "saving clause assumes that there are some significant number of common-law
liability cases to save." Geier at 868. The instant case, at the very least, is one of the
cases the saving clause is meant to save: those that are not in actual conflict with MVSA.
The district court's ruling should be reversed and Appellee's motion for summary
judgment denied accordingly.
4.

Statutory construction requires the Court read MVSA, FMVSS and FELA
together, not with preemptive or preclusive effect.
This is a matter of statutory construction. When evaluating FELA, MVSA and

FMVSS, it is the duty of courts to find coexistence, making each law effective. Morton
v. Mancari, All U.S. 535, 551 (1974) ("The courts are not at liberty to pick and choose
among congressional enactments, and when two statutes are capable of co-existence, it is
the duty of the courts, absent a clearly expressed congressional intention to the contrary,
to regard each as effective.") "We must read the statutes to give effect to each, if we can
do so while preserving their sense of purpose." Watts v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 267
(1981). "[RJepeals by implication are not favored...." Morton, All U.S. at 549. "The
intention of the legislation to repeal must be 'clear and manifest.'" Watts, 451 U.S. at
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267, quoting, Red Rock v. Henry, 106 U.S. 596, 602 (1883). The presumption against
preemption is illustrated by the U.S. Supreme Court's overriding unwillingness to leave
injured parties without an adequate judicial remedy to recover damages. See, Sprietsma
v. Mercury Marine, 537 U.S. 51, 52 (2002); United Contr. Workers v. Laburnum Constr.
Corp., 347 U.S. 656, 663-64 (1954).
Federal preemption is a disfavored defense, particularly in the areas of health and
safety. Kemp v. Medtronic, Inc., 231 F.3d 216, 222 (6th Cir. 2000) ("In view of the
historic importance of federalism in these areas, the states' police powers relating to
public health and safety are not preempted by federal law unless Congress' intent to do so
is clearly expressed.") MVSA, FMVSS, and FELA can easily be read together. Safety is
the object of FELA, MVSA and FMVSS. Head restraints promote safety.

FMVSS

provides, in relevant part, that:
This standard specifies requirements for head restraints to reduce the
frequency and severity of neck injury in rear-end and other collisions.
49 C.F.R. §571.202.
FELA mandates a safe work place and imposes a specific and remedial statutory
duty upon the railroad. Bailey v. Central Vermont Ry., 319 U.S. 350, 352-53 (1943).
FELA "was designed to put on the railroad industry some of the cost for the legs, eyes,
arms, and lives which it consumed in its operations." Gottshall v. Consolidated Rail
Corp., 512 U.S. 532, 543 (1994); quoting, Wilkerson v. McCarthy, 336 U.S. 53, 68
(1949).
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Appellees and the district court improperly conflate FELA employer's nondelegable and continuous duty of a reasonably safe work place, with the common law
duty of ordinary care placed upon a private non-employer consumer, not in the business
of transportation.

R. 594-603 and R. 1605-1609,

As described above, Archer has

brought a claim against his employer railroad under FELA, a federal remedial right and
protection of railroad workers with a well defined jurisprudence. Appellees have not
shown any actual conflict between FELA, MVSA and FMVSS.7 The district court's
ruling should be reversed and Appellee's motion for summary judgment denied
accordingly.
F.

Archer's Orthopedic and Spine Surgeons Have the Medical Expertise to
Render Medical Causation Opinions Regarding the Injuries Caused by the
Failure to Provide a Rear Seat Head Restraint.
Expert testimony is generally required to establish a causal connection between an

accident and an injury "unless the connection is a kind that would be obvious to laymen,
such as a broken leg from being struck by an automobile. Moody v. Maine C. R.R. Co.,
823 F.2d 693, 695-96 (1 st Cir. 1987). Utah Rule of Evidence 702 provides the parameters
for admission of expert testimony:
... [I]f scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the
trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a
witness is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training,
or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.
Utah R. Evid. 702.
7

Federal preemption is an affirmative defense, and Defendant bears the burden of proof
in establishing its applicability. Fort Howard Paper Co. v. Standard Haven, Inc., 901
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In Utah, the ultimate question is whether, "on balance, the evidence will be helpful
to the finder of fact." Balderas v. Starks, 2006 UT App 218, 138 P.3d 75, 81 (Utah App.
2006). Expert testimony is helpful when the subject is not within "the knowledge or
experience of the average individual." The standard for medical causation is that the
physician must testify to a reasonable degree of medical probability. Sohm v. Dixie Eye
Center, 2007 UT App 245, 166 P.3d 614 (Utah App 2007). The expressions "probably,"
"more likely than not," and others of similar import are proper qualifications for a
medical expert's opinion testimony, if taken as a whole, the testimony reflects a
professional opinion as to reasonable medical probabilities. Nunez v. Wilson, 507 P.2d
329, 448 (Kan. 1973). "Probable" is defined as "likely to be or become true or real."
Merriam-Webster

Online Dictionary (2009), retrieved from

http://www.merriam-

webster.com/dictionary/probable.
A treating physician is uniquely qualified to give an opinion about his or her
diagnosis of a patient and the admissibility of such testimony should be given due
deference. Banks v. INC Kalium Carlsbad Potash Co., 11 P.3d 1014, 1019 (N.M. 2003).
"The rationale for giving greater weight to a treating physician's opinion is that he is
employed to cure and has a greater opportunity to know and observe his patient ..."
Holbrookv. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., 30 F.3d 777, 783 (3 rd Cir. 1996).
In the instant case, Archer's experts have the medical expertise to render medical
causation opinions regarding the injuries caused by the failure to provide a rear seat head
F.2d 1373, 1377 (7th Cir. 1990).
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restraint. The trial court ignored the language of Archer's expert reports and entered
summary judgment despite Archer establishing questions of fact sufficient to go to the

Dr. Huntsman, Archer's treating physician and orthopedic surgeon specializing in
spine surgery, stated that to a reasonable degree of medical probability:
The September 26, 2004 rear-end collision involving Mr. Archer as a
passenger in a vehicle without a seat head restraint was one of the probable
medical causes of the injuries I diagnosed and treated, including contusion
to his spinal cord, radicular pain radiating from his neck into his right
shoulder along the C5 nerve root distribution, right arm weakness, and
changes in spinal reflexes;
It is medically probable that Mr. Archer would not have suffered these
injuries from the rear end collision if he had a seat head restraint at the time
of the collision; and
It is pure speculation that Mr. Archer would have suffered these injuries
even if he had a seat head restraint at the time of the subject rear end
collision.
R. 1492 and 1539-1540.
Dr. Huntsman testified that the accident caused a contusion to Archer's spinal
cord, resulting in a permanent, hollow spot inside the cord. R. 1492. Dr. Huntsman
further testified that head restraints "prevent flexion/extension-type injury by avoiding
excessive extension" and that the "neck doesn't excessively extend because there is
something there to protect it. Id. Dr. Huntsman stated that the "fact that [ Archer] was
then involved in this motor vehicle accident in which his head and neck were not
restrained did likely cause the myelopathy and likely caused the subsequent need for
surgical intervention." Id.
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Dr. Huntsman's position is supported by Dr. Gordon, Archer's treating physician
and orthopedic surgeon, and biomedical expert Dr. France. When asked if it was his
opinion that the head restraint, or the lack of head restraint in this particular instance, was
a causative factor with the shoulder injury, Dr. Gordon testified, "Yes.

I think it

contributed to it, yes." R. 1493-1494.
Dr. France stated that a head restraint "would have likely reduced Mr. Archer's
maximum posterior neck motion to be within a range of 15-20 degrees extension of the
neck." R. 1493 and 1548. Dr. France quoted Traumatic Myelopathy In Patients With
Cervical Spinal Stenosis Without Fracture Or Dislocation, stating that, "[p]atients with
cervical spinal stenosis are uniquely vulnerable to hyper-extension injuries of the cervical
spine." R. 1493. Dr. Huntsman stated that, "[t]he 1980 article from Spine regarding
traumatic myelopathy in patients with cervical spinal stenosis without fracture and
dislocation as well as the 1998 Spine article which reviewed the pathophysiology of
cervical spondylotic myelopathy are accurate and I am in complete agreement with." Id.
Dr. Huntsman testified that the Spine articles were significant to the mechanism of injury
in this case. Id.
Finally, causation is a question of fact and jurors are empowered to weigh expert
testimony as they deem appropriate. Neely v. Bennett, 2002 UT App. 189, 51 P.3d 724,
728 (UtahApp. 2002); citing Dixon v. Stewart, 658 P.2d 591, 597 (Utah 1982); Nay v.
General Motors Corp., 850 P.2d 1260, 1264 (Utah 1993).
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G.

There are Genuine Issues of Material Fact as to Armadillo's Negligence
Under the Heightened Standard of Care as a Common Carrier
Armadillo admits that it is a common carrier. R. 894. "Common carriers are held

to a higher standard of care than the 'reasonably prudent person' standard." Lamb v.
B&B Amusements Corp., 869 P.2d 926, 930 (Utah 1993). The Utah Supreme Court
stated that "[t]he heightened standard of care required of common carriers is predicated
on the principle that '[pjersons using ordinary transportation devices, such as elevators
and buses, normally expect to be carried safely, securely, and without incident to their
destination.'" Id, at 930 (quoting, Harlan v. Six Flags Over Georgia Inc., 297 S.E.2d
468, 469 (Ga. 1982)). The Court further discussed the rationale behind the common
carrier standard of care:
The "reasonably prudent person" standard of care is a flexible legal concept
requiring a greater or lesser degree of care according to the nature of the
circumstances that a reasonably prudent person would consider in assessing
possible risks of injury. Common carriers are held to a higher standard of
care than the "reasonably prudent person" standard. See Johnson v. Lewis,
121 Utah 218, 225, 240 P.2d 498, 502 (1952); see also, McMaster v. Salt
Lake Transp. Co., 108 Utah 207, 210, 159 P.2d 121, 122 (1945); Sine v.
Salt Lake Transp. Co., 106 Utah 289, 296, 147 P.2d 875, 879 (1944).
Passengers entrust common carriers with their personal safety, have little if
any opportunity to protect themselves from harm caused by a common
carrier, and pay the carrier for safe transportation. In addition, the public
has an important stake in having the public transportation of persons be as
safe as possible.
Lamb, 869 P.2d at 930.
Judge Learned Hand described the duties of a common carrier as follows:
[H]is very enterprise is to carry passengers safely, and he# is bound to a
much longer forecast of the dangers which surround them than he is as
regards strangers. It is not perhaps important in just what terms this duty is
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measured; usually they include the 'highest human foresight' possible in
the circumstances.
Giger v. New York N.K & H.R. Co., 60 F.2d 63, 64 (2nd Cir. 1932).
The Utah Supreme Court has held that, "the duty owing by the carrier to its
passengers for hire is definitely greater than such carrier owes to guests and the general
public ... the relationship of carrier to its passengers for hire is a circumstance which
requires more foresight and greater caution than it owes to guests or the public
generally." Johnson v. Lewis, 121 Utah 218, 225 (1952).
In the instant case, Armadillo breached its duty of care as a common carrier, when
it did not exercise more foresight and greater caution in transporting Plaintiff without a
head restraint. Before Archer's September 26, 2004 injury, one third of Armadillo's 200
vehicle fleet had rear seat head restraints.

Id.

The Chevy Suburban vehicles in

Armadillo's fleet had the capacity to transport up to five passengers with seat head
restraints. Id. Armadillo admits that before Archer's September 26, 2004 injury, it had
transported UP crew members in vehicles with rear seat head restraints.

R. 893.

Armadillo admits that the center seats of its vehicles did not have head restraints and
some railroad location passengers were restricted from using the center seats. R. 894.
Armadillo admits that had it known before Archer's September 26, 2004 injury
that seat head restraints reduced the risk of neck injuries then it should have used vehicles
with rear seat head restraints for transporting UP passengers. R. 893. Armadillo should
have known. Before Archer's September 26, 2004 injury, it was common knowledge
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that seat head restraints prevent or reduce neck injuries from rear end collisions according to the NHSTA Report, biomedical expert Dr. France, and UP. R. 896.
Negligence is a question of fact for the jury.

Baczuk v. Salt Lake Regional

Medical Center, 2000 UT App 225, 8 P.3d 1037, 1039 (Utah App. 2000). It is for the
jury to decide whether the general field of danger should have been anticipated by
common carrier Armadillo in transporting Archer without a head restraint. The district
court's ruling should be reversed and Appellee's motion for summary judgment denied
accordingly.
VII.

CONCLUSION

A district court is justified in withdrawing the foregoing issues from the jury's
consideration only in those extremely rare instances when there is a zero probability
either of employer negligence or that any such negligence contributed to the injury of an
employee. This is not one of those extremely rare instances. The record establishes that
John Archer has introduced substantial evidence; far more than that required to bring his
FELA and state claims to a jury. For the foregoing reasons, the district court's ruling
should be reversed and Appellee's motion for summary judgment denied accordingly.
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-> RULE 56. SUMMARY JUDGMENT
(a) For claimant, A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the action or after service of a motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, move for summary judgment upon all or any part
thereof.
(b) For defending party* A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time, move for summary judgment as to all or any part thereof.
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion, memoranda and affidavits shall be in aocordance with Rule
7. The judgment sought shall be rendered if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law, A summaiy judgment, interlocutory in character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a genuine issue as to the amount of dam- ages.
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion, If on motion under this rule judgment is not rendered upon the
whole case or for ail the relief asked and a trial is necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the pleadings and the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if practicable ascertain what material facts exist without substantial controversy and what material facts are actually and in good faith controverted. It shall thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear without substantial controversy, including
the extent to which the amount of damages or other relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the action as are just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be deemed established,
and the trial shall be conducted accordingly.
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made
on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn or certified copies of all papers
or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court may permit affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, or furthef affidavits. When a
motion for summaiy judgment is made and supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest
upon the mere allegations or denials of the pleadings, but the response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in
this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against a party failing to file such a response.
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(0 When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits of a party opposing the motion that
the party cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to justify the party's opposition, the court
may reftise the application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such other order as is just.
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. If any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule are presented in bad
faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall forthwith order the party presenting them to pay to the
other party the amount of the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused, including reasonable
attorney's fees, and any offending party or attorney may be adjudged guilty of contempt.
CREDIT(S)
[Amended effective November 1,1997; November 1,2004.]
Current with amendments effective April 1,2009.
Copr (c) 2008 Thomson Reuters/West. No claim to orig. U.S. govt.
END OF DOCUMENT
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Effective; July 3,2007
Code of Federal Regulations Currentness
Title 49. Transportation
Subtitle B. Other Regulations Relating to
Transportation
Chapter V. National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration, Department of Transporta- tion
*®Part 571. Federal Motor Vehicle Safety
Standards (Refs & Annos)
*[§ Subpart B. Federal Motor Vehicle
Safety Standards (Refs <& Annos)
+ § 571.202 Standard No. 202;
Head restraints; Applicable at the
manufacturers option until September 1,2009.
SI. Purpose and scope. This standard specifies requirements for head restraints to reduce the frequency and severity of neck injury in rear-end and
other collisions.
52. Application. This standard applies to passenger
cars, and to multipurpose passenger vehicles, trucks
and buses with a GVWR of 4,536 kg or less, manufactured before September 1, 2009. Until September 1, 2009, manufacturers may comply with the
standard in this § 571.202, with the European regulations referenced in S4.3 of this § 571.202, or with
the standard in § 571.202a. For vehicles manufactured on or after September 1, 2009 and before
September 1, 2010, manufacturers may comply
with the standard in this § 571.202 or with the
European regulations referenced in S4.3 of this §
571.202, instead of the standard in § 571.202a, only
to the extent consistent with phase-in specified in §
571.202a.
53, Definitions.

Head restraint means a device that limits rearward
displacement of a seated occupant*s head relative to
the occupant's torso.
I leight means, when used in reference to a head restraint, the distance from the H-point, measured
parallel to the torso reference line defined by the
three dimensional SAE J826 (rev. Jul 95) manikin,
to a plane normal to the torso reference line.
Top of the head restraint means the point on the
head restraint with the greatest height.
84, Requirements.
54.1 Each passenger car, and multipurpose passenger vehicle, truck and bus with a GVWR of
4,536 kg or less, must comply with, at the manufacturer's option, 54,2, S4.4 or S4.5 of this
section.
54.2 Except for schoof buses, a head restraint
that conforms to either S4.2 (a) or (b) of this
section must be provided at each outboard front
designated seating position, For school buses, a
head restraint tfiat conforms to either S4.2 (a)
or (b) of this section must be provided at the
driver's seating position.
(a) When tested in accordance with S5.1 of
this section, limit rearward angular displacement of the head reference line to 45
degrees from the torso reference line; or
(b) When adjusted to its full) extended
design position, conform to each of the following;
(1) When measured parallel to the
torso line, the top of the head restraint
must not be less than 700 mm above
the seating reference point;
(2) When measured either 64 mm below the top of the head restraint or 635
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mm above the seating reference point,
the lateral width of the head restraint
must be not less than:
(i) 254 mm for use with bench-type
seats; and
(ii) 170 mm for use with individual seats;
(3) When tested in accordance with
S5.2 of this section, any portion of the
head form in contact with the head restraint must not be displaced to more
than 102 mm perpendicularly rearward
of the displaced extended torso reference line during the application of the
load specified in S5.2 (c) of this section; and
(4) When tested in accordance with
S5.2 of this section, the head restraint
must withstand an increasing load until one of the following occurs:
(i) Failure of the seat or seat back; or,
(ii) Application of a load of 890N.

Sales Section, Office C.115-1, Palais des Nations, CH-1211, Geneva 10, Switzerland. A
copy of ECE 17 Rev. 1/Add. 16/Rev. 4 (31 July 2002) may be inspected at NHTSA's Technical Information Services, 400 Seventh Street,
SW., Plaza Level, Room 403, Washington, DC,
or at the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA). For information on the
availability of this material at NARA, call
202-741-6030,
or
go
to:
http://www.archives.gov/federal_register/code_o
f_federal_regulations/ibrlocations.html,
54.4 Except for school buses, a head restraint
that conforms to S4.4 (a) and (b) of this section
must be provided at each outboard front designated seating position, For school buses, a head
restraint thai conforms to S4.4 (a) and (b) of
this section must be provided at the driver's
seating position.
(a) The head restraint must comply with
Paragraphs 5.1.1, 5.1.3, 5.3.1, 5.5 through
5.13, 6.1.1, 6.1.3, and 6.4 through 6.8 of
the English language version of the Economic Commission for Europe (ECE) Regulation 17: ECE 17 Rev. 1/Add. 16/Rev. 4
(31 July 2002).

S4.3 Incorporation by reference.
The English language version of the Economic
Commission for Europe (ECE) Regulation 17:
"Uniform Provisions Concerning the Approval
of Vehicles with Regard to the Seats, their Anchorages and any Head Restraints,, ECE 17
Rev. 1/Add. 16/Rev. 4 (31 July 2002) is incorporated by reference in S4.4(a) of this section.
The Director of the Federal Register has approved the incorporation by reference of this
material in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a)
and 1 CFR Part 51. A copy of ECE 17 Rev.
1/Add. 16/Rev. 4 (31 July 2002) may be obtained from the ECE Internet site: http://www.unece.org/trans/main/wp29/wp29regs
/r017r4e.pdf, or by writing to: United Nations,
Conference Services Division, Distribution and

(b) The head restraint must meet the width
requirements specified in S4.2(b)(2) of this
section.
54.5 Except for school buses, head restraints
that conform to the requirements of § 571.202a
must be provided at each front outboard designated seating position. If a rear head restraint
(as defined in § 571.202a) is provided at a rear
outboard designated seating position, it must
conform to the requirements of § 571.202a applicable to rear head restraints. For school
buses, a head restraint that conforms to the requirements of § 571,202a must be installed at
the driver's seating position.
54.6 Where manufacturer options are specified
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in this section or § 571,202a, the manufacturer
must select an option by the time it certifies the
vehicle and may not thereafter select a different
option for that vehicle. The manufacturer may
select different compliance options for different designated seating positions to which the
requirements of this section are applicable.
Each manufacturer must, upon request from the
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, provide information regarding which of
the compliance options it has selected for a particular vehicle or make/model,
SI'I I Jniionsti nil"

IIIUK'HIIJIH/S,

S5.1 Compliance with $4,2(a) of this section is
demonstrated in accordance with the following
with the head restraint in its fully extended
design position!

AulOiiiw*..,

;Jiii\v'.:. t .

Ku-tO l'CIS,

Sec.

2.3.6, P.E 1.0 \, Scptembet 196/
(5) Establish tjie dummy torso reference line by superimposing the torso
line of the manikin on the torso of the
dummy,
(6) Establish the head reference line
by extending the dummy torso reference line onto the head.
(b) At each designated seating position
having a head restraint, place the dummy,
snugly restrained by Type 2 seat belt, in
the manufacturer's recommended design
seating position,

(1) Position the dummy's back on a
horizontal fiat surface with the lumbar
joints in a straight line.

(c) During forward acceleration applied to
the structure supporting the seat as described in this paragraph, measure the
maximum rearward angular displacement
between the dummy torso reference line
and head reference line. When graphically
depicted, the magnitude of the acceleration
curve shall not be less than that of a halfsine wave having the amplitude of 78 m/s2
and a duration of 80 milliseconds and not
more than that of a half-sine wave curve
having an amplitude of 94 m/s2 and a duration of 96 milliseconds,

(2) Rotate the head of the dummy rearward until the back of the head contacts the flat horizontal surface specified in S5.1(a)(1) of this section

S5.2 Compliance with S4.2(b) of this section is
demonstrated in accordance with the following
with the head restraint in its fully extended
design position!

(3) Position the SAE J-826 twodimensional manikin's back against
the flat surface specified in S5,l(a)(l)
of this section, alongside the dummy
with the H-point of the manikin
aligned with the H-point of the dummy.

(a) Place a test device, having the back
plan dimensions and torso line (centerline
of the head room probe in full back position), of the three dimensional SAE J826
manikin, at the manufacturer's recommended design seated position,

(4) Establish the torso line of the
manikin as defined in SAE Aerospace-

(b) Establish the displaced torso reference
line by applying a fearward moment of 373
Nm. about the seating reference point to the

(a) On the exterior profile of the head and
torso of a dummy having the weight and
seated height of a 95th percentile adult
male with an approved representation of a
human, articulated neck structure, or an
approved equivalent test device, establish
reference lines by the following method:
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seat back through the test device back pan
specified in S5.2(a) of this section.
(c) After removing the back pan, using a
165 mm diameter spherical head form or
cylindrical head form having a 165 mm
diameter in plan view and a 152 mm height
in profile view, apply, perpendicular to the
displaced torso reference line, a rearward
initial load 64 mm below the top of the
head restraint that will produce a 373 Nm
moment about the seating reference point.
(d) Gradually increase this initial load to
890 N or until the seat or seat back fails,
whichever occurs first.
[54 FR 39187, Sept. 25, 1989; 61 FR 27025, May
30, 1996; 63 FR 28935, May 27, 1998; 69 FR
74883, Dec. 14,2004; 72 FR 25514, May 4,2007]
SOURCE: 36 FR 22902, Dec. 2, 1971; 50 FR
21056, June 6, 1985; 51 FR 9456, March 19, 1986;
59 FR 37175, July 21, 1994; 59 FR 38940, Aug. 1,
1994; 60 FR 58524, Nov. 28, 1995; 64 FR 10815,
March 5, 1999; 64 FR 47582, Aug. 31, 1999, unless
otherwise noted.
AUTHORITY; 49 U.S.C. 322, 30111, 30115,
30166 and 30177; delegation of authority at 49
CFR1.50.
49 C. F. R. § 571.202,49 CFR § 571.202
Current through April 2,2009; 74 FR 15188
(C) 2009 Thomson Reuters
END OF DOCUMENT
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Effective: July 3, 2007
Code of Federal Regulations Currentness
Title 49. Transportation
Subtitle B, Other Regulations Relating to
Transportation
Chapter V. National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration, Department of Transporta- tion
*iiPart 571. Federal Motor Vehicle Safety
Standards (Refs & Annos)
*H Subpart B . Federal Motor Vehicle
Safety Standards (Refs & Annos)

2009 and before September i, 2010, manufacturers may comply with the standard in §
571.202 or with the European regulations referenced in S4.3(a) of § 571.202, instead of the
standard in this § 571.202a, only to the extent
consistent with the phase-in specified in this §
571.202a.
S2.2 Incoi poratio

(a) Society of Automotive Engineers
(SAE) Recommended Practice J211/1 rev.
Mar 95, "Instrumentation for Impact Test-Part 1-Electronic Instrumentation," SAE
J211/1 (rev. Mar 95) is incorporated by
reference in S5.2.5(b), S5.3.8, S5.3.9, and
5.3.10 of this section. The Director of the
Federal Register has approved the incorporation by reference of this material in accordance with 5 U,S.C, 552(a) and 1 CFR
part 51. A copy of SAE J211/1 (rev. Mar
95) may be obtained from SAE at the Society of Automotive Engineers, Inc., 400
Commonwealth Drive, Warrendale, PA
15096. A copy of SAE J211/1 (rev. Mar
95) may be inspected at NHTSA's Technical Information Services, 400 Seventh
Street, SW„ Plaza Level, Room 403,
Washington, DC, or at the National
Archives and Records Administration
(NARA). For information on the availability of this material at NARA, call
202-741-6030,
or
go
to;
http://www.archives.gov/federai register/cod
e_of_federalj*eguIations/ibrJocations.html

*+ § 571.202a Standard No. 202a;
Head restraints; Mandatory applicability begins on September 1,2009
SI. Purpose and scope. This standard specifies requirements for head restraints to reduce the frequency and severity of neck injury in rear -end and
other collisions,
S2. Application & incorporation by reference.
S2.1 Application, This standard applies to passenger cars, and to multipurpose passenger
vehicles, trucks and buses with a GVWR of
4,536 kg or less, manufactured on or after
September I, 2009. However, the standard's requirements for rear head restraints do not apply
to vehicles manufactured before September 1,
2010, and, for vehicles manufactured between
September 1, 2010 and August 31, 2011, the
requirements for rear head restraints apply only
to the extent provided in S7. Until September
1, 2009, manufacturers may comply with the
standard in this § 571.202a, with the standard
in § 571.202, or with the European regulations
referenced in 54.3(a) of § 571.202. For
vehicles manufactured on or after September 1,

€> 2009 Thomson Reuters/West
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(b) Society of Automotive Engineers
(SAE) Standard J826 "Devices for Use in
Defining and Measuring Vehicle Seating
Accommodation/* SAE J826 (rev. Jul 95)
is incorporated by reference in S3, S5,
S5.1, S5.1.1, S5.2, S5.2.1, S5.2.2, and
S5.2.7 of this section. The Director of the
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Federal Register has approved the incorporation by reference of this material in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR
Part 51. A copy of SAE J826 (rev. Jul 95)
may be obtained from SAE at the Society
of Automotive Engineers, Inc., 400 Commonwealth Drive, Warrendale, PA 15096.
A copy of SAE J826 (rev. Jul 95) may be
inspected at NHTSA's Technical Information Services, 400 Seventh Street, SW.,
Plaza Level, Room 403, Washington, DC
or at the National Archives and Records
Administration (NARA). For information
on the availability of this material at
NARA, call 202-741-6030, or go to: http:/Avww.archives.gov/federaljegister/cod
e_of_federaljegulations/ibrJocations.html.

to a plane normal to the torso reference line.
Intended for occupant use means, when used m reference to the adjustment of a seat, positions other
than that intended solely for the purpose of allowing ease of ingress and egress of occupants and access to cargo storage areas of a vehicle.
Rear head restraint means, at any rear outboard designated seating position, a rear seat back, or any independently adjustable seat component attached to
or adjacent to a seat back, that has a height equal to
or greater than 700 mm, in any position of backset
and height adjustment, as measured in accordance
with S5.1.1.
Top of the head restraint means the point on the
head restraint with the greatest height.

S3. Definitions.
Backset means the minimum horizontal distance
between the rear of a representation of the head of a
seated 50th percentile male occupant and the head
restraint, as measured by the head restraint measurement device.
Head restraint means a device that limits rearward
displacement of a seated occupant's head relative to
the occupant's torso.
Head restraint measurement device (HRMD) means
the Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE) (July
1995) J826 three-dimensional manikin with a head
form attached, representing the head position of a
seated 50th percentile male, with sliding scale at
the back of the head for the purpose of measuring
backset. The head form is designed by and available from the ICBC, 151 West Esplanade, North
Vancouver, BC V7M 3H9, Canada (www.icbc.com).
Height means, when used in reference to a head restraint, the distance from the H-point, measured
parallel to the torso reference line defined by the
three dimensional SAE J826 (July 1995) manikin,

S4. Requirements. Except as provided in S4.4,
S4.2.1(a)(2) and S4.2.1(b)(2) of this section, each
vehicle must comply with S4.1 of this section with
the seat adjusted as intended for occupant use.
Whenever a range of measurements is specified, the
head restraint must meet th£ requirement at any position of adjustment within the specified range.
54.1 Performance levels. In each vehicle other
than a school bus, a head restraint that conforms to either S4.2 or S4.3 of this section
must be provided at each front outboard designated seating position. In each equipped with
rear outboard head restraints, the rear head restraint must conform to either S4.2 or S4.3 of
this section. In each school bus, a head restraint
that conforms to either S4.2 or S4.3 of this section must be provided for the drivers seating
position. At each designated seating position
incapable of seating a 50th percentile male Hybrid III test dummy specified in 49 CFR Part
572, Subpart E, the applicable head restraint
must conform to S4.2 of this section.
54.2 Dimensional and static performance. Each
head restraint located in the front outboard designated seating position and each head restraint
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located in the rear outboard designated seating
position must conform to paragraphs S4.2.1
through S4.2.7 of this section. Compliance is
determined for the height requirements of
S4.2.1 and the backset requirements of S4.2.3
of this section by taking the arithmetic average
of three measurements.
(

vl ? 1 Minimum height,
(a) Front outhwiiid •
positions.
(1) Except
as provided
in
S4,2.1(a)(2) of this section, when
measured
in accordance with
S5.2.1(a)(1) of this section, the
top of a head restraint located in a
front outboard designated seating
position must have a height not
less than 800 mm in at least one
position of adjustment
(2) Exception. I lie requirements
of S4.2.1(a)(1) do not apply if the
interior surface of the vehicle at
the roofline physically prevents a
head restraint, located in the front
outboard designated seating position, from attaining the required
height. In those instances in which
this head restraint cannot attain
the required height, when measured
in
accordance
with
S5.2,1(a)(2), the maximum vertical distance between the top of the
head restraint and the interior surface of the vehicle at the roofline
must not exceed 50 mm for convertibles and 25 mm for all other
vehicles. Notwithstanding this exception, when measured in accordance with S5.2.1(a)(2), the
top of a head restraint located in a
front: outboard designated seating
position must have a height not

less than 700 nun, in the lowest
position of adjustment.
(b) All outboard designated s.-utng
positions equipped with head re str; :! t
(i)
Except
as pro video m
S4.2.1(b)(2) of this section, -.re*
measured
in accordance
(*
S5.2,1(b)(1) of this section, the
top of a head restraint located in
an outboard designated seating
position must have a height not
less than 750 mm in any positron
of adjustment.
(2) Exception, The requirements
of S4.2,1(b)(1) do not apply if the
interior surface of the vehicle at
the roofline or the interior surface
of the backlight physically prevent
a head restraint, located in the rear
outboard designated seating position, from attaining the required
height. In those instances in which
this head restraint cannot attain
the required height, when measured
In
accordance
with
85.2.1(b)(2), the maximum vertical distance between the top of the
head restraint and the interior surface of the vehicle at the roofline
or the interior surface of the backlight must not exceed 50 mm for
convertibles and 25 mm for all
other vehicle's.
S4.2.2 Width. When measured in accordance with S5.2.2 of this section, 65 ± 3
mm below the top of the head restraint, the
lateral width of a head restraint must be
not less than 170 mm, except the lateral
width of the head restraint for front outboard designated seating positions in a
vehicle with a front center designated seat-
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ing position, must be not less than 254 mm.
54.2.3 Front Outboard Designated Seating
Position Backset. When measured in accordance with S5.2.3 of this section, the
backset must not be more than 55 mm,
when the seat is adjusted in accordance
with S5,l. For adjustable restraints, the requirements of this section must be met
with the top of the head restraint in any
height position of adjustment between 750
mm and 800 mm, inclusive. If the top of
the head restraint, in its lowest position of
adjustment, is above 800 mm, the requirements of this section must be met at that
position. If the head restraint position is independent of the seat back inclination position, the head restraint must not be adjusted such that backset is more than 55 mm
when the seat back inclination is positioned closer to vertical than the position
specified inS5.1.
54.2.4 Gaps.
All head restraints must meet limits for
gaps in the head restraint specified in
S4.2.4.1. For gaps between the seat and
head restraint, adjustable head restraints
must meet either the limits specified in
S4.2.4.IorS4.2.4.2.
S4.2.4.1 Gaps within the head restraint
and between the head restraint and
seat using a 165 mm sphere. When
measured in accordance with S5.2.4.1
of this section using the head form
specified in that paragraph, there must
not be any gap greater than 60 mm
within or between the anterior surface
of the head restraint and anterior surface of the seat, with the head restraint
adjusted to its lowest height position
and any backset position, except as allowed by S4.4.

S4.2.4.2 Gaps between the adjustable
head restraint and seat using a 25 mm
cylinder. When measured in accordance with S5.2.4.2 of this section using the 25 mm cylinder specified in
that paragraph, there must not be any
gap greater than 25 mm between the
anterior surface of the head restraint
and anterior surface of the seat, with
the head restraint adjusted to its lowest
height position and any backset position, except as allowed by S4.4.
54.2.5 Energy absorption. When the anterior surface of the head restraint is impacted
in accordance with S5.2.5 of this section
by the head form specified in that paragraph at any velocity up to and including
24,1 km/h, the deceleration of the head
form must not exceed 785 m/s2 (80 g) continuously for more than 3 milliseconds.
54.2.6 Height retention. When tested in accordance with S5.2.6 of this section, the
cylindrical
test
device
specified
in
S5.2.6(b) must return to within 13 mm of
its initial reference position after application of at feast a 500 N load and subsequent reduction of the load to 50 N ± 1
N. During application of the initial 50 N
reference load, as specified in 85.2.6(b)(2)
of this section, the cylindrical test device
must not move downward more than 25 mm.
54.2.7 Backset
and strength.

retention,

displacement,

(a) Backset retention and displacement. When tested in accordance with
S5.2.7 of this section, the described
head form must;
(1) Not be displaced more than 25
mm during the application of the
inilial reference moment of 37 ±
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0.71 fin;
(2) Not be displaced more than
102 mm perpendicularly and posterior of the displaced extended
torso reference line during the application of a 373 ± 7.5 Nm mo
ment about the H-point; arid

forward acceleration of the dynamic test
platform described in S5.3J, the head re
straint must:
(a) Angular rotation. Limit posterioi
angular rotation between the head and
torso of the 50th percentile male Hybrid III test dummy specified in 49
CFR part 572, subpart E, fitted with
sensors to measure rotation between
the head and torso, to 12 degrees for
the dummy in all outboard designated
seating positions;

(3) Return to within 13 mm of its
initial reference position after the
application of a 373 ± 7.5 Nm moment about the H-point and reduction of the moment to 37 ± 0.7 Nm.
(b) Sti engfli. W lien the head restraint
is tested in accordance with S5,2.7(b)
of this section with the test device specified in that paragraph, the load applied to the head restraint must reach
890 N and remain at 890 N for a period of 5 seconds.
S4,3 Dynamic performance and width. At each
forward-facing outboard designated seating position equipped with a head restraint, the head
restraint adjusted midway between the lowest
and the highest position of adjustment must
conform to the following:

(b) Head injury criteria. Limit the
maximum HICl5 value to 500. HICI5
is calculated as followsFor any two points in time, t, and t2>
during the event which are separated
by not more than a 15 millisecond
time interval and where t, is less than
t2, the head injury criterion (H1C15 )
is determined using the resultant head
acceleration at the center of gravity of
the dummy head, a r, expressed as a
multiple of g (the acceleration of gravity) and is calculated using the expression:

$4.3.1 Injury criteria. When tested in accordance with S5.3 of this section, during a

HIC =

(t.-

$4.3.2 Width. The head restraint must have
the lateral width specified .in S4.2.2 of this
section.

this section. However, in any such position, the
head restraint must meet either S4.4(a), (b) or
(c) of this section.

S4.4 Folding, or retracting rear head restraints
non-use positions, A rear head restraint may be
adjusted to a position at which its height does
not comply with the requirements of S4.2.1 of

(a) The head restraint must automatically
return to a position in which its minimum
height is not less than that specified in
S4.2.1(b) of this section when a test
dummy representing a 5th percentile female Hybrid III test dummy specified in 49
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CFR part 572, subpart O is positioned according to S5.4(a); or
(b) The head restraint must, when tested in
accordance with S5.4(b) of this section, be
capable of manually rotating forward or
rearward by not less than 60 degrees from
any position of adjustment in which its
minimum height is not less than that specified in S4.2.1(b) of this section.
(c) The head restraint must, when tested in
accordance with S5.4(b) of this section,
cause the torso reference line angle to be at
least 10 degrees closer to vertical than
when the head restraint is in any position
of adjustment in which its height is not less
than that specified in S4.2.1(b)(i) of this
section.
54.5 Removability of head restraints. The head
restraint must not be removable without a deliberate action distinct from any act necessary
for upward adjustment.
54.6 Compliance option selection. Where manufacturer options are specified in this section,
the manufacturer must select an option by the
time it certifies the vehicle and may not thereafter select a different option for that vehicle.
The manufacturer may select different compliance options for different designated seating
positions to which the requirements of this section are applicable. Each manufacturer must,
upon request from the National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration, provide information regarding which of the compliance options it has selected for a particular vehicle or
make/model
54.7 Information in owner's manual.
S4.7.1 The owner's manual for each
vehicle must emphasize that all occupants,
including the driver, should not operate a
vehicle or sit in a vehicle's seat until the

€> 2009 Thomson Reuters/West. No
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head restraints are placed in their proper
positions in order to minimize the risk of
neck injury in the event of a crash.
S4.7.2 The owner's
vehicle must—

manual

for

each

(a) Include an accurate description of
the vehicle's head restraint system in
an easily understandable format. The
owner's manual must clearly identify
which seats aref equipped with head restraints;
(b) If the head restraints are removable, the owner's manual must provide
instructions on how to remove the
head restraint by a deliberate action
distinct from any act necessaiy for upward adjustment, and how to reinstall
head restraints;
(c) Warn that all head restraints must
be reinstalled to properly protect
vehicle occupants.
(d) Describe in an easily understandable format the adjustment of the head
restraints and/or seat back to achieve
appropriate head restraint position relative to the occupant's head, This discussion must include, at a minimum,
accurate information on the following
topics:
(1) A presentation and explanation
of the main components of the
vehicle's head restraints.
(2) The basic requirements for
proper head restraint operation,
including an explanation of the
actions that may affect the proper
functioning of the head restraints.
(3) The basic requirements for
proper positioning of a head re-
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straint in relation to an occupant's
head position, including information regarding the proper positioning of the center of gravity of an
occupant's head or some other
anatomical landmark in relation to
the head restraint.
S5. Procedures. Demonstrate compliance with S4.2
through S4.4 of this section with any adjustable
lumbar support adjusted to its most posterior nominal design position. If the seat cushion adjusts independently of the seat back, position the seat cushion such that the highest H-point position is
achieved with respect to the seat back, as measured
by SAE J826 (July 1995) manikin, with leg length
specified in S10.4.2.1 of § 571.208 of this Part. If
the specified position of the H-point can be
achieved with a range of seat cushion inclination
angles, adjust the seat inclination such that the most
forward part of the seat cushion is at its lowest position with respect to the most rearward part. All
tests specified by this standard are conducted with
the ambient temperature between 18 degrees C. and
28 degrees C.
S5.1 Except as specified in S5.2.3 and S5.3 of
this section, if the seat back is adjustable, it is
set at an initial inclination position closest to
the manufacturer's design seat back angle, as
measured by SAE J826 manikin. If there is
more than one inclination position closest to
the design angle, set the seat back inclination to
the position closest to and rearward of the
design angle.
S5.1.1 Procedure for determining presence
of head restraints in rear outboard seats.
Measure the height of the top of a rear seat
back or the top of any independently adjustable seat component attached to or adjacent to the rear seat back in its highest
position of adjustment using the scale incorporated into the SAE J826 (July 1995)
manikin or an equivalent scale, which is
positioned laterally within 15 mm of the

centerline of the rear seat back or any independently adjustable seat component attached to or adjacent to the rear seat back.
S5.2 Dimensional and* static performance procedures. Demonstrate compliance with S4.2 of
this section in accordance with S5.2.1 through
S5.2.7 of this section. Position the SAE J826
(July 1995) manikin according to the seating
procedure found in SAE J826 (July 1995).
S5.2.I Procedure for height measurement.
Demonstrate compliance with S4.2.1 of
this section in accordance with S5.2J (a)
and (b) of this section, using the headroom
probe scale incorporated into the SAE J826
(July 1995) manikin with the appropriate
offset for the H-point position or an equivalent scale, which is positioned laterally
within 15 mm of the head restraint centerline. If the head restraint position is independent of the seat back inclination position, compliance is determined at a seat
back inclination position closest to the
design seat back angle, and each seat back
inclination positlod less than the design
seat back angle.
(a)(0 Eor head restraints in front outboard designated seating positions, adjust the top of the head restraint to the
highest position and measure the height.
(2) For head restraints located in
the front outboard designated seating positions that are prevented by
the interior surface of the vehicle
at the roofline from meeting the
required height as specified in
S4.2.1(a)(1), measure the clearance between the top of the head
restraint and the interior surface of
the vehicle at the roofline, with
the seat adjusted to its lowest vertical position intended for occu-
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pant use, by attempting to pass a
25 mm sphere between them. Adjust the top of the head restraint to
the lowest position and measure
the height.
(b)(1) For head restraints in all outboard designated seating positions
equipped with head restraints, adjust
the top of the head restraint to the lowest position other than allowed by S4.4
and measure the height.
(2) For head restraints located in
rear outboard designated seating
positions that are prevented by the
interior surface of the vehicle at
the roofline or the interior surface
of the rear backlight from meeting
the required height as specified in
S4,2J{b)(J), measure the clearance between the top of the head
restraint or the seat back and the
interior surface of the vehicle at
the roofline or the interior surface
of the rear backlight, with the seat
adjusted to its lowest vertical position intended for occupant use, by
attempting to pass a 25 mm sphere
between them.
55.2.2 Procedure for width measurement.
Demonstrate compliance with S4.2.2 of
this section using calipers to measure the
maximum dimension perpendicular to the
vehicle vertical longitudinal plane of the
intersection of the head restraint with a
plane that is normal to the torso reference
line of SAE J826 (July 1995) manikin and
65 ± 3 mm below the top of the head restraint.
55.2.3 Procedure for backset measurement.
Demonstrate compliance with S4.2.3 of
this section using the HRMD positioned
laterally within 15 mm of the head restraint

centerline. Adjust the front head restraint
so that its top is at any height between and
inclusive of 750 mm and 800 mm and its
backset is in the maximum position other
than allowed by S4.4. If the lowest position of adjustment is above 800 mm, adjust
the head restraint to that position. If the
head restraint position is independent of
the seat back inclination position, compliance is determined at each seat back inclination position closest to and less than the
design seat back angle.
S5.2.4 Procedures for gap measurement.
S5.2.4.1 Procedure using a 165 mm
sphere.
Demonstrate compliance with S4.2.4.I
of this section in accordance with the
procedures of S5.2AA (a) through (c)
of this section, with the head restraint
adjusted to its lowest height position
and any backset position, except as allowed by S4.4.
(a) The area of measurement is
anywhere on the anterior surface
of the head restraint or seat with a
height greater than 540 mm and
within the following
distances
from the centerline of the seat(1) 127 mm for seats required to
have 254 mm minimum head restraint width; and
#
(2) 85 mm for seats required to
have a 170 mm head restraint width.
(b) Applying a load of no more
than 5 N against the area of measurement specified in subparagraph
(a), place a 165 ± 2 mm diameter
spherical head form against any
gap such that at least two points of
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contact are made within the area.
The surface roughness of the head
form is less than 1.6 « m u » m ,
root mean square.
(c) Determine the gap dimension
by measuring the vertical straight
line distance between the inner
edges of the two furthest contact
points, as shown in Figures 2, 3
and 4.
S5.2.4.2 Procedure using a 25 mm cylinder.
Demonstrate compliance with S4.2.4.2
of this section in accordance with the
procedures of S5.2.4.2 (a) through (c)
of this section, with the head restraint
adjusted to its lowest height position
and any backset position, except as allowed by S4.4,
(a) The area of measurement is
between the anterior surface of the
head restraint and seat with a
height greater than 540 mm and
within the following distances
from the centerline of the seat-(1) 127 mm for seats required to
have 254 mm minimum head restraint width; and
(2) 85 mm for seats required to
have a 170 mm head restraint width.
(b) Orient a 25 ± 1 mm diameter
cylinder such that its long axis is
perpendicular to the seat back
angle and in a vertical longitudinal vehicle plane. Applying a load
of no more than 5 N along the axis
of the cylinder, place the cylinder
against any gap within the area of
measurement specified in subpara-

graph (a). The surface roughness
of the cylinder is less than 1.6
« m u » m , root mean square.
(c) Determine if at least 125 mm
of the cylinder can completely
pass through the gap.
S5.2.5 Procedures for energy absorption.
Demonstrate compliance with S4.2.5 of
this section in accordance with S5.2.5 (a)
through (e) of this section, with adjustable
head restraints in any height and backset
position of adjustment.
(a) Use an impactor with a semispherical head form with a 165 ± 2 mm diameter and a surface roughness of less
than 1.6 « m u » m , root mean square.
The head form and associated base
have a combined mass of 6.8 ± 0.05 kg.
(b) Instrument the impactor with an
acceleration sensing device whose output is recorded in a data channel that
conforms to the requirements for a 600
Hz channel class as specified in SAE
Recommended Practice J211/1 (March
1995). The axis of the acceleration-sensing device coigcides with the geometric center of the head form and the direction of impact.
(c) Propel the impactor toward the
head restraint. At the time of launch,
the longitudinal axis of the impactor is
within 2 degrees of being horizontal
and parallel to the vehicle longitudinal
axis. The direction of travel is posteriorly.
(d) Constrain the movement of the
head form so that it travels linearly
along the path described in S5.2.5(c)
of this section for not less than 25 mm
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before making contact with the head
restraint.
(e) Impact the anterior surface of the
seat or head restraint at any point with
a height greater than 635 mm and
within a distance of the head restraint
vertical centerline of 70 mm.
S5.2.6 Procedures for height retention.
Demonstrate compliance with S4.2.6 of
this section in accordance with S5,2.6(a)
through (e) of this section. For head restraints that move with respect to the seat
when occupant loading is applied to the
seat back, S5.2.6(a) through (e) may be
performed with the head restraint fixed in a
position corresponding to the position
when the seat is unoccupied.
(a) Adjust the adjustable head restraint
so that its top is at any of the following height positions at any backset position(1) For front outboard designated
seating positions(i) The highest position; and
(ii) Not less than, but closest to
800 mm; and
(2) For rear outboard designated
seating positions equipped with
head restraints-(i) The highest position; and
(ii) Not less than, but closest to
750 mm.
(b)(1) Orient a cylindrical test device
having a 165 ± 2 mm diameter in plan
view (perpendicular to the axis of revolution), and a 152 mm length in profile (through the axis of revolution)

with a surface roughness of less than
1.6 «mu»m, t root mean square, such
that the axis of the revolution is horizontal and in the longitudinal vertical
plane through the longitudinal centerline of the head restraint. Position the
midpoint of the bottom surface of the
cylinder in contact with the head restraint.
(2) Establish initial reference position by applying a vertical downward load of 50 ± 1 N at the rate
of 250 ± 50 N/minute. Determine
the reference position after 5.5 £
0 5 seconds at this load.
(c) Increase the load at the rate of 250
i 50 N/minute to at least 500 N and
maintain this load for 5.5 ± 0.5 seconds.
(d) Reduce the load at the rate of 250
i 50 N/minute until the load is completely removed. Maintain this condition for not more than two minutes.
(e) Increase the load at the rate of 250
db 50 N/minute to 50 ± 1 N and, after
5.5 i 0.5 seconds at this load, determine the position of the cylindrical
device with respect to its initial reference position.
S5.2.7 Procedures for backset retention,
displacement, and strength. Demonstrate
compliance with S4.2.7 of this section in
accordance with S5.2.7(a) and (b) of this
section. The load vectors that generate moment on the head restraint are initially contained in a vertical plane parallel to the
vehicle longitudinal centerline.
(a) Backset retention and displacement. For head restraints that move
with respect to the seat when occupant
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loading is applied to the seat back,
S5.2.7(a)(l) through (8) may be performed with the head restraint fixed in
a position corresponding to the position when the seat is unoccupied.
(1) Adjust the head restraint so
that its top is at a height closest to
and not less than:
(i) 800 mm for front outboard designated seating positions (or the
highest position of adjustment for
head
restraints
subject
to
S4.2.1(a)(2)); and
(ii) 750 mm for rear outboard designated seating positions equipped
with head restraints (or the highest
position of adjustment for rear
head
restraints
subject
to
S4.2.1(b)(2)).
(2) Adjust the head restraint to
any backset position.
(3) In the seat, place a test device
having the back pan dimensions
and torso reference line (vertical
center line), when viewed laterally, with the head room probe in
the full back position, of the three
dimensional
SAE J826 (July
1995) manikin;
(4) Establish the displaced torso
reference line by creating a posterior moment of 373 ± 7.5 Nm
about the H-point by applying a
force to the seat back through the
back pan at the rate of 187 ± 37
Nm/minute. The initial location on
(he bacfc pan of the moment generating force vector has a height
of 290 mm ± 13 mm. Apply the
force vector normal to the torso
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reference line and maintain it
within 2 degrees of a vertical
plane parallel to the vehicle longitudinal centerline. Constrain the
back pan to rotate about the Hpoint. Rotate the force vector direction with the back pan.
(5) Maintain the position of the
back pan as established in
85.2.7(a)(4) of this section. Using
a 165 ± 2 mm diameter spherical
head form,with a surface roughness of less than 1.6 « m u » m ,
root mean square, establish the
head form initial reference position by applying, perpendicular to
the displaced torso reference line,
a posterior initial load at the seat
centerline at a height 65 ± 3 mm
below the top of the head restraint
that will produce a 37 ± 0.7 Nm
moment about the H-point. After
maintaining this moment for 5.5 ±
0.5 seconds, measure the posterior
displacement of the head form
during the application of the load.
(6) Increase the initial load at the
rate of 187 ± 37 Nm/minute until
a 373 ± 7.5 Nm moment about the
H-point is produced. Maintain the
load level producing that moment
for 5.5 ± • 0.5 seconds and then
measure the posterior displacement of the head form relative to
the displaced torso reference line.
(7) Reduce the load at the rate of
187 ± 37 Nm/minute until it is
completely
removed.
Maintain
this condition for not more than
two minutes.
(8) Increase the load at the rate of
187 ± 37 Nm/minute until a 37 ±
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0.7 Nm moment about the H-point
is produced. After maintaining the
load level producing that moment
for 5.5 ± 0.5 seconds, measure the
posterior displacement of the head
form position with respect to its
initial reference position; and

namic test platform fall within the corridor
described in Figure 1 and Table 1.
55.3.3 Place any moveable windows in the
fully open position.

55.3.1 Mount the vehicle on a dynamic test
platform at the vehicle altitude set forth in
S13.3 of § 571.208 of this part, so that the
longitudinal centerline of the vehicle is
parallel to the direction of the test platform
travel and so that movement between the
base of the vehicle and the test platform is
prevented. Instrument the platform with an
accelerometer and data processing system.
Position the accelerometer sensitive axis
parallel to the direction of test platform
travel.

55.3.4 Seat Adjustment. At each outboard
designated seating position, if the seat back
is adjustable, it is set at an initial inclination position closest to 25 degrees from the
vertical, as measured by SAE J826 (July
1995) manikin. If there is more than one
inclination position closest to 25 degrees
from the vertical, set the seat back inclination to the position closest to and rearward
of 25 degrees. Using any control that
primarily moves the entire seat vertically,
place the seat in the lowest position. Using
any control that primarily moves the entire
seat in the fore and aft directions, place the
seat midway between the forwardmost and
rearmost position. If an adjustment position does not exist midway between the
forwardmost and rearmost positions, the
closest adjustment position to the rear of
the midpoint is used. Adjust the seat cushion and seat back as required by S5 and
S5.1 of this sectiori. If the head restraint is
adjustable, adjust the top of the head restraint to a position midway between the
lowest position of adjustment and the
highest position of adjustment. If an adjustment position midway between the
lowest and the highest position does not
exist, adjust the head restraint to a position
below and nearest to midway between the
lowest position of adjustment and the
highest position of adjustment.

55.3.2 Remove the tires, wheels, fluids,
and all unsecured components. Remove or
rigidly secure the engine, transmission,
axles, exhaust, vehicle frame and any other
vehicle component necessary to assure that
all points on the acceleration vs. time plot
measured by an accelerometer on the dy-

55.3.5 Seat Belt Adjustment. Prior to placing the Type 2 seat belt around the test
dummy, fully extend the webbing from the
seat belt retractor(s) and release it tliree
times to remove slack. If an adjustable seat
belt D-ring anchorage exists, place it in the
adjustment position closest to the mid-

(b) Strength. Increase the load specified in S5.2.7(a)(7) of this section at
the rate of 250 ± 50 N/minute to at
least 890 N and maintain this load
level for 5.5 ± 0.5 seconds.
S5.3 Procedures for dynamic performance.
Demonstrate compliance with S4.3 of this section in accordance with S5.3.1 though S5.3.9 of
this section with a 50th percentile male Hybrid
HI test dummy specified in 49 CFR Part 572
Subpart E, fitted with sensors to measure head
to torso rotation. The dummy with all sensors
is to continue to meet all specifications in 49
CFR Part 572 Subpart E. The restraint is positioned midway between the lowest and the
highest position of adjustment.
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position. If an adjustment position does not
exist midway between the highest and lowest position, the closest adjustment position above the midpoint is used.
55.3.6 Dress and adjust each test dummy
as specified in S8.1.8.2 through S8.1.8,3 of
§ 571.208 of this Part. The stabilized test
temperature of the test dummy is at any
temperature level between 69 degrees F
and 72 degrees F, inclusive.
55.3.7 Test dummy positioning procedure.
Place a test dummy at each outboard designated seating position equipped with a
head restraint.
55.3.7.1 Head. The transverse instrumentation platform of the head is level
within 1/2 degree. To level the head
of the test dummy> the following sequence is followed. First, adjust the
position of the H-point within the limits set forth in SiO.4.2.1 of § 571.208
to level the transverse instrumentation
platform of the head of the test
dummy. If the transverse instrumentation platform of the head is still not
level, then adjust the pelvic angle of
the test dummy. If the transverse instrumentation platform of the head is
still not level, then adjust the neck
bracket of the dummy the minimum
amount necessary from the nonadjusted "0" setting to ensure that the
transverse instrumentation platform of
the head is horizontal within 1/2 degree. The test dummy remains within
the limits specified in S 10.4.2.1 of §
571.208 after any adjustment of the
neck bracket.
55.3.7.2 Upper arms and hands. Position each test dummy as specified in
S10.2 and S10.3 of § 571.208 of this Part.
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55.3.7.3 Torso. Position each test
dummy as specified in SI 0.4.1.1,
S10.4.1.2, and S10.4.2.1 of § 571.208
of this Part, except that the midsagittai
plane of the dummy is aligned within
15 mm of the head restraint centerline.
If the midsagittai plane of the dummy
cannot be aligned within 15 mm of the
head restraint centerline then align the
midsagittai plane of the dummy as
close as possible to the head restraint
centerline.
55.3.7.4 Legs. Position each test
dummy as specified in SI0.5 of §
571.208 of this Part, except that final
adjustment to accommodate placement
of the feet in accordance with S5.3.7.5
of this section is permitted.
55.3.7.5 Feet. Position each test
dummy as specified in SI0.6 of §
571.208 of this Part, except that for
rear outboard designated seating positions the feet of the test dummy are
placed flat on the floorpan and beneath
the front seat as far forward as possible without front seat interference.
For rear outboard designated seating
positions, if necessary, the distance
between the knees can be changed in
order to place the feet beneath the seat.
55.3.8 Accelerate the dynamic test platform to 17.3 ± 0,6 km/h. AH of the points
on the acceleration vs. time curve fall
within the corridor described in Figure 1
and Table 1 when filtered to channel class
60, as specified in.the SAE Recommended
Practice J211/1 (March 1995). Measure the
maximum posterior angular displacement.
55.3.9 Calculate the angular displacement
from the output of instrumentation placed
in the torso and head of the test dummy
and an algorithm capable of determining
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the relative angular displacement to within
one degree and conforming to the requirements of a 600 Hz channel class, as specified in SAE Recommended Practice
1211/1, March 1995. No data generated
after 200 ms from the beginning of the forward acceleration are used in determining
angular displacement of the head with respect to the torso.

gap between the pelvis and the seat
back or until contact occurs between
the back of the dummy's calves and
the front of the seat cushion such that
the angle between the dummy's thighs
and legs begins to change.
(4) Note the position of the head restraint. Remove the dummy from the
seat. If the head restraint returns to a
retracted position upon removal of the
dummy, manua41y place it in the noted
position. Determine compliance with
the height requirements of S4.2.1 of
this section by using the test procedures of S5.2.1 of this section.

S5.3.10 Calculate the H1C,5 from the output of instrumentation placed in the head
of the test dummy, using the equation in
S4.3.1(b) of this section and conforming to
the requirements for a 1000 Hz channel
class as specified in SAE Recommended
Practice J211/1 (March 1995). No data
generated after 200 ms from the beginning
of the forward acceleration are used in determining HIC.

(b) Demonstrate compliance with S4.4 (b)
of this section in accordance with the following procedure:

S5.4 Procedures for folding or retracting head
restraints for unoccupied rear outboard designated seating positions.

(1) Place the rear head restraint in any
position meeting the requirements of
S4.2 of this section;

(a) Demonstrate compliance with S4.4 (a)
of this section, using a 5th percentile female Hybrid III test dummy specified in 49
CFR Part 572, Subpart O, in accordance
With the following procedure-

(2) Strike a line on the head restraint.
Measure the angle or range of angles
of the head restraint reference line as
projected onto a vertical longitudinal
vehicle plane. Alternatively, measure
the torso reference line angle with the
SAE J826 (July 1995) manikin;

(1) Position the test dummy in the seat
such that the dummy's midsaggital
plane is aligned within the 15 mm of
the head restraint centerline and is parallel to a vertical plane parallel to the
vehicle longitudinal centerline.
(2) Hold the dummy's thighs down and
push rearward on the upper torso to
maximize the dummy's pelvic angle.
(3) Place the legs as close as possible
to 90 degrees to the thighs. Push rearward on the dummy's knees to force
the pelvis into the scat so there is no

(3) Fold or retract the head restraint to
a position in which its minimum
height is less than that specified in
S4.2.I (b) of this section;
(4) Determine the minimum change in
the head restraint reference line angle
as projected onto a vertical longitudinal vehicle plane from the angle or
range of angles measured in 5.4(b)(2).
Alternatively, determine the change in
the torso reference line angle with the
SAE J826 (July 1995) manikin.
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S6. Vehicles manufactured on or after September 1,
2009, and before September 1, 2010 (Phase-in of §
571.202a).
(a) For vehicles manufactured for sale in the
United States on or after September I, 2009,
and befoie September 1, 2010, a percentage of
the manufacturer's production, as specified in
S6.1, shall meet the requirements specified in
this § 571.202a without regard to any option to
comply with the standard in § 571.202 or with
the European regulations referenced in S4.3(a)
of § 571.202. So long as this percentage requirement is met, a vehicle may comply with
the standard in this § 571.202a, with the standard in § 571.202, or with the European regulations referenced in S4.3(a) of § 571.202.
(b) Notwithstanding S6(a), vehicles that are
manufactured in two or more stages or that are
altered (within the meaning of 49 CFR 567.7)
after having previously been certified in accordance with Part 567 of this chapter may
comply with the standard in this § 571.202a,
with the standard in § 571.202, or with the
European regulations referenced in S4.3(a) of §
571.202.
S6.1 Phase-in percentage. For vehicles manufactured by a manufacturer on or after September 1, 2009, and before September 1, 2010, the
amount of vehicles complying with S6(a) shall
be not less than 80 percent of:
(a) If the manufacturer has manufactured
vehicles for sale in the United States during both of the two production years prior
to September 1, 2009, the manufacturer's
average annual production of vehicles
manufactured on or after September 1,
2007, and before September 1,2010, or
(b) The manufacturer's production on or
after September 1, 2009, and before
September 1,2010.

S6.2 Vehicles produced by more than one manufacturer.
56.2.1 For the purpose of calculating average annual production of vehicles for each
manufacturer and the number of vehicles
manufactured by each manufacturer under
S6.1, a vehicle produced by more than one
manufacturer shall be attributed to a single
manufacturer as follows, subject to S6.2.2.
(a) A vehicle that is imported shall be
attributed to the importer.
(b) A vehicle manufactured in the
United States by more than one manufacturer, one of which also markets the
vehicle, shall be attributed to the manufacturer that markets the vehicle.
56.2.2 A vehicle produced by more than
one manufacturer shall be attributed to any
one of the vehicle's manufacturers specified by an express written contract, reported to the National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration under 49 CFR Part
585, between the manufacturer so specified
and the manufacturer to which the vehicle
would otherwise be attributed under S6.2.1.
S7. Vehicles manufactured on or after September 1,
2010, and before September 1, 2011 (Phase-in of
rear seat requirements of § 571.202a).
(a) For vehicles manufactured for sale In the
United States on or after September 1, 2010,
and before September 1, 2011 a percentage of
the manufacturer's production of vehicles
equipped with rear outboard head restraints, as
specified m S7.1, shall meet the requirements
specified in this § 571.202a for rear head restraints.
(b) Vehicles that are manufactured in two or
more stages or that are altered (within the
meaning of 49 CFR 567.7) after having previ-
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ously been certified in accordance with Part
567 of this chapter are not subject to the requirement specified in S7(a).
57.1 Phase-in percentage. For vehicles manufactured by a manufacturer on or after September 1, 2010, and before September 1, 2011, the
amount of vehicles equipped with rear outboard head restraints complying with S7(a)
shall be not less than 80 percent of:
(a) If the manufacturer has manufactured
vehicles for sale in the United States during both of the two production years prior
to September I, 2010, the manufacturer's
average annual production of vehicles
equipped with rear outboard head restraints
manufactured on or after September 1,
2008, and before September 1,2011, or
(b) The manufacturer's production of
vehicles equipped with rear outboard head
restraints on or after September 1, 2010,
and before September 1,2011.

manufacturer and the number of vehicles
manufactured by each manufacturer under
S6.1, a vehicle produced by more than one
manufacturer shall be attributed to a single
manufacturer as follows, subject to S7.2.2.
(a) A vehicle that is imported shall be
attributed to the importer,
(b) A vehicle manufactured in the
United States by more than one manufacturer, one of which also markets the
vehicle, shall be attributed to the manufacturer that markets the vehicle.
S7.2.2 A vehicle produced by more than
one manufacturer shall be attributed to any
one of the vehicle's manufacturers specified by an express written contract, reported to the National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration under 49 CFR Part
585, between the manufacturer so specified
and the manufacturer to which the vehicle
would otherwise be attributed under S7.2.1.

57.2 Vehicles produced by more than one manufacturer.
S7.2.1 For the purpose of calculating average annual production of vehicles for each

Table 1 of 57L202a - Sled pulse corridor reference point locations.
iReference Point
A
IB
C
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|H

iTime (ms)
0
28
60
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38.5
149.5
1 84

[Acceleration (m/s2)
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'94
94
:0
0
80
80
|0
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Figure 1 of §571.202a - Sled pulse acceleration corridor. The target acceleration
with time expressed in milliseconds is a = 86 Sln(nt/88) m/s2, for, V »17.3 ± 0.6
km/h. The time zero for the test is defined by the point when the sled acceleration
achieves 2,5 m/s2 (0.25 G'$).
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Figure 2 of §571.202a - Measurement of a vertical gap "a".
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Figure 3 of §57L202a - Measurement of a horizontal gap "a".
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Figure 4 of §57L202a - Portion of gap above 540 mm height

Lowest In-Use Adjusted Height Position

Gap Above
540 mm Height

640 mm

[69 FR 74884, Dec. 14, 2004; 71 FR 12148, March
9,2006; 72 FR 25514, May 4,2007]

SOURCE: 36 FR 22902, Dec. 2, 1971; 50 FR
21056, June 6, 1985; 51-FR 9456, March 19, 1986;
59 FR 37175, July 21, 1994; 59 FR 38940, Aug. 1,
1994; 60 FR 58524, Nov. 28, 1995; 64 FR 10815,
March 5, 1999; 64 FR 47582, Aug. 31, 1999, unless
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otherwise noted.
AUTHORITY: 49 U.S.C. 322, 30111, 30115,
30J66 and 30177; delegation of authority at 49
CFR1.50.
49 C. F. R. § 571,202a, 49 CFR § 571.202a
Current through April 2,2009; 74 FR 15188
(C) 2009 Thomson Reuters
END OF DOCUMENT
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Tab 5

Page 2 of2

Westlaw,
49 U.S.C.A.§ 30101

Pagel

Effective:[See Text Amendments]
United States Code Annotated Currentness
Title 49. Transportation (Refs & Annos)
Subtitle VI. Motor Vehicle and Driver Programs
Pait A. General
*6i Chapter 301. Motor Vehicle Safety (Refs & Annos)
*® Subchapter I. General
-* § 30101. Purpose and policy
The purpose of this chapter is to reduce traffic accidents and deaths and injuries resulting from traffic accidents.
Therefore it is necessary(1) to pi escribe motor vehicle safety standards for motor vehicles and motor vehicle equipment in interstate
commerce; and
(2) to carry out needed safety research and development.
CREDIT(S)
(Added Pub.L. 103-272, § 1(e), July 5, 1994, 108 Stat. 941.)
Current through P.L. 111-12 (excluding P,L. 111-5,111-8, and 111 -11) approved 3-30-09
Westlaw. (C) 2009 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
END OF DOCUMENT
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Westlaw,
49 U.S.C.A. § 30103

Page 1

Effective:[See Text Amendments]
United States Code Annotated Currentness
Title 49. Transportation (Refs & Annos)
Subtitle VI. Motor Vehicle and Driver Programs
Part A. General
*B Chapter 301. Motor Vehicle Safety (Refs & Annos)
*® Subchapter I. General
_t § 30103. Relationship to other laws

(a) Uniformity of reguIations.-TTie Secretary of Transportation may not prescribe a safety regulation related to
a motor vehicle subject to subchapter I of chapter 135 of this title that differs from a motor vehicle safety standard prescribed under this chapter. However, the Secretary may prescribe, for a motor vehicle operated by a carrier subject to subchapter I of chapter 135, a safety regulation that imposes a higher standard of performance after
manufacture than that required by an applicable standard in effect at the time of manufacture.

(b) Preemption.—(1) When a motor vehicle safety standard is in effect under this chapter, a State or a political
subdivision of a State may prescribe or continue in effect a standard applicable to the same aspect of performance of a motor vehicle or motor vehicle equipment only if the standard is identical to the standard prescribed
under this chapter. However, the United States Government, a State, or a political subdivision of a State may
prescribe a standard for a motor vehicle or motor vehicle equipment obtained for its own use that imposes a
higher performance requirement than that required by the otherwise applicable standard under this chapter.
(2) A State may enforce a standard that is identical to a standard prescribed under this chapter.
(c) Antitrust laws.-This chapter does not(1) exempt from the antitrust laws conduct that is unlawful under those laws; or
(2) prohibit under the antitrust laws conduct that is lawful under those laws.
(d) Warranty obligations and additional legal rights and remedies.-Sections 30117(b), 30118-30121,
30166(f), and 30167(a) and (b) of this title do not establish or affect a warranty obligation under a law of the
United States or a State. A remedy under those sections and sections 30161 and 30162 of this title is in addition
to other rights and remedies under other laws of the United States or a State.
(c) Common law liability.-Compliance with a motor vehicle safety standard prescribed under this chapter does
not exempt a person from liability at common law.
CREDIT(S)
(Added Pub.L. 103-272, § 1(e), July 5, 1994, 108 Stat. 943, and amended PubX. 104-88, Title III, § 308(j), Dec.
29, 1995, 109 Stat. 947.)
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Current through P.L. 111-12 (excluding P.L. 111-5, 111-8, and 111-11) approved 3-30-09
Westlaw. (C) 2009 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
END OF DOCUMENT
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Westlaw,
Not Reported in F.Supp.2d
Not Reported in F.Supp.2d, 1998 WL 474098 (N.D.Iit.)
(Cite as: 1998 WL 474098 (N.D.IIh))
Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.
United States District Court, N,D. Illinois.
John B. WIER and Linda M. Wier, Plaintiffs,
v.
SOO LINE RAILROAD COMPANY, d/b/a CP
Rail Systems, Mile Post Inns, Inc., and David
Castaneda, Defendants.
SOO LINE RAILROAD COMPANY, d/b/a CP
Rail Systems, and Mile Post Inns, Inc.,
Crossclaimants,
v,
David CASTANEDA, Crossdefendant.
No, 96 C 2094.
Aug. 3,1998.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
HART, District J.
*1 Plaintiffs, husband and wife, John Wier
("Wier") and Linda Wier, bring this personal injury
action against Wier's employer, the Soo Line Railroad Company ("Soo Line"). The action arises out
of a two-vehicle traffic accident which occurred
during the course of Wier*s employment. Also
named as defendants are Mile Post Inns, Inc. ("Mile
Post"), the owner and manager of the mini van in
which Wier was traveling as a passenger, David
Jones ("Jones"), the driver of the minivan, and
David Castaneda ("Castaneda"), the driver of the
other vehicle. On March 13, 1997, Jones moved for
summary judgment. The court ordered judgment in
his favor and dismissed him as defendant. Presently
pending is the motion of defendants Soo Line and
Mile Post for summary judgment.
On a motion for summary judgment, the entire record is considered with all reasonable inferences
drawn in favor of the nonmovant and all factual disputes resolved in favor of the nonmovant. Valance
v.. Wisel, 110 F.3d 1269, 1274 (7th Cir.1997); Patel

Page 1

v. Allstate Insurance Co., 105 F.3d 365, 367 (7th
Cir.1997). The burden of establishing a lack of any
genuine issue of material fact rests on the movant.
Essex v. United Parcel Service, Inc., I l l F.3d
1304, 1308 (7th Cir.1997). The nonmovant,
however, must make a showing sufficient to establish any essential element for which he or she will
bear the burden of proof at trial. Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91
L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Wintz v. Northrop Corp., 110
F.3d 508, 512 (7th Cir.1997). The movant need not
provide affidavits or deposition testimony showing
the nonexistence of such essential elements.
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. Also, it is not sufficient to
show evidence of purportedly disputed facts if
those facts are not plausible in light of the entire record. See NLFC, Inc. v. Devcom Mid-America, Inc.,
45 F.3d 231, 236 (7th Cir.), cert, denied,5\5 U.S.
1104, 115 S.Ct. 2249, 132 L.Ed.2d 257 (1995); Covalt v. Carey Canada, Inc., 950 F.2d 481, 485 (7th
Cir. 1991); Collins v. Associated Pathologists, Ltd.,
844 F.2d 473, 476-77 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,4U
U.S. 852, 109 S.Ct. 137, 102 L.Ed.2d 110 (1988).
As the Seventh Circuit has summarized:
The moving party bears the initial burden of directing the district court to the determinative issues and
the available evidence that pertains to each. "[A]
party seeking summary judgment always bears the
initial responsibility of informing the district court
of the basis for its motion, and identifying those
portions of 'the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together
with the affidavits, if any* which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material
fact rCelotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323,
106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); id. at 325
("the burden on the moving party may be discharged by 'showing'-that is, pointing out to the
district court-that there is an absence of evidence to
support the nonmoving party's case"). Then, with
respect to issues that the non-moving party will
bear the burden of proving at trial, the non-moving
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party must come forward with affidavits, depositions, answers to interrogatories or admissions and
designate specific facts which establish that there is
a genuine issue for trial. Id. at 324.The non-moving
party cannot rest on the pleadings alone, but must
designate specific facts in affidavits, depositions,
answers to interrogatories or admissions that establish that there is a genuine triable issue. Id. The
non-moving party "must do more than simply show
that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.'5Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith
Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89
LJEd.2d 538 (1986)."The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the [non-moving
party's] position will be insufficient; there must be
evidence on which the jury could reasonably find
for the [non-moving $dxty].nAnderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91
L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).
*2 Selan v. Kiley, 969 F.2d 560, 564 (7th Cir. 1992).
Resolving all genuine disputes and drawing all
reasonable inferences in plaintiffs' favor, the facts
are as follows. At all relevant times, Wier was employed as an engineer for Soo Line, a railroad operator. On May 29, 1994, Wier was injured in a
traffic accident while being transported between
employment locations. The accident occurred
when, while stopped at a traffic signal, the minivan
in which Wier was traveling was struck in the rear
by Castaneda's vehicle. Wier, who was seated on
the right side of the minivan's rear seat, sustained
whiplash injuries on impact and currently suffers
from posttraumatic vertigo related to the accident .FNI
FN1. This diagnosis was made by Dr.
Timothy Hain ("Hain"), an otolaryngologist at Northwestern University Medical
School. See Exhibit H to Plf. Mem.
The minivan was owned and operated by Mile Post,
a common carrier. At all relevant times, Mile Post
provided transportation services for Soo Line, pursuant to an agreement brokered by a third

© 2009 Thomson Reuters/West.
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^ B y the terms of that agreement, Mile Post was
obliged to supply Soo Line with vehicles capable of
transporting seven passengers and their luggage in
an efficient and comfortable manner. The vehicles
were required to be in good mechanical condition
and furnished with specified equipment including
seat belts for all passengers, fire extinguishers and
road flares.FN*Mile Post had not made any structural alterations to the minivan after purchasing it
from the manufacturer.
FN2.See Exhibit B to Def. Stm. The agreement was concluded by Mile Post and
Crew Transportation Services, Co., acting
as broker.
FN3. Agreement, § 17, at Exhibit B to Def.
Stm.
Wier offers the expert opinion of Dr, Daniel
Pacheco ("Pacheco"), a mechanical engineer and
expert in safety and accident investigation. Pacheco
concludes that Wier sustained whiplash injuries as a
result of the minivan not being equipped with headrests for the rearseat passengers. In his opinion, the
minivan should have been so equipped given the intended occupancy of the minivan and the foreseeability of a rear-end collision. Pacheco relies in part
on Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 202,
49 C.F.R. § 571,202, which states that headrests reduce the frequency and severity of neck injuries in
rear-end collisions. However, in his deposition,
Pacheco conceded that Standard No. 202 does not
require the installation of headrests on seats in the
rear of minivans.FN4
FN4. Exhibit E to Def. Stm.
Defendants produced their own expert engineer,
Stanley Sangdahl ("Sangdahl"). He opines that
while headrests are designed to diminish the likelihood of injury in rear-end collisions, they cannot
prevent injury in all instances. In Sangdahl's opinion, it is impossible to predict the effect of headrests on the likelihood or severity of injury to individual occupants in rear-end collisions.FN5It is un-
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disputed that, at all relevant times, there were other
brands of minivans on the market that were
equipped with rearseat headrests.
FN5. Sangdahi's Affidavit at Exhibit F to
Def. Stm.
Count I of the complaint contains claims by Wier
against Soo Line pursuant to the Federal Employers' Liability Act ("FELA"), 45 U.S.C. § S\et seq.
The remaining claims come within the court's diversity jurisdiction.FN*Wier alleges common law
negligence against Mile Post in Count II and
against Castaneda in Count III, Counts IV and V set
out claims for loss of consortium against Mile Post
and Castaneda, respectively. Soo Line and Mile
Post
crossclaim
for
contribution
against
Castaneda.^PIaintiffs complain principally that
defendants were negligent in failing to provide Wier with a safe means of transportation. Specifically,
it is alleged that the van should have been equipped
with rear headrests or other restraining devices to
prevent or reduce injury in a foreseeable rear-end
collision.
FN6. John and Linda Wier are citizens of
Wisconsin. Mile Post is incorporated and
has its principal place of business in
Nevada. Castaneda is a citizen of Illinois.
The complaint, which was filed on April
10, 1996, alleges that the amounts in controversy with respect to the claims of John
Wier and the claims of Linda Wier, respectively exceed $50,000.
FN7. The pleadings refer to this claim as a
counterclaim although it is in fact a
crossclaim.
*3 Defendants depict this lawsuit as "a products liability cause of action masquerading as a FELA violation or common negligence cause of action."Def.
Mem. at 3-4. Defendants describe themselves as
consumers or end-users of the minivan, owing no
special duties to Wier, a fellow consumer. They
seek summary judgment on grounds of breach of

duty and causation.
The first issue to be considered is the extent of Soo
Line's duty to guarantee the safety of the minivan.
FELA creates a toit remedy for railroad employees
injured on the job. Lancaster v. Norfolk & Western
Ry. Co., 773 F.2d 807, 812 (7th Cir.1985), cert.
denied,4%0 U.S. 945, 107 S.Ct. 1602, 94 L.Ed.2d
788 (1987). The statute provides in relevant part:
Every common carrier by railroad ... shall be liable
in damages to any person suffering injury while he
is employed by such carrier ... resulting in whole or
in part from the negligence of any of the officers,
agents or employees of such earner, or by reason of
any defect or insufficiency, due to its negligence, in
its cars, engines, appliances, machineiy ... or other
equipment.
45 U.S.C. §51.
In light of its broad remedial purpose, FELA is liberally construed in favor of railroad employees.
Consolidated Rait Corp, v. Gottschall, 512 U.S.
532, 543, 114 S.Ct. 2396, 129 L.Ed.2d 427 (1994);
Lisek v. Norfolk & Western Ry. Co., 30 F.3d 823,
831 (7th Cir.1994), cert. denied,5\3 U.S. 1112, 115
S.Ct. 904, 130 L.Ed.2d 787 (1995). To establish
negligence, a plaintiff must prove duty, breach,
foreseeability and causation. Fulk v. Illinois Central
R.R. Co., 22 F.3d 120, 124 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied,5\3 U.S. 870, 115 S.Ct. 193, 130 L.Ed.2d
125 (1994). However, that burden is significantly
lighter than it would be in an ordinary negligence
case. A plaintiff need only show that the employer's
negligence "played any part, even the slightest in
producing the injury".//*/*//! v. Burlington Northern R.R. Co., 921 F.2d 129, 131 (7th Cir.1990)
(quoting Rogers v. Missouri Pacific R.R. Co., 352
U.S. 500, 506, 77 S.Ct. 443, 1 L.Ed.2d 493 (1957)).
This lightened burden of proof means that a FELA
plaintiff can survive a motion for summary judgment provided there is even slight evidence of negligence. Lisek, 30 F.3d at &32;Harbin, 921 F.2d at
131.
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Under FELA, a railroad employer has a duty to
provide its employees with a reasonably safe workplace and safe equipment. Shenker v. Baltimore and
Ohio RR. Co., 374 U.S. i, 7, 83 S.Ct. 1667, 10
L.Ed.2d 709 (1963); Williams v. National RR Passenger Corp., 1997 WL 754175 *2 (NJD.I1I.
NOY.20, 1997). Courts have recognized that unsafe
conditions in railroad vehicles may give rise to liability under the statute. See, e.g., Finley v. National
RR. Passenger Corp., 1997 WL 59322 *8 (E.D.Pa.
Feb. 12, 1997) (defective window collapsed injuring
employee); George v. Burlington Northern RR.
Co., 1994 WL 523713 *3 (N.D.IU. Sept.26, 1994)
(trainman injured when attempting to align defective drawbar); Korte v. New York, NM. & H.R Co,,
191 F.2d S6t 87 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,342 U.S.
868, 72 S.Ct. 108, 96 L.Ed. 652 (1951) (ticket collector injured when opening defective trap door);
Sullivan v. Aliguippa & S.RR. Co,, 57 F.Supp. 353,
354 (W.D.Pa.1944) (defective handbrake resulted
in injury to brakeman).
*4 The employer's duty is nondelegable and applies
even when the employee is required to go onto the
premises of a third party over which the employer
has no control. Shenker, 374 U.S. at 7. Moreover,
the concept of agency is broadly defined for the
purposes of FELA. Liability extends to the acts of
others contractually bound to perform operational
activities on behalf of the employer. Sinkler v. Missouri Pacific RR. Co., 356 U.S. 326, 331-32, 78
S.Ct. 758, 2 L.Ed.2d 799 (1958). Specifically,
transporting railroad employees has been recognized as one such operational activity. Austin v. Soo
Line RR. Co,, 1996 WL 539123 *3 (N.D.IU.
Sept.20, 1996) (quoting Leek v. Baltimore & Ohio
RR.
Co,,
200
F.Supp.
368,
370-71
(N.D.W.Va.1962)).
To establish breach of duty, the employee must
show that the employer failed to act as a reasonable
and prudent person would ordinarily act under the
circumstances. Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line RR,
Co., 318 U.S. 54, 67, 63 S.Ct. 444, 87 L.Ed. 610
(1943). However, liability is limited to hazards

which the employer could have reasonably foreseen. Gallick v. Baltimore & Ohio RR. Co., 372
U.S. 108, 117, 83 S.Ct. 650, 9 L.Ed.2d 618 (1963);
Dukes v. Illinois Central RR. Co., 934 F.Supp. 939,
945 (NJD.II1.1996) (citing Gallose v. Long Island
RR. Co. 878 F.2d 80, 85 (2d Cir. 1989)).
It is undisputed that Soo Line is a common carrier
by railroad for the puiposes of FELA and that Wier
was employed by Soo Line at all relevant times. By
virtue of Soo Line's duty to provide a safe means of
transportation for its employees, Wier contends that
Soo Line was required to provide a minivan
equipped with rearseat headrests. Since it was not
involved in the manufacture of the minivan, Soo
Line disputes that it was under any duty to guarantee the safety of the minivan. It argues that an employer cannot be liable under FELA merely for permitting an employee to ride in one type of mass
produced passenger vehicle as opposed to another.
Soo Line's position would be more tenable if all
mass produced passenger vehicles (in this case,
minivans) were identical". However, Wier has
shown that, at all relevant times, there were other
brands of minivans available which were equipped
with rearseat headrests. Wier contends that the benefits of headrests are well known and are recognized by federal safety standards. In these circumstances, a factfinder might reasonably conclude that
Soo Line knew or ought to have known of the hazard posed by the absence of headrests. This conclusion is underscored by the fact that Soo Line's
agreement with Mile Post specifically addressed the
issue of safety, although it did not include headrests
in the list of mandatory safety features. Thus, Soo
Line is precluded from simply relying on the judgment of the manufacturer as to the adequacy of the
minivan's safety features.
Read in the light most favorable to Wier, the record
suggests that a prudent employer might have taken
steps to ensure that its employees were transported
in minivans equipped with rearseat headrests. Soo
Line could have insisted that Mile Post provide
such a guarantee, simply by listing headrests as a
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mandatory safety feature in its agreement with Mile
Post. Alternatively, it was open to Soo Line to find
another transport service that adequately addressed
vehicle safety concerns. Whether Soo Line should
have taken such steps remains a material issue of
fact in this case sufficient to defeat Soo Line's motion for summary judgment.
*5 As an additional matter, for the reasons stated
below, Wier has presented enough evidence to suggest that Mile Post may have been negligent in failing to provide transportation in a vehicle equipped
with rearseat headrests. Since Mite Post was acting
at the behest of Soo Line, it was acting as Soo
Line's agent for these purposes. Austin, 1996 WL
539123 *3;Servais v, T.J. Management of Minneapolis, Inc., 973 F.Supp. 885, 893 (D.Minn. 1997)
(distinguishing, for purposes of an indemnity claim,
an employer's own negligence from the negligence
of a transportation agent attributable to the employer under FELA). Thus, for this reason also, summary judgment In favor of Soo Line is inappropriate.
Soo Line also moves for summary judgment on the
issue of proximate cause. It disputes Wier's contention that his injuries were caused by the lack of a
headrest. The parties present conflicting expert
testimony in this regard. Pacheco, plaintiffs' expert,
concludes that the lack of a headrest was a direct
cause of Wier's injuries. Sangdahl, defendants' expert, opines that it is impossible to quantify the effect headrests may have on the likelihood or degree
of injury in rear-end collisions.
As a preliminary matter, defendants question
Pacheco's expertise by pointing out that he is not an
expert in biomechanics. However, Pacheco is a
mechanical engineer with expertise in the areas of
design and test engineering and product safety.
Moreover, he works for an engineering consultancy
firm
that
specializes
in
accident
investigations.^Expert testimony may be offered
when scientific, technical or other specialized
knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand
the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.

Fed.R.Evid. 702; Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals* Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 590, 113 S.Ct. 2786,
125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993); Gruca v. Alpha Therapeutic Corp., 51 F.3d 638, 643 (7th Cir,1995). The
district court has wide discretion in determining the
competency of a witness as an expert and the relevancy of his or her testimony with respect to a particular subject. Roback v. V.I.P. Transport, Inc., 90
F.3d 1207, 1215 (7th Cir.1996); United States v.
Stevenson, 6 F.3d 1262, 1267 (7th Cir.1993). In his
deposition, Pacheco emphasized that he could not
speak to the injury itself.^Rather, he stated that
his testimony was based on engineering expertise,
having regard to mechanics and dynamics.
Pacheco's testimony relates to these subjects and
his knowledge distinguishes him from the ordinary
person. Downes v. Volkswagen of American, Inc.,
41 F.3d 1132, 1143 (7th Cir.1994); Stevenson, 6
F.3d at 1267. Defendants have failed to explain
why Pacheco is not an expert for the purposes of
the proffered testimony.
FN8. Exhibit E to Def. Stm.
FN9. Wier presents the testimony of Hain
regarding the nature and extent of Wier's
injuries. See Exhibit H to Plf. Mem.
When the testimony of experts conflicts, it is the
exclusive province of the jury to determine the
weight to be given to the opinion of each expert,
based on an assessment of their respective credibility. United States v. Scop, 846 F.2d 135, 142 (2d
Cir.1988); Perfection Spring & Stamping Corp. v.
Exacio Spring Corp., I998.WL 142424 *5 (N.D.Ill.
March 26, 1998); Van Houten-Maynard v. ANR
Pipeline Co., 870 F.Supp. 206, 209 (N.D.Ill. 1994).
For the purposes of this motion, it is sufficient to
note that Wier has produced an expert willing and
able to testify as to proximate cause. In the view of
that expert, the lack of rearseat headrests in the
minivan in which Wier was traveling contributed to
the injuries he sustained. Thus, whether the lack of
a headrest on Wier's seat proximately caused his injuries remains a material issue in this case. Accordingly, Soo Line's motion for summary judgment
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will be denied with respect to the issue of proximate cause.
*6 Mile Post moves for summary judgment on the
same grounds as Soo Line. The parties implicitly
agree that Wier's Count II negligence claim is governed by Illinois law. It is undisputed that, at all relevant times, Mile Post was a common carrier of
passengers for hire. Mile Post contends that it was
under no duty at common law to provide a minivan
equipped with rearseat headrests. Additionally, it
argues that the lack of a headrest was not the proximate cause of Wier's injuries. It fails to cite any
legal precedent in support of either of these propositions.
The elements of a common law action for negligence are (1) a duty owed by the defendant to the
plaintiff; (2) a breach of that duty by the defendant;
and (3) an injury to the plaintiff proximately resulting from that breach. Mieher v. Brown, 54 IH.2d
539, 301 N.E.2d 307, 308 (1973). In Illinois, a
common carrier must exercise the highest degree of
care for the safety of its passengers consistent with
the practical operation of its conveyances. Katamqy
v. Chicago Transit Authority, 53 I!!.2d 27, 289
N.E,2d 623, 625 (1972); Rotheli v. Chicago Transit
Authority, 7 I11.2d 172, 130 N.E.2d 172, 175
(1955). Specifically, a carrier must take all reasonable action to avoid foreseeable accidents and consequential injuries to passengers. Wasserman v.
City of Chicago, 190 lll.App.3d 1064, 138 Ill.Dec.
319, 547 N.E.2d 486, 488 (1st Dist.1989), appeal
denied, 129 IH.2d 573, 140 Ill.Dec. 681, 550 N.E.2d
566 (1990); Gordon v. Chicago Transit Authority,
128 Ill.App.3d 493, 83 Ill.Dec. 743, 470 N.E.2d
1163,1169 (1st Dist.1984).
Mile Post asserts that, while rearseat headrests may
be desirable, common carriers are not obliged to
use them. But reading the record in the light most
favorable to Wier, a reasonable factfinder could
conclude that by transporting Wier in a vehicle that
lacked rearseat headrests, Mile Post was not exercising the highest degree of care consistent with its
practical operations to guarantee his safety. This

Page 6

genuine issue of material fact is sufficient to defeat
Mile Post's claim for summary judgment with respect to Mile Post's duty of care.
On the issue of proximate cause, the standard of
proof required of Wier with respect to his claim
against Mile Post is higher than that pertaining to
his FELA claim against Sao Line. Wier must show
that, but for Mile Post's failure to provide seats
equipped with headrests, he would probably not
have been injured. Smith v. Chicago Limousine Service, Inc., 109 lll.App.3d 755, 65 IlKDec. 289, 441
N.E.2d 81, 85 (1st Dist.1982) (quoting Kind v.
Hycel, Inc., 56 Ill.App.3d 772, 14 Ill.Dec. 374, 372
N.E.2d 385, 396 (1st Dist.1977)). In this regard, for
the reasons stated above, Wier has produced sufficient evidence to survive Mile Post's motion for
summary judgment. The proximate causal relationship between Mile Post's selection of a vehicle
without rearseat headrests and Wier's subsequent
injuiies is an issue of material fact in this case. Accordingly, summary judgment in favor of Mile Post
will be denied with respect to the issue of proximate cause.
*7 Finally, Mile Post does not expressly address
Linda Wier's Count IV loss of consortium claim in
its motion for summary judgment. To the extent
that the motion may be construed as implicity seeking summary judgment with respect to Count IV,
the motion is denied for the reasons stated above.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that defendants'
motion for summary judgment [31] is denied. In
open court on September 15, 1998 at 9:15 a.m., the
parties shall file an original and one copy of a topbound, final pretrial order in full compliance with
Local Rule 5.00.
N.D.IH.,1998.
Wier v. Soo Line R. Co.
Not Reported in F.Supp.2d,
(N.D.I11.)

1998 WL 474098

END OF DOCUMENT
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ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANTS UNION PACIFIC
RAILROAD COMPANY AND BROWN'S CREW
CAR OF WYOMING, INC.

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
JOHN D.ARCHER,

]
Plaintiff,

vs.

])

PROPOSED ORDER

;>

Civil No. 060909436

APRIL GAULTNEY, an individual;
]
BROWN'S CREW CAR OF WYOMING, INC. ]1
d/b/a ARMADILLO EXPRESS, a Wyoming
]
Corporation; and UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD )
COMPANY, a Delaware corporation,
]
Defendants.

Honorable Judith S.H. Atherton

]

The matter of Plaintiff s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Regarding Application of
FELA Liability to Van Transportation having come before the Honorable Judith S.H. Atherton,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1.

That said Motion is GRANTED in the following respects.

2.

That for purposes of this case, Defendant Brown's Crew Car of Wyoming, Inc. is

deemed to be an agent of Defendant Union Pacific Railroad Company in connection with
«

transportation of Plaintiff.
3.

That at the time of the accident at issue, Defendant Brown's Crew Car of

Wyoming, Inc. was performing an operational activity of Defendant Union Pacific Railroad
Company in transporting Plaintiff John Archer.
4.

That said motion is DENIED in connection with Plaintiffs request for a finding

that the vehicle owned and operated by Defendant Brown's Crew Car of Wyoming, Inc. was the
constructive property of Defendant Union Pacific Railroad Company.
Dated this

b

day of

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 11th day of April, 2007,1 caused a true and correct copy of
the within and foregoing PROPOSED ORDER to be mailed, postage prepaid, to the following:
Philip G. Arnold
Bahareh Samanian
ROSSI, COX, VUCINOVICH, P.C.
777 108th Ave.. NE, Suite 2050
Bellevue, Washington 98004
Ralph C. Petty
10 West Broadway Suite 800
Salt Lake City. Utah 84101
Peter H. Christensen
Ryan P. Atkinson
STRONG &HANNI
3 Triad Center Suite 500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84180
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1

SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH - SEPTEMBER 22, 2008

2

JUDGE JUDITH S. ATHERTON

3

P R O C E E D I N G S

4

THE COURT:

Let's take the matter of John D. Archer

5

vs. April Gaultney and others. Case No. 060909436.

6

counsel state their appearances?

7

MR. MEWBORN:

8

MR. ATKINSON:

THE COURT:

Okay.

MR. ATKINSON:

14

THE COURT:

15

MR. ARNOLD:

17
18
19

And you're just sitting in

right?

13

16

Ryan Atkinson, Your Honor, for April

Gaultney.

11
12

I'm James Mewborn for the defendants,

Brown's (inaudible) of Wyoming, Union Pacific Railroad.

9
10

Will

Yes, I am.

Okay.
Phil Arnold for plaintiff, John

Archer.
THE COURT:

Okay, thank you.

All right, Mr.

Mewborn, this is your motion.
I'll tell you, counsel, that I've reviewed a rather

20

substantial number of pages in preparation so I believe that

21

I'm pretty well up to speed and just then, Mr. Mewborn, it

22

appears that the issues then are three, the negligence

23

against Armadillo based on failure to install rear seat head

24

restraints; negligence against Armadillo's driver, Casey

25

Sorensen; and the FELA claim against Union Pacific; is that

1

correct?

2

MR. MEWBORN:

3

THE COURT:

That's correct, Your Honor.

And it's true then, Mr. Arnold, that

4 I you did conceded in your briefs the breach of third party
5

contract and concerning the uninsured, under insured motorist

6

and the off-track vehicle accident?

7

MR. ARNOLD:

8

THE COURT:

9

right, just those three claims?

Okay.

10

MR. MEWBORN:

11

THE COURT:

12
13

Yes, we have, Your Honor.
So that's where we are, is that

Yes.
Okay, so I will entertain some argument

but I think I really am pretty familiar with what's going on.
MR. MEWBORN:

I'm glad you had a chance to look at

14

all that paper, Your Honor.

15

and I'll try to kind of get through it fairly quickly then.

16

Basically we're moving for Summary Judgment here because the

17

plaintiff is seeking to impose liability on all of my clients

18

because they didn't require head restraints on all of your

19

transport vehicles.

20

rear-end accident in September 2004 where the pretty simple

21

facts, one driver, Ms. Gaultney, admittedly dozed

22

wheel and the next thing she knew she was waking up and

23

realized that she had been in a rear-end collision, had rear-

24

ended the Armadillo van.

25

It's quite a lot I understand

The undisputed evidence is that we got a

off at the

That's undisputed,

It's also undisputed that there are no complains to

1

either defendant about the lack of rear head restraints prior

2

to this incident and the National Highway Traffic Safety

3

Administration does not in fact require such head restraints

4

and one of the documents that we've submitted to Your Honor

5

is the regulatory discussion by the NITSA from 2004 where

6

they considered and rejected a rule requiring head restraints

7

and they pointed out that existing head restraints were

8

largely ineffective at protecting rearward movement of

9

passengers.

10

So we've got that and frankly, there's no evidence

11

of any carrier or transport company, whether it's' railroad

12

shuttle companies or taxi companies or airport shuttles being

13

required to only purchase vehicles with these rear head

44

restraints and there's nothing unique about the business that

15

Armadillo is in and nobody is required to have those head

16

restraints.

17

essentially what the plaintiff is seeking to do in this case

18

is to have the Court impose this requirement on my client and

19

in effect this particular industry when the federal

20

government has not seen fit to require manufacturers to

21

install these head restraints.

22

In fact, as we know NITSA doesn't require it and

In their opposition, the plaintiff challenges just

23

a handful of the long list of undisputed facts that we have

24

listed in our moving papers and the points that the plaintiff

25

does not object to or contravene is that neither Archer nor

1

Gaultney have knowledge of anything that Sorensen did, that

2

our driver that caused or contributed to the accident, that

3

at the time this 2001 van was manufactured, NITSA did not

4

require installation of rear head restraints and that in

5

March of 2005 NITSA considered and rejected a proposed change

6

to the requirement of rear head resti^aints dr the lack of a

7

requirement of rear head restraints and NITSA found that the

8

use of properly manufactured head restraints reduces the

9

possibility of neck injuries in rear-end collisions but

10
11

doesn't eliminate or prevent all such injuries.
Plaintiff doesn't dispute that prior to the

12

accident neither Union Pacific nor Armadillo had received any

13

complaints or concerns about the absence of head restraints,

44

They don't dispute that there's a variety of these type of

15

devices out there, some of which are better than others.

16

Although there is an adjustable head restraint available as

17

an option for this particular 2001 van.

18

expert nor our expert, mechanical experts were able to locate

19

such a van within 100 mile radius of Salt Lake City and also,

20

the effectiveness of the head restraint system can be

21

affected by the position of the person sitting in the

22

Neither plaintiffs

van.

The real issue here, Your Honor, is whether there's

23

a duty on the part of Armadillo to provide vans,

24

transportation with rear head restraints and'the fact is -

25

and that's a legal issue, of course, it's not a matter to be

1

determined by experts, it's one for the Court and under -

2

well, foresee ability would be one of the iSsues that would

3

go into whether there's a duty and again, there's no

4

particular, there is no evidence of foresee ability that the

5

head- restraint would have done anything.

6

evidence accumulated by the federal agency is that these head

7

restraints are really kind of hit or miss proposition,

8
9

In fact the

We've touched on the issue also of conflict
prevention as a kind of an interesting, I thought kind of an

10

interesting argument that's applicable to this case.

11

hasn't been, as far as I can tell, hasn't b<3en applied in

12

this particular case, the U.S. Supreme Court case, the Guyer

13

vs. American Honda Company case dealt with a suit, against the

-14

manufacturer for not having air bags and the Court rejected a

15

requirement, rejected enforcing the plaintiff's request to

16

find liability on the part of the manufacturer and the same

17

rationale really applies here that where you're got NITSA

18

never requiring the head restraints on rear seats and that

19

basically you have a consumer here that is being, the

20

plaintiff is asking to impose a rule on consumer when the

21

manufacturer itself has no such obligation to install head

22

restraints.

23

THE COURT:

It

And your argument to apply this

24

conflict preemption is that a state court is equivalent to

25

state regulation?

1

MR. MEWBORN:

2

THE COURT:

3

Yes.

And that's what plaintiff took issue

with?

4 I

MR. MEWBORN:

5

THE COURT:

Yes, that's my -

And you're just saying that the state

6

court action really is the equivalent of applying state law

7

whether it's through the courts in adjudicating or the

8

legislature by passing statute?

9

MR. MEWBORN:

10

Yes, whether it's statute or

regulation or court decision.

11

And again, there is no evidence, they've

12

acknowledged as much by not contesting the fact that there's

13

no evidence that Mr. Sorensen, the driver, did anything wrong

-14

and Ms. Gaultney couldn't point to anything, Mr. Archer in

15

his deposition couldn't point to anything.

16

nothing to support that.

17

There's just

The plaintiff in opposition to our motion has

18

submitted a number of affidavits from Mr. Archer -himself and

19

from a couple of doctors and from Mr. France, the plaintiff's

20

expert and as Your Honor knows from our reply brief, you

21

know, we're taking the position that they can't have reports

22

and deposition testimony saying one thing and then come up on

23

a summary judgment motion and say just conclusory statements

24

that yes a head restraint would have made a difference.

25

the case of the two doctors, they've already disqualified

In

1

themselves in their depositions saying they don't have any

2

particular biomechanical training and they're not head

3

restraint experts but yet they come up with very similarly

4

worded affidavits saying, yes, it would have made a

5

difference when the agency that performed that investigation

6

in 2004 (inaudible) concluded otherwise,

7

With regard to the specific head restraint system

8

that was available as an option, our expert, Mr. Ashmead, Dr.

9

Ashmead, has opined that he doesn't think that head restraint

10

would have made any difference and Dr. France, plaintiff's

11

expert, from his deposition testimony, he went to a dealer to

12

see what was available.

13

that there was a head restraint available as an option.

JL4

France has not done any particular study or testing of that

15

particular head restraint system, to determine

16

were installed it would have been one of the more effective

17

head restraint systems.

18

The dealer was actually surprised
Dr.

even if it

Basically, Your Honor, the plaintiff has a case

19

where the driver itself, himself, didn't do anything wrong

20

and plaintiff is looking for a theory to hang some liability

21

on Armadillo and the U.P. Railroad and the evidence just

22

isn't there either that a head restraint would have made a

23

difference, there's no causation.

24

speculate about a number of factors as to had there been head

25

restraint, they have to speculate would it have been

It's asking the jury to

1

effective and that Mr. Archer would have been sitting in a

2

fashion that it would have made it effective and all of that

3

is speculation.

4

have any questions.

5

Basically that's it, Your Honor, unless you

THE COURT:

So essentially what you're saying is

6

that the duty is not owed based - essentially you argued that

7

foresee ability is really the critical issue here, that there

8

is no duty since Dyer didn't impose a duty on a manufacturer,

9

essentially bootstrapping it to a consumer, can't be done

10

either.

11

lacking also.

12
13

MR. MEWBORN:

That's right.

The plaintiffs claim

fails on multiple levels, Your Honor,

JL4
15

But if I were to find a duty, the causation is

THE COURT:

Okay.

No, I think that's all I - I

don't have any further questions at the moment.

16

Mr. Arnold?

17

MR. ARNOLD:

18

THE COURT:

Thank you.
And also, I know I focused on Mr.

19

Mewborn but I've also reviewed of course your response and

20

attachments as well.

21

MR. ARNOLD:

Thank you, Your Honor.

This case is a

22

rear-end motor vehicle accident.

John Archer went to work,

23

the van that he was injured in was his workplace.

24

have any prior neck or shoulder complaints or symptoms or

25

history.

He didn't

8

1

I'll address first the issue of the Federal Motor

2

Vehicle Safety Standards which obviously apply only to

3

manufacturers.

4

In this case we're not simply alleging that the defendant

5

should have retrofitted the van that Mr. Archer was a

6

passenger in, they had a choice.

7

200 vehicles that they did have, one-third of the fleet of

8

Armadillo had rear seat head restraints.

9

used those vehicles if they wanted to.

They don't apply to consumers or other users.

They could have used the

They could have
If they didn't want

10

to use one of those 200 vehicles then they could have

11

retrofitted the van.

12

There's no prohibition against that.

This is in part a Federal Employer's Liability Act

13

case.

The standard for negligence and for causation is

-14

different than the state standard for negligence for a common

15

carrier.

16

part, even the slightest part of causation.

17

statute and part of the remedy as has been articulated by the

18

Supreme Court is a jury trial.

19

go to trial than in normal negligence cases.

20

I think we have a very strong case here.

21

lack of foresee ability.

22

admissions where Union Pacific has admitted that it has a

23

responsibility to provide a safe workplace.

24

Archer was riding in on the day of his injury was his

25

workplace.

FELA causation is based upon proving in whole or in
It's a remedial

More cases in the FELA avenue
I say that but

Defendant claims a

We provided the Court a number of

The van that Mr.

They admit they had a responsibility to identify

1

reasonably foreseeable hazards,

They admitted that rear-end

2

collisions were reasonable foreseeable hazards.

3

Union Pacific had a safety committee with noted that there

4

was a large number of accidents occurring when they

5

transported their crews.

6

a responsibility to reduce the risk of any foreseeable hazard

7

and more importantly, the Union Pacific knew before this

8

motor vehicle accident that seat head! restraints were

9

important safety devices and reduced the risk of neck

In 1990 the

The Union Pacific admits they have

10

injuries in rear-end collisions.

11

deposition.

12

That's our Exhibit 10, Pages 12, Line 6 through 17, Pages 25,

13

Line 12 through 24,

14

rest before Mr, Archer's injury.

15

required Armadillo to have a seat head restraint in the rear

16

seat or they could have had Armadillo provide one of the

17

vehicles that already had a seat head restraint,

18

That was the Bryzitis

He was the speaking agent on behalf of the U.P.

They admit the function of a seat head
They admit they could have

Armadillo takes the position that they didn't know

19

what a seat head restraint was which is inconsistent with the

20

common public knowledge of seat head restraints.

21

the Court in our material fact No. 35, the information that

22

seat head restraints way before, for 30 years before Mr.

23

Archer's injury, was a subject of congressional testimony,

24

safety literature, medical literature.

25

insurance company, consumer publications and the

We provided

It had been put into

10

1

manufacturers themselves had put the purpose and use of seat

2

head restraints in their automobile owner's manuals,

3

Armadillo, through its speaking agent, admits that

4

they had transported Union Pacific crews and vehicles with

5

rear seat head restraints.

6

the vehicles that rear seat head restraints, the rear seat

7

head restraints were adjacent to the windows and that the

8

center rear seat did not have a head restraint and at certain

9

railroad locations, railroaders were restricted from using

They also admitted that some of

10

those center seats without the rear seat head restraints when

11

transported by Armadillo.

12

injury,

13

THE COURT:

-14

MR. ARNOLD:

15
16
17

This is before Mr, Archer's

And where is that in the deposition?
That is in material statement of fact

No. 14, 15 and 16.
THE COURT:

In the affidavit though, where is it in

the deposition, not the affidavit, but the deposition?

18

MR. ARNOLD:

It's in Mr. Brown's deposition,

19

Exhibit 11 and it's on Page 17.

20

if the Court would like me to,

21

THE COURT:

22

MR. ARNOLD:

I can read that to the Court

I've got it here.
Page 17, Line 14 and it states,

23

question, this is Mr, Brown, "Well, what would prevent you

24

from purchasing a September 26, 2001 Suburban that had five

25

seat head rests for passengers?"
11

1

Answer, "No, you see you just said five*

Your

2

previous question said all passengers.

3

center seat and to my knowledge there's never been a head

4

rest for the center seat."

5

I was looking at the

Question, "Part of the contract between Armadillo

6

and (inaudible) Transportation Services, Inc. operating on

7

behalf of U.P., must provide vehicles that were no more than

8

three years of ago; is that correct?"

9
10

"Yes."
And he goes on to say that given enough lead time,

11

they could have all their fleet have rear seat head

12

restraints.

13

Going onto Page 10, Line 15, question, "So you're

J.4

saying that some Armadillo vehicles purchased, the

15

manufacturer put the head rests for cill the. passengers on the

16

outward seats in the rear and in some vehicles they did not?"

17

Answer, "Varying by make and model."

18

Then on Page 7, Line 20. Answer, "And that, well,

19

there are some railroad locations have limited it to five

20

passengers where we did no use the center seats.

21

hold seven passengers."

22

It could

Putting that together, what they're saying is that

23

in those vehicles that didn't have head rests in the center

24

seats, railroad crews were restricted from using those seats

25

before Mr. Archer's injury.

And as I have said, they had
12
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1

compliance with NITSA requirements and so how does that duty

2

then go to Onion Pacific or Armadillo, Union Pacific really

3

under FELA, to impose a greater requirement than is required

4

by federal regulatory and imposed upon the actual

5

manufacturer?

6

MR. ARNOLD:

This is the argument that the van

7

should have been retrofitted because we do have the argument

8

that there was vehicles that had rear seat head rests.

9
10

THE COURT:

But not retrofitted, they were

different vehicles,

11

MR. ARNOLD: They were different vehicles.

12

THE COURT: They were Suburbans, not vans?

13

MR. ARNOLD:

-14

could have been used.

15

THE COURT:

16

MR. ARNOLD:

They were different vehicles that

Right.
Well, it's a complicated discussion,

17

Dr. France points out that most adults sit in the front seat.

18

In the back seat you tend to have children and there's less

19

injuries occurring in the back seat because of non-adult use.

20

He says in his affidavit though is that for an adult, the

21

risk of a whiplash type injury is the same whether you're

22

seated in the front seat or the rear seat and so the National

23

Highway Traffic Safety Agency is just looking at the numbers

24

and a cost and that's when they made that decision.

25

THE COURT:

Now -

But did Dr. France look at this
14

vehicle?

Couldn't

(inaudible).
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n e c k movement t h e n we c o u l d

prevent

1

all whiplash injuries, the sore neck that might last a day,

2

So there's two different injuries being contemplated here,

3

hyper extension for the spinal cord injury and the sore neck

4

muscles for preventing all rearward neck movement.

5

a nuance and Dr. France and the neurosurgeon point out

6

there's a hyper extension injury that occurred to Mr, Archer

7

and the hyper extension injury is what contused his spinal

8

cord.

9

subjected to, would have prevented hyper extension but would

10

not perhaps have prevented sore neck muscles that could have

11

lasted a day or two or three.

12

So that's

So yes, the standard that Mr. Archer would have been

The duty for the railroad is different than the

13

ordinary consumer.

The duty of the railroad is to provide

-14

Mr. Archer a reasonably safe place to work is a continuing

15

non-delible duty.

16

hazards in the workplace and to take reasonable action to

17

remedy those hazards.

18

ordinary consumers such as perhaps Mr. Mewborn or I taking a

19

friend to a movie in our vehicle.

20

from the relationship of an employer owing safety duties and

21

responsibilities to an employee, Mr. Archer.

22

is an agent of the Union Pacific as the Court has previously

23

ruled.

24

other safety device and here it was an important safety

25

device to prevent hyper extension.

They have a duty to investigate potential

It's remedial statute.

It's not as

This is a duty growing

Armadillo Van

So the rear seat head restraint is analogous to any

It was foreseeable that
16
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1

THE COURT:

2

MR. ARNOLD:

And what do they know about vehicles?
What do they know about vehicles?

I

3

think that rear-end motor vehicle collision's are a common

4

occurrence in our society and in the medical practice.

5

know, that the defense in its opening brief made that argument

6

without citing any authority that a doctor, a medical doctor

7

is not qualified to testify to medical causation with respect

8

to a rear-end motor vehicle collision but that -

9

THE COURT:

I

Certainly the doctors can speak to the

10

cause of the injury which is a contusion, but can a doctor

11

really speak to the presence of absence of equipment in a

12

vehicle that might have intervened?

13
-14

MR. ARNOLD:

Well, yes, because in this case the

issue is could hyper-extension have been prevented? And Dr.

15

France and the NITSA say yes, you could prevent hyper-

16

extension with the standard that was then prevalent and it's

17

the hyper-extension mechanism.

18

affidavit as well as Dr. France, an article published in the

19

medical journal, Spine, that talked about hyper-extension

20

causing these types of neck, cervical cord contusions.

21

was in the medical literature and that is what is relevant in

22

this case.

23

protection against all injury and how much rear displacement

24

of the head is there with headrest A and B, no, they wouldn't

25

know that but they do know it prevents hyper-extension

Dr. Huntsman related in his

So it

Now whether, you know, a head rest provides

18
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1

Traffic Safety Agency which says manufacturers do not have to

2

put in rear headrests in the rear seat, they can if they want

3

and the Federal Employer's Liability Act says that you're

4

suppose to provide a reasonably safe place to work and

5

investigate potential hazards and reduce reasonable

6

foreseeable risks with safety devices in essence is our

7

argument and the seat headrest is a safety device.

8
9

You have a common carrier, Armadillo, in this
business that had vehicles that had rear seat head restraints

10

and that should have known constructively, you know, based

11

upon the public domain information that seat head restraints

12

are there for a purpose, that the manufacturers in the

13

owner's manual provides information why they're there and

-14

that they just simply can't duck their head*in the sand and

15

claim ignorance.

16

Armadillo subjectively, we just have to say that there's

17

enough there to take it to a jury and I think there's

18

substantial information to take it to a jury.

19

We don't have to prove actual notice to

THE COURT:

So you're not accepting, you just

20

reject defendant's argument that the state court

21

determination is the equivalent of state legislation statute

22

so that the preemption applies?

23

MR. ARNOLD:

24

THE COURT:

25

MR. ARNOLD:

No You're saying simply no?
No.

I don't go that far.

I think
20

state action or state court action is equivalent t.c state
legislative action,
1111 ' Ji'l/I
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nodical causation and this concept of
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1

sham affidavits I think is an unfortunate one.

2

at - and I'd like to go specifically and look at the evidence

3

and direct the Court's attention to Exhibit 7 which is the

4

deposition of Dennis Gordon, an orthopedic surgeon, on Page

5

45, Iiine 23, there the question is "Therefore, it's your

6

opinion that the head restraint or the lack.of head restraint

7

in this particular instance was a causative factor with the

8

shoulder injury?"

9
10

If you look

Answer, "Yes, I think it contributed to it, yes."
Then when you go to his affidavit, Exhibit 15,

11

Paragraph B, it's consistent.

12

absence of a seat head restraint is one of the probable

13

medical causes of the aforementioned injuries.7' There's no

,14
15

In his affidavit he says, "The

inconsistency there.
We go to Dr. Huntsman and his deposition, Exhibit 5

16

on Page 33, Line 9, the question says, "I'm looking at the

17

bottom paragraph of page 1 of this June 6, 2007 letter.

18

were asked whether or not the absence of a seat or head

19

restraint was one of the medical causes of the neck injury

20

that you treated Mr. Archer for, correct,"

You

21

Answer, "Correct."

22

Question, "What's your understanding as to what the

23
24
25

intent of the head restraint is in an automobile?"
Answer, "To prevent flexion, extension type injury
by avoiding excessive extension."
22
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1

"The fact that he was then involved in this motor vehicle

2

accident in which his head and neck were not restrained, did

3

likely cause the myopathy and likely caused a subsequent need

4

for surgical intervention."

5 I

Likely, that's before the deposition-

The

6

depositions never asked him in the terms of medical

7

probability.

8

I mean, can you rule out the possibility?

9

The defense counsel didn't aslj: him, well, gosh,
No, I can't.

Then Dr. Huntsman in his affidavit in Exhibit 14

10

consistently states in Paragraph 5(b) "It is medically

11

probable that Mr. Archer would not have suffered these

12

injuries from a rear-end collision if he had a seat head

13

restraint at the time of the collision."

-14

Those are all consistent.

Those aren't sham

15

affidavits, those aren't a neurosurgeon who is impeaching

16

himself and testifying falsely or an orthopedic surgeon who

17

is impeaching himself or testifying falsely.

18

consistent with their pre-deposition statements, they're

19

consistent with the questions that were asked at the

20

deposition and consistent with the affidavit.

They're

21

Your Honor, this case really is about the absence

22

of a simple safety device, a seat head restraint to prevent

23

hyper-extension of the neck posing factual questions for the

24

jury with respect to the Union Pacific and the common carrier

25

Armadillo.
24
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1

kind of stepping back and listening to it is that a motor

2

vehicle manufacturer who has the expertise and employees,

3

auto design engineers, you know, government regulations

4

specialists, probably bioraechanical engineers, they do these

5

testing, crash testing, while they don't have an obligation

6

under federal regulations to provide rear head restraints in

7

vehicles of this type, a consumer company like Armadillo who

8

has none of those resources available or on board, has a

9

higher duty than does a Chevrolet or a General Motors and I

10

mean, it strikes me that to require a company like Armadillo

11

or a company like an airport shuttle service which basically

12

uses the same kind of vehicles, basically you're saying, the

13

plaintiff is saying that they need to have orthopedic

-14

surgeons and head restraint experts and motor vehicle design

15

engineers in order to make vehicle design decisions about

.16

what features to add on and whether the particular feature is

17

appropriate•

18

General Motors has an optional head restraining that not even

19

a dealer was aware of until he looked it up at Dr. France's

20

request, but you know, we've also got to make a

21

determination, you know, that just because GM provides it,

22

that's not good enough, we've got to look at it and make sure

23

it's an adequate whiplash control device which strikes me as

24

really, really backwards and it kind of ties into the

25

preemption argument.

You know, it's not enough just to say, okay,

-26
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1

where the company would tell passengers not to ride in the

2

middle seat.

3

testimony dealt with anything to do with the existence or

4

non-existence of a head restraint.

5

other possibilities for that, explanations for that such as

6

not, you know, trying not to block the rear view of the

7

driver or perhaps lack of a shoulder harness in some of those

8

seat positions.

9

I don't think that it specifically dealt, his

I mean, there's certainly

With respect to the doctor's opinions, I mean,

10

orthopedic doctors certainly have lots of expertise but at

11

least the particular doctors that we're dealing with in this

12

case have indicated that they aren't experts in head

13

restraints.

There's no evidence that they've made any

.14

particular study of head restraints or this particular

15

vehicle and head restraint system in particular.

16

evidence with respect to this particular head restraint is

17

that of Dr. Ashby, our expert who says it doesn't think it

18

would have made any difference.

19

contradict that, Your Honor, and I guess for all those

20

reasons as for the reasons set forth in our filings, that's

21

why we're looking for summary judgment.

22

THE COURT:

The only

There's nothing to

What about really, that gets down to

23

the last arguments really we've been talking about, what a

24

jury might consider and that's not where summary judgment is.

25

What I need to determine is again, those tort elements, the
28

1

duty, foresee ability -

2

MR, MEWBORN:

And again, like I think the evidence

3

is uncontradicted, there is no - the evidence is that there's

4

nobody at Brown's (inaudible) Car or the (inaudible) that had

5

any particular specialized knowledge about head restraints

6

more than, you know, a person walking down the street that

7

you had some general sense that, yeah, head restraints are a

8

good idea but there's nothing beyond that and there's nothing

9

to show that this particular head restraint system available

10

on this vehicle would have made any difference and, you know,

11

the government agency charged with examining such things,

12

NITSA, has not required head restraints and if they can't

13

find the justification to do it, it's hard to see how

-14

imposing in litigation that duty on a private company makes

15

any sense.

16

THE COURT:

All right, thanks.

17

MR. MEWBORN:

18

THE COURT:

Okay,

Okay, thank you.
Starting with the issue of disputed

19

facts.

There were four facts designated in plaintiff's

20

response that were disputed, 3, 23, 26 and 32, No. 3 really

21

simply wasn't a dispute; No. 23, I find not to be material;

22

No. 26 I find is cited really out of context; and No. 32

23

regarding the doctor's opinions of causation.

24

agreeing with counsel for the defendant with regard to the

25

affidavits submitted with plaintiff's response.

First, I am

I'm not
29

1

going to consider them.

2

expertise is part of an M.D.

3

affidavits and accordingly, I find that there is no genuine

4

issue of material fact in this case.

5

in all areas by defendant's position and I find that the

6

defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

7

granting the Motion for Summary Judgment in each instance.

8
9

Moreover, I'm persuaded

So I'm

consistent with my ruling.
MR. MEWBORN:

11

THE COURT:

13

So I have not considered those

Mr. Mewborn, if you will prepare then an order

10

12

I don't believe that area of

Yes Your Honor.

All right, thanks.

Thank you for the

arguments,
MR. MEWBORN:

Thank you.

,14

THE COURT:

Thanks for coming to sunny Utah,

15 I

(Whereupon the hearing was concluded)
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Third Judicial District

James F, Mewborn, Minnesota Bar No. 72370
ARTHUR, CHAPMAN, KETTERING,
SMETAK & PKALA, P.A.
500 Young Quinlan Building
81 South Ninth Street
Minneapolis, MN 55402-3214
(612) 339-3500/Fax: (612) 339-7655

DEC J ! m
SALT LAKE COUNTY

By_

^

E. Scott Savage, Esq. (2865)
Casey K. MoGarvey (4882)
Berman & Savage, P.C.50 South Main Street, Suite 1250
Salt Lake City, UT 84144
(801) 328-2200/Fax - (801) 531-9926
ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANTS UNION PACIFIC
EtAlLROAD COMPANY AND BROWN'S CREW
CAR OF WYOMING, INC.

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

JOHN D.ARCHER,
Plaintiff

APRIL GAULTNBY, an individual;
BROWN'S CREW CAR OF WYOMING, INC.
d/b/a ARMADILLO EXPRESS, a Wyoming
Corporation; and UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD
COMPANY, a Delawaie corporation,
Defendants.

Civil No. 060909436
Honoiable Judith S. H. Atherton

AMENDED ORDER GRANTING
miWNVAmS
BROWN'S CREW
CAR OF WYOMING, INC., d/b/a
ARMADILLO EXPRESS'S AND
UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD
COMPANY'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

This matter came before the Court for hearing on Defendants Brown's Crew Car of
Wyoming, Inc., d/b/a Armadillo Express's and Union Pacific Railroad Company's Motion for
Summary Judgment on September 22,2008. Attorney Philip G. Arnold appeared on behalf of the
Plaintiff John D. Archer. Attorney James R Mewborn appeared on behalf of the Defendants
Brown's Crew Car of Wyoming, Lie, d/b/a Armadillo Express ("Armadillo") and Union Pacific
Railroad Company ("Union Pacific"). AttomeyRyan Atkinson appeared on behalf of the Defendant
Apiil Gaultney,
The Court having read the memorandafiledwith respect to the Motion and having heard oral
argument and beingftilladvised in the premises, hereby GRANTS Defendants' motion for summary
judgment based upon the following grounds:
1. Neither Armadillo nor Union Pacific owed Plaintiff a duty to provide transportation
equipped with rear seat head restraints.
2. The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration does not impose a duty on
vehicle manufacturers to install rear seat head restraints and specifically consideied
and rejected imposing such a duty upon manufactuters. Imposing such a duty upon
consumers such as Armadillo or Union Pacific would be inconsistent with the
NHTSA manufacturing requirements, particularly in light fof the absence of
specialized knowledge of head lestraints on the part of defendants in this case
Plaintiffs claims against Armadillo and Union Pacific based upon failure of

2

Armadillo and Union Pacific to provide transportation with leai seat head restraints
are therefore barred by the doctrine of conflict preemption,
3, Even if Armadillo and/or Union Pacific owed Plaintiff a duty, and Plaintiffs claims
were not barred by the doctrine of conflict preemption, PlaintifFis unable to prove by
a preponderance of the evidence that Plaintiff would not have suffered his injuries if
there had been rear seat head restraints installed in the subject van. Indeed, Plaintiffs
experts are unable to offer any opinions as to whether the existence of a rear seat
head restraint would have prevented the Plaintiffs injuries.
4. There are no disputed material facts demonstrating any negligence on behalf of
Armadillo's driver, Casey Sorensen.
Based upon the foregoing, Counts II and IV of the Amended Complaint against Defendants
are dismissed with prejudice and on the merits. Plaintiff has conceded Defendants' aiguments on
summary judgment pertaining to Counts V and VI of the Amended Complaint, and those claims are
therefore dismissed with prejudice and on the merits.
The Court hereby ORDERS that all of the Plaintiff s claims against the Defendants Brown's
Crew Car of Wyoming, Inc., d/b/a Armadillo Express and Union Pacific Railroad Company aie
dismissed with prejudice and upon the merits.
Pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court expressly determines
that there is no just reason for delay and expressly directs entry of final judgment in favor of Brown's
Crew Car of Wyoming, Inc., d/b/a Annadillo Express, and the Union Pacific Railroad Company.

DATED this- 16 • day of " k ^ 7 , , 2008
BY THE

^Tlird
VHonorabli

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I heieby certify that on this 13th day of November, 2008,1 caused a true and correct copy of
the within and foregoing {PROPOSED] AMENDED ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS
BROWN'S CREW CAR OF WYOMING, INC., d/b/a ARMADILLO EXPRESS'S AND
UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT to be
mailed, postage prepaid, to the following:
Philip G. Arnold, Esq.
James K. Vucinovich, Esq.
Bahareh Samanian, Esq.
Rossi, Cox, Vucinovich, P.C.
10900 NE 8th Street, Suite 1122
Bellevue, WA 95004-4456
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Traumatic Myelopathy in
Patients With Cervical
Spinal Stenosis Without
Fracture or Dislocation
Methods of Diagnosis,
Management, and Prognosis
NANCY EPSTEIN, MD,* JOSEPH A. EPSTEIN, MD.t
VALLO BENJAMIN, MD,* and
JOSEPH RANSOHOFF, MD*

The NewYork University Spinal Cord Trauma Center recently completed
an evaluation of 200 patients seen over a period of four years, from
1974 to 1978. A unique group of 23 patients with cervical spinal stenosis and myelopathy without fracture or dislocation was isolated. The
presence of a narrow canal significantly Influenced morbidity and prognosis. Based on a review of plain roentgenograms and myelograms, there
were seven patients with an average age of 41 who had absolute low levels of narrowing of the spinal canal without evidence of degenerative
changes. The remaining 16 patients, averaging 61 years of age, h^d superimposed spondylosis. In both groups, patients with the lowest anteroposterior diameters of the spinal canal had the most severe myelopathy
after trauma. Patients with absolute stenosis were more susceptible to
traumatic myelopathy than were those with relative stenosis. Varying the
dose of steroids to maximal levels had no effect on prognosis. Patients
showing improvement during the intitial 48 hours had the greatest degree
of eventual recovery. [Key words: Traumatic myelopathy, cervical spinal
steonosis, surgery]

HE NEW YORK University Spinal Cord
Trauma Center recently completed an evaluation of 200 patients seen over a period of
four years, from 1974 to 1978. A unique

£ From the New York University Medical Center, Department of
Neurosurgery, 550 First Avenue, New York, New Yorlc,# and the
[ong Island Jewish-Hillside Medical Center, Long Island, New
iork.t
f This work was partially supported by NINCDS Grant Number NS
I0164-O651 NSPA.
[Submitted for publication April 20, 1979.
Fine authors express their appreciation to Mrs. Juliette Newman,
pwrdinator of the Spina! Cord Injury Center, and to Ms. Sherry
[?ynn Grimm for her dedicated efforts in editing and preparing the
|*fttt$cript.

group of 23 patients with cervical spinal stenosis and
myelopathy without fracture or dislocation was isolated.
These patients had unusual clinical findings, which had
a specific impact on methods of treatment, morbidity,
and prognosis.
All patients arriving at the Center were assessed on
the basis of a complete neurologic evaluation followed
by roentgenographic examination of the spine to identify and to document the presence of fracture and subluxation. Patients were thei> randomly assigned to differing steroid dose schedules currently being evaluated.
For patients with cervical trauma, myelography was
performed within the first 48 hours by means of a Cl-2
puncture after institution of tong traction to reduce dis-
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locations and to maintain vertebral alignment. Studies
of spinal evoked sensory potential were carried out for
the majority of patients.
In the comprehensive management of all 200 cases,
myelography evidence of external compression upon
the spinal cord in patients with partial or complete cord
lesions justified operative decompression. However, in
the 23 patients with asymptomatic cervical spinal stenosis prior to injury who did not have fracture or dislocation, myelography evidence of complete block was
infrequent (Table 1), and new criteria regarding treatment had to be developed. These 23 patients were randomly assigned to receive differing doses of steroids,
depending on the current protocols. Surgical decompression was utilized only for patients whose conditions
deteriorated clinically.
For such patients, if the myelogram showed relevant
ventral defects, an anterior diskectomy and fusion were
performed. If the defects were posterior, laminectomy
was done with duroplasty and fusion. Myelotomy was
considered on a randomized basis only if significant
cord swelling was present below C5 in the presence of
myelopathy.
The neurologic status of each patient was evaluated
periodically throughout the period of hospitalization.
Motor power was quantitated m the following manner:
0 to 5 points were assigned for each extremity, with 0
representing total absence of function and 5 representing normal strength. The sum of the points for the four
extremities rendered a possible maximum of 20/20
points. The four-extremity totals for the entire group
were then added up. This sum was divided by the number of patients in the various groups, to provide an average figure for the motor ability of each patient in a particular category (Tables 2 and 3). The sensory
examination was conducted according to customary
charting patterns. The selected steroid dose was continued for each patient for a ten-day period and then discontinued. These schedules were changed as data during the current study was evaluated. The regimens used
were as follows: The first 104 patients were randomly
assigned to treatment with steroids with or without
Amicar.* Fifty-one cases were treated with SoluMedrol,"!" iv, or Medrol,* po, given in dosages of 20 to 40
mg every six hours. Amicar was used in a dose of 1-2 g
hour for 63 patients. The last 86 patients were given either high doses* or low doses* of steroids. Treatment of
the 23 patients with cervical spinal stenosis and myelop-

* 6-Anrinocaproic acid, Lederte Laboratories, Pearl River, New
York.
t Methylprednisolotie sodium succinate, The Upjohn Company,
Kalamazoo, Michigan.
f Mcthylprcdaisolonc tablets, The Upjohn Company, Kalamazoo,
Michigan.
* High dose: 1 g Solu-Medrol iv daily.
f Low dose: 160 mg Solu-Medrol iv daily.

Table 1 . Myelography Data for Patients with Absolute and
Relative Narrowing of the Spinal Canal

Group

No
block

Partial
block

Total
block

Total
numbtv
of
pal/ems

5

t

1

y

6

7

3

16

11

8

4

23

Absolute narrowing of
the canal
Relative narrowing of the
canal with spondylosis
Total number of patients

athy without fracture or dislocation was evenly distributed among variable dosage schedules.
CASE MATERIAL
On the basis of the findings of the plain roentgenographic studies of the spine, there were 7 patients witfc
evidence of absolute stenosis showing low levels of narrowing of the spinal canal without evidence of degener*
ative arthropathy. The remaining 16 patients had relative stenosis with narrowing of the spinal canal and
superimposed developmental changes associated with
spondylosis (Figure 1). The anatomic alteratic-ns were
similar to those described by Verbiest18 who distinguished between patients with relative and patients with
absolute stenosis of the lumbar spinal canal and for
whom absolute stenosis implied a ventrodorsal diameter
of 10 mm ox less, while relative stenosis implied a canal
of greater depth. In the absolute group, small intrusions
normally not producing symptoms became clinically
significant. In our patients, remarkably similar measurements of the cervical spinal canal conformed to the
range of normal and abnormal already reported for the
lumbar region. A diameter of less than 10 mm was considered to be indicative of absolute narrowing. Measurements less than 13 mm were placed in the category
of relative stenosis, the anteroposterior diameter of the
canal being measured from the most prominent vertebral osteophytes to the posterior laminar line. The considerable variation in landmarks of the spondylotic
spine made interpretation of the measurements vulnerable to effects of changes in projection and posture.
Myelographic evidence of abnormal widening of the
spinal cord to 2.5 cm was related to pathologic swelling

Table 2 . Results of Motor Examination of Patients with Partial or
Complete Deficits According to the Type of Canal Narrowing^

Group
Patients with absolute narrowing
of the canal (7)
Patients with relative narrowing
of the canal (16)
Total group

At
admission

At 3
days

4.9

4.0

8.3

8.5

7.2

6.0
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Table 3. Results of Motor Examination of 16 Surgically and
Nonsurglcally-Trealed Patients with Partial Neurologic Deficits
Group
patients with narrow canals
Surgically treated (5)
»
Nonsurgical treated (11)
Total group (16)

At
admission
8.0
10.7
8.8

At 3
days

At6
weeks

8.2
10.5
9.5

10.2
13.9
11.7

caused by trauma, including intramedullary hemorrhage and edema (Figures 2 and 3). Clinically, evidence
of myelopathy was most severe for patients with absolute congenitally narrow canals, as compared with those
with relatively narrow canals with superimposed developmental changes.
The majority of patients were injured in falls (Table
4). The estimated neurologic levels of injury were: four
at C3-4, nine at C4-5, nine at C5-6, and one at C6-1
(Xable 5). Myelographic data for the 23 patients showed
that only four (17%) of the 23 patients had a complete
block. Eleven (48%) had no block, and eight (35%) had
a partial block (Table 1). In addition, myelographic evidence of swelling of the cord was seen for 15 (65%)
cases, 10 of which had relatively narrow canals with
spondylosis. No finding suggestive of an anteriorly situated disc was encountered. Plain films and myelograms
at C3-4, C4-5, and C5-6 of the 16 patients with relative
narrowing of the canal and spondylosis demonstrated
numerous levels of ridging. The maximal cord swelling
that occurred at or below the highest level of radiographic change was possibly related to greater mobility
of the vertebral segments above the area of spondylosis.

The greatest neurologic deficit was seen for the seven
patients in the group with absolute narrowing. At admission three (42%) had evidence of partial cord lesions,
and four—complete. Of the 16 patients in the group
with relative narrowing of the canal and spondylosis, 12
(72%) had partial cord lesions, and four—complete.
In both groups, patients who improved neurologically
within 48 hours of admission showed the greatest degree
of eventual recovery. Rapid, intermediate, and no improvement were defined in tenns of the degree of motor
or sensory recovery that occurred within 48 hours of injury. Of the 23 patients, eight showed rapid improvement, seven showed intermediate improvement, and
eight with total lesions at admission were unchanged
(Tables 2 and 6).
The neurologic parameters included an evaluation of
long tract signs, plantar responses, deep tendon reflexes,
and evidence offiaccidityand spasticity, as well as signs
of bowel and bladder dysfunction. At six weeks, in the
combined groups, long tract signs with spastic paralysis
were found in 10/23 instances. Nine patients showed
evidence offlaccidparalysis, and the remaining patients
had unilateral spasticity. With regard to bowel and
bladder function, 19/23 (78.2%) were incontinent at admission, and the number had declined to 17/23 (60%)
by six weeks.
Of the five deaths, only one occurred in the group of
five surgically treated patients.
The operations performed were three anterior Cloward fusions at one or two interspaces and two laminectomies from C2-7 (Table 7). Of the five patients undergoing surgery, all had significant neurologic defects.
SP9NDYLOCHONDRQSIS OF THE CERVICAL SPINE

NPRflAl,
Fig 1 . Variations of the splnat canals of 100 cervical spines studied by Arnold.1. In A, the ventrodorsal diameter of the spinal cord at the maximum cervical enlargement averages 0.8 cm. The
average canal measures 1.4 cm In the same diameter. The total normal and abnormal ranges
are illustrated \n the remaining drawings. The horizontal lines illustrate the relations between the
posterior, supenor border of the articular facets
and the leading inferior surface of the lamina and
base of the spinous process. In the presence of a
narrow canal, the laminar arch is frequently shah
'low, and the incised line will pass through the
posterior tips of the facets and the base of the la
rmna. The lateral view (see Figure 2A) illustrates
.tins finding and ts helpful in establishing the presence of stenosis Variations in the height of the
Pedicle are also reflected by changes in the dorsoventral diameter of the spinal canal.
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Ftg 2. Roentgenograph^ studies of a 63-yeaf.
old man who sustained a hyperextension injurC
to the spina! cord when he fell from a ladder
He showed evidence of severe central cord Injury
and a C 4 - 5 neurologic level of involvement
Only^minimal leg movements and positional
sense were retained. The presence of posterior
column function was confirmed by somatosensory evoked cortical potentials. Plain cervical
spinalfilms(A) show spondytotic changes at C4
C5, and C 6 , with minimal posterior osteophytes. However, the posterior margins of the
facets closely approximate the base of the spj.
nous process and lamina at all levels (arrow),
suggesting an underlying stenosis. In the myelo^
gram (B), the spinal cord is widened at the C4~
5 level (arrows) to a diameter of 2.5 cm. The
ventrodorsal diameter of the spinal canal in A
averages 1.3 cm. After anterior cervical decompression and fusion at C 4 - 5 , there was no
change in the patient's cMcal status. At hlbwup five days after surgery, evoked potentials
showed some increase in amplitude. The pa*
tient subsequently died of sepsis and renal failure.

Four had partial cord injuries, and one had completed
cord injury. Postoperatively, one patient died of renal
failure and sepsis. Neurologicaily, two improved and
two remained unchanged (Figures 2 and 3).
DISCUSSION
The value of surgical decompression and fusion in
aiding recovery remains conjectural. For patients with
presumed instability, early rehabilitation is facilitated
by fusion. While the information derived from a study
of this small number of patients has no statistical value,
the improvement in the neurologic status of two of the
five patients operated upon cannot be disregarded. The
spontaneous improvement in the conditions of the patients not operated upon reflects the importance of cautious delay to permit vital signs to stabilize and to allow
the effects of corticosteroids to become apparent. The
use of afirm,molded cervical support and tong traction
is mandatory until evidence of stability has been confirmed and while the effects of medical management are
being assessed. As Table 3 indicates, for this small
group, there was no significant difference between the
neurologic recovery of patients not operated upon and

that of patients treated with a decompressive procedure
by either approach.
No particular steroid schedule was superior to any of
the others in so far as the degree of recovery was concerned. Variations in the time interval between injury,
admission, and institution of steroid treatment made no
difference.
Throughout all phases of recovery, patients with relative narrowing of the canal and spondylosis had greater
improvement in neurologic status, with twice the quant i s e d motor ability of patients with absolute stenosis.
Patients with the lowest anteroposterior diameter of
the canal suffered the greatest degree of trauma to the
spinal cord because of the absence of available space.
Since hyperextension results in maximal narrowing of
the spinal canal, all margins of safety are abruptly depleted with consequent crushing of the cord.
The spinal columns in older patients with spondylosis
and relative narrowing are less mobile than those of
younger patients. The less mobile column would be
more resistant to hyperextension and olisthesis, factors
which contribute to further narrowing of the anteroposterior diameter of the spinal canal. Such individuals re-
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Fig 3. Roentgenographs studies of a 79year-old woman who sustained an acute hyperextension Injury with severe central cord
trauma. The patient had no hand function,
minimal bilateral leg movements, and preservation of positional sense. A. In the lateral
exposure, degenerative changes are minimat. However, the anteroposterior diameter
of the spinal canal in the mid- and lower cervical area averages only 1.3 cm. Notice that
the base of the spinous process as it joins
the leading margin of the lamina is In close
approximation to the projections of the articular facets. B. In the myelogram, the spinal
cord is slightly widened to 2 cm in the lower
and midcervlcal areas. The lateral gutters
remain patent. The patient was not treated
surgically and showed no improvement in
condition.

main unusually susceptible to cord injury because of
various intrusions into the spinal canal caused by infolded yellow ligaments and hypcrtrophied arthrotic
joints and lamina. The abnonnal movements of the vertebral bodies above and below portions of the spine
fused by spondylarthrosis add to destruction of the
cord.
Many authors have constructed tables of the dimensions of the normal spinal canal on the basis of findings
in cervical spinal roentgenograms of living subjects and
cadavers. The result has been considerable variation in
the measurements obtained.»-**.*•"••» Arnold's1 data
demonstrated an average C5 anteroposterior diameter
of 14 mm, the values ranging from 10 to 18 mm (see
Figure 1). Hinck7 evaluated roentgenograms of children: the measurements at C3-5 were from 14.8 mm to
p.l mm. When the 18-year-olds were considered as
adults, the adults' canal at C3-4 and C4-5 measured
F'7.3 mm and 16.7 mm, respectively* From age 3 to 18,
jwiere had been an increase in the anteroposterior diameter of the canal of less than 3.3 mm. Wolfe et al'° found
l& average diameter of 17 mm, with a range of 12-20
. Patients with an anteroposterior diameter of 10
or less had symptoms of cervical spondylotic myopathy. Normaiand abnormal values must be related
clinical findings in order to be significant, empha-

sizing the basic defect in measurements where the landmarks are obscure at best. Under no circumstances
should such data replace a most critical and thoroughgoing neurologic evaluation as the basis for proper
management.
Spinal stenosis associated with the narrowed anteroposterior diameter of the canal is rarely accompanied by
a concomitant decrease in the size of the neural foramens.7"* The nerve root in a normal foramen is usually
displaced, rather than compressfed, and surgical decompression by laminectomy for these patients does not require extensive foramenotomy.
Myelography shows evidence of changes in the internal dimensions of the spinal canal caused by thickened
Table 4. Causes of Injuries to Patients with Absolute Narrowing of
the Canal or with Relative Narrowing of the Canal with Spondylosis

Group
Absolute narrowing
{7 patients)
Relative narrowing with
spondylosis 0 6 patients)
Total
(23 patients)

Fails

Sports
accidents

accidents

Motorcycle
accidents

5

0

f

1

11

3

2

0

16

3

3

1

Auto
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Table 6. Neurologic Levels of Injury for Patients with Absolute
Narrowing of the Canal Versus Patients with Relative Narrowing of
the Canals with Spondylosis
Group
Absolute narrowing of
the canal
Relative narrowing of
the canal with
spondylosis
%
Total

C3-4

C4-5

C5-6

C6~7

2

4

1

2

5

8

1

4

9

9

t

Total

0

7
16

ligamenta flava and lamina, hypertrophied posterior
facets, and, often, spurs insufficiently calcified to be recognized on plain films.
During myelography of patients with cervical spinal
stenosis, there is delayed movement of iophendylate
into narrowed lateral gutters, with poor filling of deformed axillary pouches, varying degrees of block, and
a widened cord with scant subarachnoid space (Figures
2 and 3).3-5
Widening of the cord similar to that of patients, with
spinal stenosis may be found in many pathologic states.
Robertson" described myelographic studies of two patients with spinal cord necrosis and wide spinal cords resembling intramedullary tumors. Similar myelographic
changes can be seen in patients with central disc herniations, spondylosis, arterial thrombosis, demyelinating disease, syringomyelia, hydromyelia, abscess, and'
arteriovenous malformations. A good lateral roentgenogram aids in the differential diagnosis.
The significance of soft-tissue investments of the
dural sac can be dealt with both in static and biodynamic terms. These investments include the yellow and
the posterior longitudinal ligaments, the epidural fat,
and the blood vessels. Arnold1 cited the following data
based on studies of cadavers: the average diameters of
the canals measured 1.4-2.5 cm, the cords measured 0.8
by 1.3 cm, and the soft tissues measured 3 mm, leaving
a reserve of space of 3 mm (see Figure 1). The ligamentum flavum could bulge inward by 4-6 mm in extension and. could increase to 6-8 mm in thickness.
In an autopsy study of 42 cadavers, Brieg3 demonstrated
that the spinal cord slides 2-3 mm and adapts itself to
the length of the canal. In flexion, it elongates, and in
Table 6. Degrees of Resolution for Patients with Absolute
Narrowing of the Canals as Compared to Those with Relative
Narrowing of the Canal and Spondylosis (48 Hours After
Admission)

Group
Absolute narrowing of
the canal (7 patients)
Relative narrowing of
the canal (16 patients)
Totals
(23 patients)

Rapid
change

No
inter- change/
mediate
stow
change change

Total

2-

1#

4"

7*

6°

6*

4*

16#

8*

7*

8°

23*

extension, it shortens and thickens in cross-sectional diameter. In extension, the posterior portion of the cord
exhibits gjeater relative shortening with respect to the
anterior portion. In eight of 11 patients with spondylosis
studied in full extension, the cord appeared to be deeply
grooved posteriorly by the bulging of the ligamentum
flavum. With neck flexion, the cord widened and there
was ventral ridging. In extension, ridging, discal intrusion, and infolding of the ligamentum flavum would
contribute to cord compression, as well as to ischemia.
Such changes can be devastating for patients with narrow canals, in whom an epidural fat cushion is minimal
or absent.
On the basis of studies of 21 cadavers of persons aged
41-96, Waltz19 found that the transverse area of the spinal canal from C3-4 to C7-T1 was smaller in extension
(1.9 cm) than in flexion (2.2 cm). The average transverse area was diminished by 15% in extension. In extension, the annulus fibrosis bulged posteriorly into the
canal to cause a 14-16% reduction in the transverse diameter. In addition, the shortened cord was 7-19%
thicker, emphasizing its unique vulnerability in this posture. Altogether, the vertebral structures in flexion and
in extension showed a relative shortening of the anterior
margins of the spinal canal during hyperflexion of 3%.
A 25% shortening of the posterior structures occurred
during hyperextension. Hyperextension resulted in a
25% reduction in the size of the foramina. Since flexion
is limited by the approximation of the chin to the sternum, an automatic check exists in this position.
Where available space is concerned, the stenotic canal has a reduced, if not absent, margin of safety, rendering the cord maximally susceptible to minimal
trauma, especially during hyperextension.1,5
Moiel10 described two patients with cervical hyperextension injuries without evidence of fracture or dislocation. The myelopathy was consistent with a central
cord syndrome. Both patients were immediately made
quadriplegic. Results of the tomograms were normal.
Myelograms showed a widened cord consistent with
cord concussion and contusion. The absence of fracture
and subluxation was explained as a "recoil" phenomenon wherein temporary subluxation causing injury was
followed by spontaneous reduction.
Taylor1*-17 documented hyperextension cord injury of
patients at autopsy, showing ruptured anterior longitudinal ligaments in the presence of normal spinal films.
Pathologically, contused cord with or without hematomyelia was found with or without the presence of a widened cord observed by myelography (see Figure 3).
Ohwada11 studied 12 patients, with an average age of
30 years, who had cervical stenosis and myelopathy and
in whom a widened spinal cord resembling an intramedullary tumor was evident by myelography. Computerized and transverse axial tomography showed maidevelopment of the neural arches resulting in flattening
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Table 7. Neurologic Deficits and Operative Procedures tor Patients with Absolute Narrowing and with Relative Narrowing of the Canals
with Spondylosis
t
Group

Part/a/
deffcft

7
18
23

12(75%)
15(65%)

3(43%)

Complete
deficit

III

Absolute narrowing of the canal
Relative narrowing of the canal with spondylosis
Totals

Number of
patients

Surgical
treatment*
and anterior
fusion

Laminectomy
and fusion

2
1
3

1
1
2

• With partial deficit- only •

af the spinal canal in the transverse plane (see Figures 2
and 3).
In support of OhwadaV1 findings, Epstein et al5 cited
results for six cases. Two of these patients had hyperextension injuries with acute myelopathy, one demonstrating hematomyelia at operation. On the basis of
plain lateral roentgenograms, Ohwada11 found that the
neural arches were hidden behind the articular processes, making the diagnosis of stenosis indicated by such
films possible (see Figure I). In his 12 cases, the diagnosis of narrowed canal syndrome was made using four
criteria: (1) a small anteroposterior diameter of the caEial; (2) absence of spondylosis; (3) maldevelopment or
Battening of the neural arches; and (4) presence of a
motor, dominant cervical myelopathy. The patients'
conditions improved symptomatically after laminar decompression had been done.
Schneider14,15 observed a group of patients who had
preservation of light touch and vibratory sensation after
receiving cervical cord injuries with myelographic evidence of widening of the cord. The patients' neurologic
feficit showed rapid and spontaneous resolution within
M hours after injury. Laminectomy often made the condition worse. Schneider thought that the patients with
central cord injuries had a good prognosis for recovery
because of the reversibility of the effects of concussion,
contusion, and cord swelling. Conservative management was used, unless myelographic block or radiographic bony impingement on the canal was demonstrated. When there was spontaneous improvement, the
use of aggressive measures was delayed. These principals remain a noteworthy guide for the management of
patients with spinal stenosis without fracture or dislocation.
CONCLUSIONS

Patients with cervical spinal stenosis are uniquely
vulnerable to hyperextension injuries of the spinal cord.
Trauma to the cord is often manifested by evidence of
central cord injury and a motor, dominant myelopathy.
Treatment consists of immobilization and the use of steroids with proper respiratory, biochemical, and metabolic support. Early improvement in the neurologic
status is an excellent prognostic sign and makes conservative care mandatory. Results of appropriate plain

films and myelography soon after admission establish
criteria for surgical intervention, depending on the patient's neurologic status. The presence of a myelographic block and a failing or poorly sustained neurologic status in five of our most seriously injured patients
justified surgical decompression by either an anterior or
posterior approach.
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A Review of the Pathophysiology of
Cervical Spondylotic Myelopathy With
Insights for Potential Novel Mechanisms
Drawn From Traumatic Spinal
Cord Injury
Michael 6. Fehlings, MD, PhD, FRCSC, and Ghassan Skat MD, FRCSC

Cervical myelopathy is the most serious complication of
cervical spondylosis and is the most common acquired
cause of spinal cord dysfunction. This disorder was originally described by Stookey in 1928 and was attributed
to compression of the cord by cartilaginous nodules of
degenerated disc material/4 The definition of cervical
spondylotic myelopathy (CSM) as a distinct clinical entity began to evolve in 1956 when Clarke and Robinson
distinguished this condition from cervical myelopathy
caused by acute disc prolapse.19 The pathophysiology of
CSM has not been fully elucidated and is of particular
relevance, given the failure in some patients of the condition to respond to appropriate medical and surgical therapy.
The first part of this review will examine the neuropathologic course of CSM with an emphasis on features
that provide potential insight into underlying mechanisms (Table 1). Next, the pathophysiology of CSM will
be discussed in the context of static and dynamic mechanical factors and ischemia (Table 2). The third part of
this review will examine selected cellular and molecular
mechanisms of traumatic spinal cord injury including
glutamatergic toxicity, free radical- and cationicmediated cell injury, and apoptosis, all of which may be
of relevance to the pathophysiology of CSM (Table 3).
•

Neuropathology Course of Cervical
Spondylotic Myelopathy
Key Pathologic Features of Cervical
Spondylotic Myelopathy

The pathologic features of CSM are summarized in
Table 1. Histologic analysis of the spinal cord of patients with CSM characteristically shows that the central gray and medial portions of the myelinated long
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tracts are affected most severely and show evidence of
cystic cavitation, gliosis, and demyelination.38,40 Wallerian degeneration of the posterior columns and posterolateral tracts occurs cephalad to the site of compression. Anterior horn cell dropout occurs at the site
of compression, and the corticospinal tracts undergo
degeneration, with loss of myelin staining caudal to
the site of compression.48,15
Temporal Evolution of Pathologic Changes
Ogino et al conducted a clinicopatbologic study in
which nine patients with CSM were observed clinically,
radiographically, and, at time of death, neuropathotogically. The severity of pathologic changes in the cord correlated well with the extent of spinal cord compression,
measured by the anteroposterior compression ratio. The
posterolateral white matter fibers, including the lateral
corticospinal tracts, were most susceptible to minor degrees of compression. In contrast, anterior horn cell loss
and localized infarction of the gray matter was associated with more severe degrees of compression. With an
anteroposterior compression ratio of less than 20%, extensive infarction of all the gray matter occurred. Although the lateral white matter tracts were involved in
cases of severe compression, the anterior columns were
remarkably resistant to degeneration, a finding consistent with other clinical and experimental reports.9 Degeneration of the dorsal columns, particularly medially,
was seen only in cases of severe compression. The pathologic changes showed an excellent correlation with clinical neurologic findings. The four patients in this series
with mild to moderate cord compression exhibited
mainly long-tract signs in /he lower extremities consistent with early involvement of the corticospinal tracts.
Four patients with severe cord compression had spastic
quadriparesis and showed marked disability of the hands
andfingersaccompanied by severe intrinsic hand muscle
wasting, caused by a combination of corticospinal rract
degeneration and anterior horn cell loss.
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Table 1. Pathology of Cervical Spondylotic Myelopathy
Central gray and medial white matter most severely affected
Wallerian degeneration of posterior columns cephalad to site of compression and of corticospinal tracts caudal to site of compression
Relative sparing of anterior columns
Progression of pathological changes varies with severity of compression
Lateral corticospinal tracts most vulnerable to compression
Anterior horn cell loss or localized infarction of gray matter associated with severe compression
Extensive infarction of gray and white matter associated with anterior/posterior compression ratios of <20%

Role of Axial Tension on Ischemia and

Axonal Degeneration
Breig et ai 14 observed that the anterior columns and the
subpial axons in the dorsal columns were relatively preserved, even in advanced cases of CSM. The blood supply of the subpial portion of the dorsal columns was
thought to be resistant to ventral compression, because
the posterior spinal arteries "zigzag" and are not put
under tension when the cord elongates in cervical flexion. Similarly, the arteries supplying the anterior columns run in an anteroposterior direction so that the
stresses that flatten the cord do not narrow them. In
contrast, the vascular supply of the gray matter and medial white matter arises from transverse perforating vessels that arborize from the anterior sulcal arterial system.
Accordingly, Breig et al concluded that the most probable cause of gray matter degeneration and medial white
matter degeneration was mechanical distortion and occlusion of the transverse penetrating vessels of the spinal
cord arising from the anterior sulcal arteries. In particular, the medial aspect of the dorsal columns and lateral
corticospinal tracts were vulnerable to injury from ischemia and axial tension. These pathologic observations,
Table 2. Pathophysiology of Cervical
Spondylotic Myelopathy
Mechanical factors
Static
Canal stenosis
Severity of spinal cord compression
Dynamic
Changes in flexion
In flexion, the spinal cord lengthens causing increased tension
on dorsal fiber tracts
Changes in extension
Role of ischemia
Pathological evidence
Pathological changes in cord predominantly in the distribution of
anterior spinal artery
Hyalinization and thickening of walls of anterior spinal artery and
perforating vessels
Possible role of periradicular fibrosis
Experimental evidence
Compression of cord with Fogerty balloon catheter causes ischemia due to compression/stretching of transversely placed Intramedullary vessels
Microangiographic, autoradiographic/ and hydrogen clearance evidence of ischemia due to compression
Pathophysiological effects of ischemia are additive with compression

Table 3. Mechanisms of Traumatic Spinal Cord Injury of
Potential Relevance to Cervical Spondylotic Myelopathy
Mechanical factors (static/dynamic)

Ischemia
Free-radical mediated cell injury
Cation-mediated injury (Na + /Ca + + )
Linked to protease activation (calpain)
Glutamatergic cell injury
lonotropic glutamate receptors
NMDA (anterior horn cell injury)
AMPA/katnate (white matter Injury)
Metabotroprc receptors (coupled to 6 proteins)
Group 1 mGluRs (linked to rises in C a + * through PLC)
Group 2,3 mGluRs (negatively coupled to cAMP)
Apoptosis (programmed cell death)
Proapoptotlc genes: Box, Bcl-xS, c-fosr c-jun, p75N6FR, and ICE-like
proteases
Genes that block apoptosis: Bcl-2 and Bcl-xL

which suggest a significant role for ischemia, have been
validated in experimental models discussed later.
•

Pathophysiology oif Cervical Spondylotic Myelopathy
Static Mechanical Factors

Spinal Canal Size. The presenoe of cervical spondylosis
alone does not usually result in myelopathy. Normally,
there is ample tolerance of the spinal cord to encroachment of spondylosis, and the development of myelopathy
is more likely to occur in patients with a developmentally
narrow spinal canal. The normal cervical canal diameter
from C3 to C7 in whites is 17-18 mm, 17,37 with slight
variation between sexes. It is noteworthy, however, that
the normal dimensions of the cervical canal are considerably smaller in Asians.42
Arnold5 demonstrated a high correlation between
sagittal diameter of the cervical spinal canal in cervical
spondylosis and the development of myelopathy. A sagittal diameter of 12 mm or less was a critical factor in the
development of cervical spondylotic myelopathy. Similarly, Adams and Logue1 identified three groups of patients with spondylosis, and in group 3 (with cervical
myelopathy), the sagittal diameter was 11.8 mm (range,
9-IS mm).
The cervical cord varies little ^n size from CI to C7,
measuring approximately 10 mm in diameter (range,
8.5-11.5 mm).56 Accordingly, in a normally sized cervical spinal canal, up to two thirds of the canal is unoccupied by the spinal cord from CI to C3, compared with
one quarter from C4 to C7. Thus, the normal spinal
canal has sufficient space to accommodate the development of spondylotic changes without cord compression,
and CSM is more likely to develop in a congenitaily narrowed cervical canal, where additional narrowing by
spondylotic changes results in spinal cord compression.35
Progressive Cervical Spondylosis. Although a decreased
sagittal diameter is essentia! to the development of CSM,
progressive cervical spondylotic changes are clearly also
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a key feature in the pathogenesis of this disorder. These
changes, which can include disc degeneration and osteophytosis anteriorly, uncovertebral joint hyperostosis anterolaterally, and facet hypertrophy and ligamentum flavum buckling posteriorly, result in circumferential
narrowing of the cervical canal.55
Burrows17 studied the sagittal diameter of the spinal
canal in cervical spondylosis radiographically and noted
three distinct types of degenerative encroachment in the
cervical spinal caAal. Thefirsttype involved obliteration
of the neuroforamens by osteophyric overgrowth at the
posterolateral margin of the vertebral body. The second
type involved encroachment on the neural canal of an
osteophytic spur or "bar" across the back of the degenerated disc, producing an impression on the spinal cord
by direct compression. The third encroachment was
caused by degeneration, hypertrophy, and buckling of
the ligamentum flavum. Burrows concluded that the initial size of the canal was a key underlying factor in the
eventual development of cervical spondylotic myelopathy. Similar conclusions were reached by Murone51 in a
study of 51 Japanese men.
Edwards and LaRocca24 measured the developmental
sagittal diameter and the spondylotic sagittal diameter in
patients with symptomatic and refractory cervical spondylosis. The difference between the two measurements
was termed the spondylosis index and represented the
degree of spondylotic narrowing for each cervical segment. It was found that patients with preexisting narrowed cervical canals became symptomatic at an index
of 2 mm versus 3.45 mm in the patients with normal
cervical dimensions. The patients with more severe
symptoms of myelopathy had the narrowest sagittal diameters. C5-C6 had the greatest frequency and extent of
involvement in both groups. These investigators suggested the existence of a premyelopathic group of patients with midcervical sagittal diameters between 10
mm and 13 mm. In this group, spondylotic narrowing of
approximately 2 mm would result in CSM. In contrast,
patients with sagittal diameters of 17 mm or more were
thought to be at low risk for the development of CSM.
Ball et al* examined genetic influences on the development of spondylotic changes in twins and found a
statistically significant concordance of radiologic features in monozygous and, to a lesser extent, dizygotic
twin pairs. Patients older than 50 years with normal cervical spine radiographs were significantly more likely to
have a sibling with normal or only mildly abnormal radiographs.
Severity of Spinal Cord Compression. There is evidence that
symptoms of cord compression appear after the cord has
been reduced in size by 30% or to a transverse area of
less than 60 mm".5' Moreover, Ogino et al observed that
the severity of pathologic changes in the spine of patients
with CSM correlated significantly with the exrent of
compression.'3 Similar morphometric studies were per-

formed by Fujiwara et al using radiographic techniques
including computed tomographic myelography.29 The
transverse area of the spinal cord was measured to determine the severity of cervical cord compression and was
related to prognosis with surgical intervention. Although
the transverse area did not correlate well with the preoperative neurologic status, rhis measurement was found to
be the most significant factor in determining the response
to surgery. In patients with a transverse area greater than
30 mm2, functional recovery after decompression was
favorable. In contrast, there was a poor response to surgery when the transverse area was less than 30 mm2.
Thus, 30 mm2 proved to be the critical size of area compression, below which the cervical spinal cord could
not recover.
Dynamic Mechanical Factors

It is intuitive that the extent of mechanical compression
of the spinal cord could be significantly influenced by
movement of the cervical spine. As reviewed by White
and Panjabi,70 several investigators have observed that
the functional diameter of the cervical spinal canal may
be reduced to a critical level or less with flexion and extension.
In flexion, the spinal cord must lengthen or take a
more anterior path in the canal, resulting in axial tension
and, potentially, ischemia.14 In the presence of anterior
osteophytes, the spinal cord can be stretched over rhe
anterior bars.54 Chronic changes have been documented
at the sites of these areas of compression in autopsy studies.14
As the neck extends, the ligamentum flavum buckles
inward,55 which results in the greatest decrease in crosssectional area of the cervical canal. Moreover, in extension, the spinal cord shortens, and its cross-sectional area
increases.14 The combination of a maximum reduction
in canal area along with an increase in spinal cord transverse area, places the cord at significant risk in extension
in CSM. A pincer effect is seen in this condition, in which
the spinal cord is compressed in extension between the
posteroinferior margin of one vertebral body and the
lamina or ligamentum flavum of the next caudal level.58'70'72
Role of Ischemia

There is considerable evidence to indicate that interruption of the vascular supply to the spinal cord, caused by
several factors, may be a significant component in the
origin and pathophysiology of CSM. Histopathologic
observations support the concept of ischemic injury to
gray matter and medial white matter tracts in patients
with CSM. l4 ' 40 Spinal cord ischemia as a potential mechanism in the pathophysiology of CSM wasfirstproposed
by Brain in 19488'12 and later supported by Mair and
Druckman*48 who observed hyalinization and thickening of the walls of the anterior spinal artery and the
parenchymal arterioles: by Taylor.oS who suggested that
radicular arteries to the cervical spinal cord were inter-
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rupted by fibrosis in the intervertebral foramina; and by
Nurick52 in his classic treatise.
Several experimental observations support the vascular hypothesis of CSM. For example, several investigators have reported evidence of ischemia in animal models
of CSM based on microangiography,38 autoradiography,33 and hydrogen clearance.4 In other studies, investigators have examined the additive effects of ischemia
and compression on spinal cord dysfunction and disease.
Gooding et al32 published an experimental study in dogs
in which the combined effects of anterior spinal cord
compression and ligation of segmental arteries was examined. Ischemia clearly exacerbated the pathologic effects of compression on the spinal cord. Moreover, the
corticospinal tracts were the most vulnerable to injury, a
finding that correlates well with clinicopathologic observations in patients with CSM.53 Similarly, Shimomura*1
studied the effect of ischemia in conjunction with compression of the cervical cord in dogs and demonstrated
that obstruction of the peripial arterial plexus could
cause intramedullary cavitation.
Doppman et al23 studied compression of the spinal
cord using a Fogerty balloon catheter to compress the
anterior, posterior, and lateral cord. Anterior compression compromises perfusion through the transverse arterioles arising from the anterior sulcal arteries. When the
cord is compressed posteriorly, perfusion is reduced to
the intramedullary branches in the central gray matter.
Accordingly, stretching of the cord laterally or flattening
of the cord causes interruption of the transversely placed
intramedullary arteries by elongation and narrowing,
with inadequate perfusion of the gray matter in adjacent
lateral columns.
There is evidence that oligodendroglia may be particularly vulnerable to ischemic injury and that this mechanism may particularly account for the demyelination
that occurs in chronic CSM.31 This observation is of
particular relevance, given more recent evidence that oligodendroglia undergo delayed programmed cell death
or apoptosis after traumatic spinal cord injury.62 Accordingly, the effects of chronic ischemia may account
for the observation that demyelination of the corticospinal tracts is one of thefirstpathologic changes in CSM.53
•

Novel Mechanisms of Spinal Cord Injury of Potential
Significance in Cervical Spondylotic Myelopathy

The pathophysiology of spinal cord injury involves a
primary mechanical injury caused by dynamic and static
forces including compression, shear, and distraction followed by a secondary injury involving several mechanisms including ischemia, glutamatergic toxicity, free
radical activation, peroxidative injury to cell membranes, and programmed cell death or apopto^2,3,21,22,26.27,35,44.67.74 T h e f e a f e s u ffi c i e n t histopathologic and pathophysiologic similarities between
cervical spondylotic myelopathy and traumatic spinal
cord injury15 to warrant a brief discussion of novel

mechanisms of traumatic central nervous system (CNS)
injury that may be of relevance in CSM.
Glutamatergic Toxicity

Excitotoxicity caused by increases in extracellular levels
of glutamate has been proposed as a mechanism of neuronal death in acute and chronic neurologic diseases including stroke, traumatic CNS injury, and prolonged seizure activity.8,25 The potential sources of glutamate
include neurons, the terminals of descending and ascending tracts, and glia.3,66 As summarized in Table 3, glutamate receptors are classified into those that gate entry of
N a + and Ca + * (ionotropicj3 and those coupled to
guanosine triphosphate-binding proteins and secondary
messenger systems (metabotropic).20 Ionotropic receptors are further sub classified into those gated by a-amino-3-hydroxy-5-methyl-4-isoxazplepropionate
(AMPA), kainate, and N-methyl-D-aspartate (NMDA).
In the spinal cord, NMDA receptors are expressed in
gray matter, whereas AMPA/kainate receptors are
present in white and gray matter.3
Increasing evidence suggests that impairment of intracellular energy metabolism increases neuronal vulnerability to glutamate which, even when present at physiologic concentrations, can damage neurons. 18 This
mechanism of slow excitotoxicity may be involved in
neuronal death in chronic neurodegenerative diseases
such as the mitochondrial encephalomyopathies, Huntington's disease, spinocerebellar degeneration syndromes, motor neuron diseases such as amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (ALS), and accordingly, CSM. 28,34 In
addition, there is increasing evidence that blocking of
AMPA/kainate receptors by compounds such as 2,3dihydroxy-6-nitro-7-sulfamyol-benzo(F)quinoxaline
may be of therapeutic value in traumatic spinal cord
axonal injury.3'73,74 This is of particular importance,
given the absence of NMDA receptors in spinal cord
white matter.3
Free Radical-Mediated Cell Injury
There is considerable evidence to support a role for free
radical and lipid peroxidation reactions in the patho-.
physiology of traumatic and ischemic injury to the
CNS.13 Moreover, the use of antioxidants and free radical scavengers in the treatment of experimental and clinical CNS trauma and ischemia has provided convincing
support for the involvement of oxygen radicals and lipid
peroxidation in these conditions. The most clinically
relevant example of this is the improvement, albeit modest, in neurologic function with high-dose methylprednisolone after traumatic spinal cord injury.11,10
The discovery of mutations in the human SOD1 gene
encoding copper-zinc superoxide dismutase (Cu,Zn
SOD) in patients with familial ALS strongly implicates
free radical-mediated cell injury in this condition.39 In
particular, there is evidence that familial ALS mutations
cause a functional enhancement in Cu,Zn SOD that promotes the generation of deleterious oxygen radicals/4
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This may render motor neurons sensitive to the excitotoxic effects of glutamate and is further supported by
evidence that riluzole, a glutamate antagonist, has therapeutic efficacy in human ALS.7 These studies suggest the
possibility that the pathophysiology of CSM, which is
also characterized by delayed anterior horn cell loss, may
partially involve free radical-mediated cell injury.
Cationh-Mediated Cell Injury
Traumatic or ischemic injury to the CNS, including
white matter, is associated with rapid energy depletion,
failure of the Na+-K+-adenosine triphosphatase pump,
and accumulation of axonal Na4" through noninactivating Na + channels.2'2*'65 In certain pathologic states
characterized by membrane depolarization, in particular
ischemia, reverse Na+-Ca2"f exchange and axonal Ca 2+
overload occurs.65 Some intracellular Ca 2+ entry may
also occur directly through Na + channels.59 The abnormal increases in intracellular Ca 2+ activate several Ca 2+ dependent enzymes including calpain, phospholipases,
and protein kinase C, resulting in cytoskeletal injury. 43,63 Although glia are relatively resistant to ischemia,
oligodendrocytes and the myelin sheath may be damaged
by glutamate released by reverse Na+-glutamate transport65 or alternatively by calcium entry through AMPA/
kainate receptors,3 Given that CSM involves both compressive and ischemic injury, it is possible that cationmediated cell injury plays a role in the pathophysiology
of this condition, in particular in the destruction of myelinated tracts.
Apoptosis
Apoptosis or programmed cell death is a distinct form of
controlled cellular degeneration that is distinguished
from necrosis by the absence of inflammation, interimcleosomal cleavage of DNA, and regulation by specific
genes.46 In the CNS, genes have been identified that promote apoptosis: Bax, Bcl-xS, c-/bs, c-jun, p75NGFR,
and ICE-like proteases;71'46 or block apoptosis: Bcl-2
and Bcl-xL.30 Apoptosis serves several physiologic functions, such as the control of cell numbers during development, the maintenance of tissue homeostasis, and the
deletion of abnormal cells.16 Apoptosis of neurons and
glia has been reported after spinal cord injury62'45,21 and
ischemia41'47 and in certain neurodegenerative conditions associated with anterior horn cell loss, including
the hereditary form of infantile spinal muscular atrophy60 and ALS.50 It is possible that the delayed degeneration of anterior horn cells that occurs in cervical spondyiotic myelopathy may reflect the effects of apoptosis.
This is of particular relevance, given recent evidence that
pharmacologic blockers of the calcium-activated protease calpain** and inhibitors of the c-Jun N-terminal
kinase tJNK) signaling pathway can inhibit the development of apoptosis in the CNS.49

• Conclusion
In conclusion, the pathophysiology of CSM involves the
combination of static and dynamic factors and progressive ischemia. Further research is required to elucidate
more fundamental mechanisms at a cellular and molecular level including the potential roles of glutamatergic
toxicity, free radical- and cation-mediated cell injury
and delayed programmed cell death or apoptosis. Improved treatment strategies for CSM may evolve from a
more detailed understanding of pathophysiologic mechanisms.
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